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This dissertation takes a realist approach to examine landsliding in the Basilicata 
region of Italy, with specific reference to the municipality of Grassano, in order to 
understand humankind’s role in contributing to environmental hazards. It concludes 
that environmental hazards such as landslides have partiy-social causes, which are 
characteristic of the societies they affect, and any real accommodation with 
environmental hazards must involve radical social change.
The dissertation analyzes the differing explanations for environmental hazards given 
by previous schools of thought. Passing to the empirical material to be examined using 
these ideas, it describes the current pattern of landslides in Basilicata and discusses 
whether the reported landslide hazard has increased during the twentieth century. It 
then examines the physical environment of the region, and discusses the extent to 
which recent reported changes in the intensity of landslides are correlated to changes 
in the use of the land.
The example of the municipality of Grassano allows an examination of the causative 
mechanisms behind the regional trends. The dissertation examines the vulnerability of 
Grassano’s physical environment to landslides, and the social factors which have 
influenced landsliding there. It then discusses the history of landslides in the 
municipality, and the extent to which they have intensified during the twentieth 
century. Finally it questions the degree to which reported changes in the level of 
landslides in Grassano have been the result of a growing sensitivity to landslides.
The dissertation’s conclusion summarizes the work done, then evaluates the 
contribution to academic knowledge. It ends with an assessment of the viability of 
likely future approaches to reducing the landslide hazard in Basilicata.
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sources translated for this dissertation have been indicated. No attempt has been made 
to standardize quoted text, and all emphasis is as in the original quotations. A Harvard 
referencing system has been used - except for the archival material, which proved too
The text
The dissertation’s text follows the general prescriptions set out in Maney and 
Smallwood (1981), with spelling conventions following Fowler (1965). Those
complex for it to be workable.
9P re fa c e
I began this research, as I suppose most do, with nothing but a vague grasp of what my 
education should be about and what it should do for me. As I end it, I realize that it has 
become about many things - most importantly about my self-realization. This self- 
realization has been guided by my development as a professional researcher but it has, 
of course, also been much wider than that. Through my work I have come to examine, 
experience, and realize the common humanity, and common fate, that we all share. This 
experience is only new in the very personal sense that I had not grasped it with such 
clarity before. We all know it: we know it in the sensual practise of our everyday life 
- though it is only with intellectual analysis that we can clarify the experience.
My education has been directed by the clarified experience of others. An interesting 
parallel to this process was that of the writer and painter Carlo Levi, exiled to 
Basilicata fifty years before I went there. Levi, too, had the luxury of time to think, 
and suggested that Basilicata (“Lucania" as it was then known) had .a vital emblematic 
quality, from which we can learn about ourselves and our experience.
Certainly all that young man (and perhaps he was I) then experienced revealed to 
him the reality of a country unknown to him, and unknown languages, labour, 
toil, suffering, misery, and customs as well. There he came to know not only 
animals and magic, and ancient problems still unsolved, and the potency that 
withstands power, but also the pride that is ever present, a contemporaneousness 
that is inexhaustible, existence which is coexistence; the human being who is the 
locus of all contact; a motionless world of possibilities at once infinite and closed, 
the dark adolescence of centuries poised to stir and emerge, like butterflies from 
the cocoon. He learned the individual eternity of all this, the Lucania within each 
of us, the vital force that is ready to turn itself into form and life and institutions 
as it struggles with paternal, prevailing institutions which, despite their claim 
to an exclusive reality, are dead and gone. [Levi, 1982, 6-7.J
Yet the value of any emblem can only be understood with reference to its social 
significance, and I only came to begin to understand the significance of the 'Lucania" 
within me... through an analysis of the everyday Basilicata. The facts are these:
I began this research in October 1985. It has been carried out part-time, and self- 
financed (with the exception of my six months in Italy in 1988 subsidized by the 
municipality of Grassano, and one further week there in 1991 that was allowed by a 
research grant from the Open University). I was first attracted to the idea of carrying 
out research in environmental hazards, and went to the LSE to be supervised by David
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Jones and Judith Rees - Judith has now left for Hull University and her place has been 
taken by Michael Hebbert. At that time the LSE had contacts with the University of 
Basilicata, as well as two other research students in the field, Alistair Fulton and 
Gordon Mudge - so I began my research into the region’s landslides.
The first eighteen months were spent in background reading and a literature review.
My first trip to Basilicata, in April 1987, clarified my understanding of the research 
problem, and gave me contacts in Grassano. Between March and August 1988 I carried 
out my main fieldwork in Basilicata, followed by visits of two weeks in 1989, one 
week in 1991, and one week in 1992. Since 1988 I have been analyzing the data and 
writing and rewriting the dissertation.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 The research question
This dissertation examines the interaction between humankind and the environment by 
an analysis of landsliding in the Basilicata region of Southern Italy. Based on the 
appreciation that humankind has a profound and continuously increasing influence over 
environmental hazards such as landsliding, it takes as its research question the 
following: how has humankind increased the intensity of the hazard from landslides in 
Basilicata, and why has this increase been caused?
Through its analysis of Basilicata and the case study of the municipality of Grassano, 
the dissertation provides empirical material which allows a number of broader 
questions to be answered about society’s involvement in environmental hazards and the 
physical and social obstacles to a harmonious relationship with the environment.
1.2 Definition of the research problem
1.2.1 Humankind and the environment
Since the mid-1980s the environment has once again become one of the major issues 
of social concern. This dissertation aims to contribute to the geographical literature on 
the environment and so to inform the debate by contributing to what Thrift (1992,
10) described as the “geography of the environmental crisis".
1.2.2 Environm ental hazards
i
The study of environmental hazards is of great relevance to an understanding of the 
relationship between humankind and the environment. Humankind has progressively
v '
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freed itself, through the application of technology, from the environmental restraints 
which afflict other animals. But this freedom is not absolute: humankind has not 
“conquered” the environment and will always remain at least partially subject to 
environmental hazards (see N Smith, 1990). Environmental hazards demonstrate the 
fragility of humankind’s freedom from environmental constraints and the very 
practical need for humankind to remake a sustainable relationship with the 
environment which “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs” (Commonwealth Secretariat, 1990, 
1 3 2 ).
This dissertation presents evidence which shows how great is the need for that 
reformed relationship. Hazards, and the disasters which they lead to, are very 
expensive in terms of lives and property. Thompson (1982) estimated that there had 
been a total of 1,062 major global disasters in the period 1947 to 1981 - each of 
which had caused at least 100 dead or 100 injured or $2.8 million of damage at 1982 
prices. According to Burton, Kates, and White (1978) the worldwide cost of hazards in 
the 1970s was about US $40 billion a year - of which $25 billion were losses, and 
$15 billion were the costs of prevention.
In addition, the damage from hazards seems to be increasing. According to Berz 
(1990), between the 1960s and the 1980s the total economic losses from hazards 
increased by a factor of 3.3, and Wijkman and Timberlake (1984) claimed that 
between the 1960s .and the 1970s the average annual death toll from hazards increased 
six-fold. As the discussion in chapter two of this dissertation shows, the increase in 
environmental hazards has prompted the appreciation that humankind can be a 
significant cause - so the old term “natural” hazard is plainly misleading. A number 
of social causes for this increase have been suggested, and they are discussed later in 
the dissertation with reference to landslides in Basilicata.
Academic research on environmental hazards has greatly increased in volume since the 
1970s, stimulated by a run of very serious events such as the Sahel drought and the 
Seveso and Bhopal disasters, and there is now a very large literature on the subject 
(see J K Mitchell, 1990; Bryant, 1991; K Smith, 1992). As is discussed in chapter 
two, contemporary approaches to environmental hazards have been influenced by three 
ideological traditions which can be characterized, after Sandbach (1984) as:
• The conservative approach, expressed in the environmental-determinist 
literature on hazards which was the dominant paradigm for the limited research into
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environmental hazards written before the middle of the present century: that 
humankind is constrained by the environment and hazard is essentially unavoidable.
• The liberal approach, expressed in the behaviouralist approach to hazards: that 
humankind can be liberated from hazards by the management of technology.
• The radical approach, expressed in the structuralist approach to hazards: that a 
change in social institutions can reduce vulnerability to hazards.
The environmental determinist approach to hazards has been widely discredited by the 
recognition of the importance of humankind in the triggering and suppression of 
environmental hazards, but the debate on the merits of the behaviouralist approach 
compared to the structuralist approach continues. This dissertation’s research 
question allows an assessment of the validity of those approaches through its 
examination of their ability to explain the hazard from mass movement in Basilicata.
1.2.3 Mass movement and landslides
Mass movements are geomorphological processes that “involve a transfer of slope- 
forming materials from higher to lower ground, under the influence of gravity, 
without the primary assistance of a fluid transporting agent” (Brunsden, 1979,
130). Mass movements can be classified in a variety of ways depending on the purpose 
of the classification systems which have been made (Hansen, 1984a; Crozier, 1986), 
and the most significant of them are landslides. Landslides are rapid mass movements 
involving some sort of slope failure (Varnes, 1978).
Environmental research shows that landslides, like any other environmental hazards, 
can no longer be identified as “natural” phenomena in the traditional sense. This is 
because the influence of humankind has become so pervasive that environmental 
processes are increasingly modified by social factors. As Johnston (1989, 199) 
explained: “understanding the nature of environmental problems and how they might 
be solved requires much more than a scientific appreciation of environmental 
processes. It demands an understanding of how societies work, and how collective action 
within those societies is both organised and constrained.” Consequently, it is necessary 
to study both society and the environment in order to understand landslides.
Having both environmental and social causes, landslides provide a suitable focus for a 
critical examination of the two main approaches to hazards - because they allow a
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questioning of the major methodological debate in contemporary research: the 
behaviouralists’ limited concern with the social element in hazards, and the 
structuralists’ limited concern with the environmental element in hazards.
At the global scale landslides are an important hazard - despite the fact that, as D K C 
Jones (1992) recently showed, the damage they cause is often ascribed to other, 
triggering events such as storms or earthquakes. In its 1989 declaration of the 1990s 
as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction, the United Nations made 
landslides fifth in the list of major global hazards behind earthquakes, storms,
tsunamis, and floods (see K Smith, 1992). Bryant (1991) assessed the seriousness of
thirty-one environmental hazards and rated landslides as the thirteenth most 
dangerous behind: drought, tropical cyclone, regional flood, earthquake, volcano, 
extra-tropical storm, tsunami, bushfire, expansive soils, sea-level rise, icebergs, 
and dust storms. And in his analysis of major global disasters from 1947 to 1981, 
Thompson (1982) listed landslides as having provided the seventh-equal largest 
number of events (out of a total of sixteen causes of disasters - though drought was not
included): the major eight disasters and their frequencies were: floods (343),
hurricanes (211), earthquakes (161), tornados (127), snowstorms (40), 
thunderstorms (36), landslides (29), and rainstorms (29).
Landslides, according to Crozier (1986) produce a variety of personal, economic, and 
environmental costs:
• Personal costs: range from physical and emotional hurt to death. Crozier drew 
on a variety of sources to produce a list of 31 recorded landslides which had caused 50 
or more fatalities (with a total of 149,000 deaths). Twelve of these landslides had 
occurred in the years 1980 to 1983 alone, with a total of more than 2,000 deaths.
Similar data is readily available elsewhere, for example in Cooke and Doornkamp 
(1990, 107). Crozier also cited International Red Cross data which suggested that 
worldwide between 1900 and 1976 landslides killed 3,006 and injured or left 
homeless another 44,637 - but he believed this to be a considerable underestimate. K 
Smith (1992) recorded that during the early 1970s an average of nearly 600 people 
were killed a year by slope failure (of whom 90% lived in the Pacific Basin, and most 
of whose deaths were also associated with earthquakes).
• Economic costs: range from the direct costs of landslides (especially to urban 
infrastructure) and the indirect costs (entailed indirectly as a result of landslide 
damage). Losses in the USA amount to between $1 billion and $2 billion a year from all
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types of ground failure, and major losses also occur in Indonesia, China, the former- 
USSR, and Italy.
• Environmental costs: include the damage done to the managed stability of the 
land by, for example, the disruption of drainage networks.
1.2.4 The case-study area
Information on the causes and consequences of landslides in the Mediterranean Basin is 
readily available, and they are well documented as a serious problem throughout the 
area. The problem in Italy is particularly interesting, the landscape being the product 
of a long struggle between humankind and the environment: as a consequence, King 
(1987, 139) noted that “Of all European and Mediterranean countries, Italy’s rural 
landscape is the most humanized”. Italy has a total of 50,000 ha (17% of the country) 
affected by severe slope instability, and about 400 km2 of land is abandoned every 
year as a result of intense erosion - which contrasts with the 60 km2 lost every year 
to road construction since 1964 (Alexander, 1982a). The economic costs of landslides 3 
in Italy were estimated to be $1.14 billion a year in the 1970s (Arnould and Frey,
1 9 7 7 ) .
Basilicata (figure 1.1) is a region in which landslides are extensive and well recorded.
This dissertation concentrates on Basilicata because the region allows a comparison of 
past and present rates of landslide intensity: and an examination of the response to
landslides, the factors which influence the nature of that response, and of the factors
which determine the effectiveness of those responses.
The land in Basilicata is heavily degraded: it was described as “the most neglected 
region of Southern Italy” (Kayser, 1961, 5, translated); and Puglisi (1977, 97, 
translated) suggested that landslides and soil erosion are so serious and so closely 
related to the poverty of the region that “there can be neither lasting economic 
development without soil conservation, nor effective soil conservation without 
economic development”. The “scourge” of erosion and landslides, and its effect on the 
environment was described by Regione Basilicata (1987, 41-42, translated) as 
follows:
By the enormous damage which it produces, by reducing slope stability and so 
promoting landslides, accelerated erosion is a real scourge of vast areas of
Basilicata. Basilicata is in fact one of the most damaged areas of Italy, both by the
1 6
♦ Rome
100 km
♦ Naples
Figure 1.1 Basilicata
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virulence of erosion and by the extent of the area affected. The countryside which 
it produces is among the most bleak and desolate. On vast areas absolutely devoid 
of vegetation, the action of erosive processes and landslides produces a 
morphology cut by deep and narrow gulleys, ravines, humps, thin ridges, 
escarpments, and landslides eaten into by calanchi... Among the calanchi features 
are numerous paleoslides, susceptible to partial or total remobilization, and also 
recent or current landslides which are often moving - now flowing, now moving 
translationally. Everything is obliterated by an aggressive erosion which softens 
the landforms and obscures the morphology of the landslides.
Basilicata is consequently “one of the regions of Italy where landslide phenomena are 
most intense" (Almagia, 1910, 145, translated); “one of the most impoverished 
regions because of climate... landslides... and... earthquakes” (Sion, 1934, 313, 
translated). A national survey of landslides by the Movimento Federativo Democratico 
(1987) demonstrated the severity of landslides in the province of Matera (the other 
province in the region, Potenza, was not surveyed - though as the data presented in 
chapter three shows the damage there is probably even more severe). On their semi- 
qualitative index of landslide damage, Matera scored 93% of the maximum score - 
much higher than the national average figure of 67%. Of the 81 reported landslides 
which they analyzed in the province: 19% destroyed inhabited buildings (national 
average 7%); 46% damaged crops (national average 25%); and 84% damaged roads 
(national average 72%).
The example of the municipality of Grassano allows a detailed analysis of whether the 
increasing regional intensity of landslides is a real one caused principally by 
destructive landuses, or whether this increase is partly exaggerated by a greater 
contemporary sensitivity to environmental hazards. Grassano is one of a sizable 
minority of towns in Basilicata where landslides have increased a great deal during the 
twentieth century. It is classed by the regional government as among the worst affected 
42 of the 131 municipalities in Basilicata. It has been described as “affected by local 
landslide phenomena, of impressive size.” (Lazzari, 1986b, 94, translated) and in a 
“fairly serious condition” (Regione Basilicata, 1987, 108, translated). A total of 
L5.5 billion is currently being spent on consolidating the town against landslides - the 
fourth highest figure for any municipality in the region.
1.3 The research’s ontology, epistemology, and methodology
The dissertation was carried out using a structuralist ontology. This dissertation, as 
most structuralist interpretations of spatial relations, relies in particular on the
J
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work of Giddens (Thrift, 1983). According to Giddens (1981) “Social systems are 
composed of patterns of relationships between actors or collectivities reproduced 
across time and space” (ibid, 26); structure is “both the medium and the outcome of 
the practices which constitute social systems" (ibid, 27); and individuals are subject 
to structural influences whether they are conscious of them or not.
Soja (1985), Pred (1986), and Urry (1987) showed how the meaning of space has 
been theorized in a new way by geographers following the work of the structuralists, 
and is now widely appreciated as socially-constructed. According to Pred (1986, 2) 
“the ‘becoming’ of any... area involves the local coexistence of structuring processes 
which vary in their geographical extent and temporal duration and which concretely 
interpenetrate with one another through the time-space specific practices of mediating 
agents...”
With particular reference to the spatial relationship between humankind and the the 
environment, structuralist research has indicated that humankind has had an 
important role in changing the land by labour (Sayer, 1979, and 1983). In this it 
follows the work of Marx and Engels in recognizing that human beings are inseperably 
a part of the environment, and that human behaviour is structured by both social 
forces and natural forces (see Schmidt, 1981; Fitzsimmons, 1989; and N Smith,
1990). According to Peet (1985, 324) “humans are increasingly conditioned by what 
they collectively and historically have made of nature - i.e., by a ‘second nature’.”
This change is a continuous process (Gregory, 1981) occurring through consciously- 
directed labour, and its unforseen consequences (Pred, 1986).
lased on its structuralist ontology, this dissertation takes a transcendental-realist 
epistemology (see Johnston, 1986). As Newton-Smith (1981) showed, “realism" has 
been used as a term to describe many differing outlooks in the philosophy of science, 
but all of them regard the validity of scientific principles as based on the 
“correspondence” theory of truth - on a validity based externally to the researcher. 
The basic claim of realism, according to Johnston (1986, 112-113) is that “the 
empirical world is the result of the actions of mechanisms that cannot be directly 
observed in particular contingent circumstances.” This is because, as Chouinard, 
Fincher, and Webber (1984) pointed out, causal mechanisms will only produce 
empirical regularities in closed systems - but the open systems studied by social 
scientists can produce only tendencies because social mechanisms are the dynamic 
products of social action.
/
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The growth in the importance of realist research in geography is, according to Sayer 
(1985b) part of a general movement away from positivism. While positivism aims to 
discover order, realism aims to discover structures - and is consequently better 
suited to the highly complex relationships discussed in this dissertation.
Realist research is of two kinds, according to Sayer (1984) - “extensive” and 
“intensive” research. Extensive research aims to discover regularities and patterns 
in the objects studied. Based on the analysis of taxonomic groups it aims to produce 
descriptive generalizations - though these are lacking in explanatory power (typical 
methods used include a large survey of the population or a representative sample, 
formal questionnaires, standardized interviews, and the application of statistical 
analysis). The power of extensive analysis is limited: although it produces 
representative results, generalizing to other populations or individuals from them is 
difficult; and they have a limited explanatory power. Intensive research aims to 
discover the mechanisms and processes behind objects or events, based on the analysis 
of causal groups (typical methods include the study of individual agents, interactive 
interviews, ethnography, and the application of qualitative analytical techniques). But 
the power of intensive analysis is also limited: although the causal powers discovered 
are generalizable, the specific patterns discovered are unlikely to be representative of 
other individuals.
Following from the dissertation’s epistemology is its methodology, which follows the 
structuralist analysis of the political economy of environmental relations - “political 
ecology” (Emel and Peet, 1989; Atkinson, 1991). Political-ecology research 
indicates that the material conditions that act together as structuring factors do so in a 
way which is geographically specific. Pred (1986, 25) explained that this is because 
“the transformation of nature is inseperable from the local expression of structuring 
processes or from the historically contingent becoming of place, it it cannot be deeply 
understood under any particular set of circumstances unless the prevailing power 
relations at the core of local social structure are identified.”
The issue of the transformation of nature has been developed in the literature on the 
political economy of environmental change (Redclift, 1984, and 1987; Blaikie, 1985; 
Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). Redclift (1984) concluded that the neoclassical 
explanation of environmental degradation as a combination of environmental factors 
and poor land management is inadequate. He believed that poor management is the 
result of a complex relationship between the environment and the political and 
economic factors which control landuse, and is forced on local people by the destruction
of the indigenous economy. Redclift later (1987) examined the reasons behind the 
breakdown of the relationship between humankind and the environment. He noted that 
suitable practices provide the only guarantee of survival for peasants. However, he 
suggested that this sustainability is prevented by the transition to capitalism which 
ensures that people enter into a new, more destructive relationship with the 
environment.
Blaikie (1985) developed Redclift’s theme using the concept of “marginalization”. 
Marginalization is the process by which peasants “lose the ability to control their own 
lives (where they live and derive their income, what crops or stock they produce, how 
hard and when they work)” (page 125). Marginalization forces farmers to exploit 
vulnerable environments as a result of an increase in the rate at which Marxian 
surplus value is extracted from them. “Under certain circumstances, surpluses are 
extracted from cultivators who then in turn are forced to extract ‘surpluses’ (in this 
case energy) from the environment (stored up fertility of the soil, forest resources, 
long evolved and productive pastures, and so on), and this in time and under certain 
physical circumstances leads to degradation and/or erosion." (Page 124.)
Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) set out to consider the relationship between farmers 
and the environment in what they described as “its historical, political and economic 
context” (page 239) to produce a political ecology which could account for both 
environmental resilience and social change. There are a number of problems with the 
concept of marginalization, discussed by Black (1990). First, some “traditional” 
land-management systems have been at least partially connected to the world economy 
for a long time - and by inference these links may not necessarily cause land 
degradation. Second, the inclusion of some farmers into the world economy is often 
welcome and may help to prevent land degradation. Third, Black pointed out that the 
relationship between people and the land depends for its effects on local relationships 
between people and their land.
In its analysis of these issues, with specific reference to land degradation in Basilicata, 
the dissertation’s methodology combines both extensive and intensive research in a 
contextualized case-study approach. Its case-study approach fits into the geographical 
tradition of regional and local analysis (J F Hart, 1982), which has been linked in 
recent years with the renewed interest in locality studies based on realist 
methodologies (A Jones, 1988) - indeed Sayer (1985b) suggested that realist 
research is a new, theorized approach to the traditional ideographic approach in 
geography. The local research is carried out in the context of the region-wide pattern.
/
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Basilicata is a unique region, but the landslides which occur there are the result of 
trends which have affected the whole Mediterranean and its climatic analogues. The 
complexity of the landslide hazard in Basilicata is such that it was desirable to choose a 
case study from within the region - which intensive research could place in the 
context of the regional pattern of landslides.
Grassano was chosen as a case study because of links with local people. It is 
representative of a significant number of municipalities in Basilicata where 
landsliding has increased. Research there was considered feasible because of the depth 
of the records, and because of the ergodic nature of landsliding - which provides a 
contemporary, documented example of a historical phenomenon. It consequently allows 
a causal explanation of the factors leading to landsliding, but an explanation that 
demonstrates how unique phenomena are the contingent products of causal mechanisms 
modified by geographically specific circumstances.
1.4 Overview of the dissertation
Following from chapter one’s definition of the dissertation’s research approach, 
chapter two discusses the nature of environmental hazards. It analyzes the 
implications of the three main approaches to environmental hazards: the 
environmental determinists, the behaviouralists, and the structuralists; then 
examines the development of these approaches. It concentrates in particular on the 
period since the development of a distinct hazards sub-discipline in the 1950s, and the 
extent to which they have recognized environmental hazards as influenced by society. It 
concludes with an analysis of landslides as hazards: the factors which cause landslides, 
the background to landslides in the Mediterranean, and the behaviouralist and 
structuralist literature on landslides. Based on the implications of the research on 
landslides for understanding the hazard in Basilicata, it sets out the research agenda 
for the dissertation.
Chapter three examines the extent of landslides in Basilicata, and their distribution. It 
describes in detail the landslide hazard to a number of the towns in the region. It then 
discusses the evidence from process studies, and archival and other historical records, 
which allows an analysis of the hypothesis that landslides have worsened in historical 
times - particularly during the twentieth century.
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Chapter four examines the factors which determine the current and past levels of 
landsliding in Basilicata. It discusses how the importance of physical and social factors 
can be determined and the extent to which those factors have determined the current 
level of landsliding in the region, by assessing whether it is very much higher than the 
“normal" level which would have occurred without the presence of humankind. It then 
examines the regional physical factors which have made Basilicata a vulnerable region 
- relief, geology, tectonism and seismicity, climate, and vegetation; then the indirect 
and direct ways in which humankind has changed the land - by deforestation, 
agriculture, urbanization, industry, and land management. It concludes with an 
assessment of the degree to which humankind is responsible for the pattern of changes 
in landslides identified in chapter three.
Chapter five introduces the town of Grassano, which has been chosen as a detailed case- 
study for the dissertation. The chapter examines the factors involved in determining 
the intensity of the current and past levels of landsliding in the town. It examines the 
physical factors which have made Grassano vulnerable: its relief, geology, tectonism 
and seismicity, climate, and vegetation It then examines the political and economic 
factors which have affected slope instability: deforestation, agriculture, industry and 
construction, and land management. It concludes with an assessment of the extent to 
which these factors can account for the pattern of changes in landslides identified in 
chapter five.
Chapter six reconstructs the history of environmental degradation at Grassano, and the 
landslide hazard which existed at the beginning of the twentieth century, before going 
on to examine the numerous landslides which have affected the town since 1900. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the extent to which (Grassano conforms to the 
regional pattern of change identified in chapter three.
Chapter seven examines the factors behind the “local discourse” on hazards which 
underlies the current approach to the land at Grassano. It examines the political and 
economic factors determining this discourse: the wishes of the electorate, local 
government, political clients, political protest, individual protest, and the role of 
research. The chapter analyzes the extent to which participants in the discourse are 
both empowered and constrained by current social structures, and the dominant 
ideological perception of hazards which those structures support.
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Chapter eight provides the dissertation’s summary and conclusion. It puts the example 
of Basilicata and Grassano in the content of humankind’s general relationship with the 
environment, and draws together the main themes of the dissertation’s thesis. The 
chapter assesses to what extent the dissertation has met its original objectives: to 
examine the changing nature of the relationship between humankind and the 
environment by an analysis of landslides in Basilicata. It summarizes the 
dissertation’s findings, evaluates their strengths and weaknesses, then examines the 
implications which arise from their limitations, and the new research which they 
imply should profitably be examined in future research. The chapter then discusses 
the implications of the dissertation’s findings for an understanding of the landslide 
hazard in Basilicata. It concludes with a discussion of the extent to which society has 
influenced the evolution of the land and its environmental hazards, the limitations 
which hinder the change of that influence, and the potential for changing it in the 
future.
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Chapter 2: Environmental hazards
This chapter examines the concept of “nature”, then reviews the literature on 
environmental hazards, discusses the suitability of that literature for explaining the 
origins of landslides, and sets out a research agenda to be followed in the rest of the 
dissertation.
2.1 Introduction
The environment is a topic of fundamental importance in geography, because the 
discipline developed in an attempt to integrate the “social” and the “natural” (Holt- 
Jensen, 1988; Rogers, 1992). The question of what nature actually is has recently 
been examined in a most interesting way by N Smith (1990). He suggested that, since 
the Enlightenment, western society has held two mutually contradictory views: that 
there is an ‘external nature” alien to humankind, and an “internal nature” which 
subjects humankind to unavoidable laws. According to his analysis, this has had two 
effects on society:
First, nature has been tamed enough now that the hostile connotations are 
generally reserved for extreme, infrequent events such as high seas, floods and 
hurricanes. Whether hostile or not, the fact of the externality of nature is enough 
to legitimate nature’s subjugation; indeed this process of subjugation has itself 
come to be treated as “natural”. Second, and more important today, is the 
ideological function of the universal conception... to invest certain social 
behaviours with the status of natural events by which is meant that the 
behaviours and characteristics are normal, God-given, unchallengable. [Pages 
15 to 16.J
According to Smith, humankind will only truly liberate itself when it can come to 
terms with these contradictory approaches and synthesize a new, holistic approach. 
Research into environmental hazards can enlighten this struggle because, as the 
remainder of this chapter shows, hazards demonstrate the nature of the environment - 
and it is only once the environment is understood that hazards can be tackled.
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2.2 Approaches to the environment
The approach to the environment, and society’s relationship to it, has always reflected 
the dominant ideas on the relationship between humankind and the environment 
(Glacken, 1967; Dobson, 1990). Since the Enlightenment there have been three main 
approaches to humankind’s relationship with the environment; these may be 
characterized as the environmental-determinist approach, the behaviouralist 
approach, and the structuralist approach. Although any division of ideas into neat 
categories threatens to distort them (Sayer, 1989; Thrift, 1989) these boundaries 
will be followed here for the sake of clarity.
The environmental-determinist approach developed from the deterministic analysis of 
humankind’s relationship with the environment. Like their Malthusian counterparts, 
the environmental determinists were by implication politically conservative, seeing 
humankind as constrained by the environment and "human nature” as in need of 
authoritarian control if it is to avoid the still-harsher control of the environment 
(Sandbach, 1984). They perceived the environment as “a set of resource constraints, 
or as a set of climatic and geologic features affecting the ease of settlement and certain 
forms of economic activity” (Palm, 1990, 58).
Although the concept of “nature” separated from humankind has continued in 
twentieth-century science (N Smith, 1990) the concept of environmental 
determinism has fallen out of favour since the beginning of the twentieth century 
(Johnston, 1986; Holt-Jensen, 1988). However, the influence of determinism still 
lingers, and Hewitt (1983, 5) noted that although the behaviouralist approach to 
hazards retained a dominant role for the environment in hazards, the “old unpalatable 
causality of environmentalism” was “swept away”.
Behaviouralism (or “behaviourism” as it is also known) developed from the 
psychological study of behaviour. It assumes that “decision-making is the result of the 
operation of a set of laws, to which individuals conform” (Johnston, 1986, 28). Such 
is the influence of the behaviouralists on environmental research that they have been 
credited with virtually founding hazards research. Behaviouralism retains the 
environmental determinist concept of the importance of the environmental influence 
on humankind, but is also influenced by the possibilist perception that this influence
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can be modified (Palm, 1990). Like their technological-optimist counterparts, the 
behaviouralists are by implication politically liberal, seeing humankind as able to 
free itself of environmental constraints through the application of technology 
(Sandbach, 1984).
Structuralism, is based on the principle that “explanations for observed phenomena 
must be sought in general structures which underpin all phenomena but are not 
identifiable within them” (Johnston, 1986, 97). This principle implies that 
humankind’s approach to the environment is conditioned by the political or economic 
factors which structure society (Palm, 1990). By implication , the structuralists are 
politically radical, seeing humankind as constrained not by the environment but by the 
structure of society (Sandbach, 1984).
2.3 Hazards
The threats posed to humankind by the environment have been perceived in a number 
of ways. Traditionally, they were perceived as “Acts of God". From the middle of this 
century, hazards research has regarded them as threats to humankind from “external 
nature”: from “those elements of the physical environment harmful to Man and caused 
by forces extraneous to him” (Burton and Kates, 1964, cited by K Smith, 1992, 16). 
Many recent analyses have identified that society has an important influence, not just 
on changing hazards, but also in contributing to them. Consequently in this dissertation 
the misleading term “natural hazard", which implies a nature external to humankind, 
is replaced by the term “environmental hazard”.
The assessed probability of a hazard occurring is a “risk”, and the realization of a 
hazard can be - if severe enough - defined as a “disaster”. The definition of disaster 
has in the past proved controversial, as K Smith (1992) explained. Definitions 
concentrate on the damage that events cause (though not on the benefits which may 
eventually stem from them) and disaster can be defined either by a threshold or by an 
assessment of its intensity. Threshold definitions include that made by Sheehan and 
Hewitt (1969) who defined a major global disaster as being an event that causes at 
least 100 dead or at least 100 injured or causes at least $1 million damage (the figure 
was updated by Thompson, 1982, to $2.8 million; and by Shah, 1983, to $3.6 
million). Intensity definitions include that made by UNDRO (1984) as an event which 
threatens a community with “severe danger”.
2.3.1 Approaches to hazards
The analysis of environmental hazards has a long history. Interest in the damage they 
inflict on humankind has existed for several thousand years (Coveilo and Mumpower, 
1985). Yet an attempt to analyze the general nature of hazards is a more recent 
phenomenon, with its origins in the growth in knowledge about the environment that 
followed from the scientific revolution. According to J K Mitchell (1990), 
contemporary research into hazards has been divided into three relatively discreet 
sub-fields: risk analysis, disaster research, and environmental hazards research.
Risk analysis is “primarily concerned with the identification, measurement, and 
evaluation of risks" (ibid, 136). Early work developed principally from the need to 
evaluate the reliability of new technologies and products, and most studies continue to 
concentrate on technological hazards. Applying the results of risk analysis can be 
difficult: the complexity of systems, and particularly the possibility of synergies 
between risks can be difficult to forecast (Lowrance, 1986). The analysis of ‘ revealed 
preferences” can give some indication of the risk which individuals, groups, and 
institutions are willing to bear (Starr, 1969). But the mental models which they hold 
can vary greatly (Fischhoff and others, 1981; Bogen and Spear, 1987) because the 
perception of risk is deeply imbedded in culture (Kunreuther and Ley, 1962; M 
Douglas, 1966; Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982).
Disaster research aims “to provide knowledge about group behavior and social life 
under stress conditions” (J K Mitchell, 1990, 136). Research began in the United 
States in the 1930s and became organized as a recognized sub-discipline in the 1950s: 
though before then, notable work had been carried out on the Halifax explosion 
(Prince, 1920), major catastrophies such as wars and famines (Sorokin, 1937), and 
the bombing of Germany and Japan (US Strategic Bombing Survey, 1947a and 
1947b). Most disaster research has been for applied purposes (Morre and Feldman, 
1962), and organizational behaviour under the strains of disaster has been perhaps 
its most important theme (Quarantelli, 1986). As a result of its concentration on the 
organizational reaction to events, rather than the environmental conditions which 
preceded them, it is closely linked to sociological research - though geographers are 
showing increasing interest in it (Varley, 1991).
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Environmental hazards research is informed by risk analysis and by disaster 
research. It aims to examine the causes and consequences of environmental hazards.
Since this is the research area of this dissertation, hazards research will be dealt with 
in more detail in the remainder of section 2.3.
2.3.2 Behaviouralist research on environmental hazards
Behaviouralist analysis of environmental hazards began in the 1950s. Principally 
under the direction of Gilbert White, it was based on the human-ecology work of 
Barrows (1923) and used “human ecological perspectives to investigate the 
interaction of human and nonhuman factors that generate, sustain, exacerbate, or 
mitigate hazards...” (J K Mitchell, 1989, 138.)
The behaviouralist approach to hazards draws heavily on the positivist analysis of 
society (Palm, 1990) and perceives hazards as the result of interaction between 
unpredictable “natural” hazards and vulnerable societies (Burton, Kates, and White,
1978). According to behavioural analyses, environmental systems are “in a 
vulnerable state of dynamic equilibrium punctuated by disasters...” (Marston, 1983,
340.) From Barrows it draws the perception of humankind as an independent 
component of the ecological system: according to which humankind is capable of 
changing the world, though is not necessarily deemed either a dominant or active in 
environmental processes (Hewitt, 1983).
In the behaviouralist approach, environmental hazards are perceived as the result of 
an imperfect (irrational) adjustment of humankind to fluctuating nature: “a natural 
hazard is an interaction of man and nature, governed by the coexistent state of 
adjustment in the human use system and the state of nature in the natural events 
system.” (Kates, 1971, 438.) Disasters are perceived as aberrant fluctuations in a 
stable state (Heinrich, 1959; Scheidegger, 1975). According to Whittow (1980, 23) 
they “will only occur when there is a fluctuation in, or a malfunction of, the physical 
systems or processes which are said to be governed by the so-called laws of nature, 
because if the status quo is preserved then no disaster can be triggered-off".
The neo-Darwinian tinge to behaviouralist research on hazards implies the hazard as 
given and humankind’s reaction to it as the problem, according to Marston (1983). 
Consequently, the behaviouralist approach describes the experience of hazards as
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dependent on the geophysical components involved: their frequency, duration, shape 
and size, speed of onset, spatial dispersion, and temporal spacing - modified by the 
vulnerability of society (Burton, Kates and White, 1978). The concept of 
vulnerability, modified by technology, is particularly important in behaviouralist 
research. Alexander (1991a, 220) put the case succinctly: all societies modify the 
environment through technology, but all are essentially reactive to the external nature 
and its “environmental imperative to society”. However, “disasters... cannot truly be 
considered natural in that human vulnerability seldom results from purely natural 
states (rather than locational discourses based on socio-economic criteria) and human 
intervention often results in aggravated risk of geophysical impact.”
When stimulated by external nature, the behaviouralist approach argues, societies are 
capable of progressively more effective adaptions to the environment to reduce their 
vulnerability (Burton, Kates, and White, 1978). The behaviouralist position has been 
made more sophisticated by a recognition of the impossibility of avoiding hazardous 
environments, and the potential role of humankind in making places more hazardous.
Behaviouralist writers argue that since technology has not allowed the total domination 
of the environment people will continue to live in hazardous areas because they 
provide superior economic opportunities, the time horizons of occupants is limited, or 
perceived benefits outweigh perceived potential losses (White, 1974). The more 
technologically sophisticated a society becomes the more it makes demands on its 
environment and changes it. White (1974, 13) argued that as a consequence of this 
increasing involvement, society becomes more vulnerable to hazards. “Certain of the 
hazards are created by man through his alteration of land and water or by his invasion 
of risky areas; others are exacerbated by his efforts to reduce the risk.” Burton,
Kates, and White (1978) characterized the adaptions made to the consequent risks as 
analyzable in discrete technological stages: preindustrial, industrial, or postindustrial 
in nature:
• Preindustrial - or folk - adjustments involve a wide range of modifications 
towards harmony with the environment. Adjustments are flexible and easily 
abandoned, low in capital requirements, require action only by individuals or small 
groups, and can be very localized.
• Industrial - or modern - adjustments involve a more limited range of 
technological actions emphasizing control of the environment based on the “techno- 
fix” of capital intensive works. They are inflexible and difficult to change, high in
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capital requirements, require interlocking and interdependent social organization, and 
tend to be uniform in their design.
• Postindustrial - or comprehensive - adjustments combine features of both the 
two earlier phases so as to involve a larger range of capital and organizational 
adjustments, and greater flexibility.
The contemporary approach to environmental hazards has been characterized as based 
not just in the application of sophisticated technology, but in its application of modern 
management techniques (Hewitt, 1983). The results of environmental managerialism 
have characteristic effects: in seeking to allow the regular, dependable use of the 
environment, management attempts to smooth those fundamental contradictions within 
society and the environment which hinder efficient production (Redclift, 1987).
The managerialist approach to environmental hazards has been criticized on two main 
counts. It has been argued that by attempting to smooth social contradictions it 
perpetuates the factors which lead to social injustice, and by seeking to smooth 
ecological contradictions while avoiding the radical solution often necessary for 
genuine solutions to be developed it perpetuates the factors which lead to 
environmental hazards (Dobson, 1990; Young, 1990). This is because managerialism 
is organized by bureaucracies - structured organizations employing their staff for a 
specific purpose or purposes (Weber, 1947). Bureaucracies require rigidity to 
ensure a dependable outcome of their work (Merton, 1957), and their structure 
ensures that they have their own prefered solutions to problems. This “bureaucratic 
dynamic” ensures that they develop stances which include implicit ideological 
assumptions.
Bureaucratic responses to hazards will tend to be in a series of small stages, because 
managers are restricted in their actions by a combination of their own limited 
understanding of events and the power structures they work within (Slovik, 
Kunreuther, and White, 1974) so they can only consider near-alternatives to the 
status quo as viable options. As Burton, Kates, and White (1978) argued, this 
approach has been a success in technical terms, but it has lacked a strategic coherence 
because bureaucratic management is by nature reactive management. Consequently, in 
order to avoid the political and social dimensions to environmental problems in 
capitalist countries, there is a tendency among managers to find a way out of debate by 
using a “technological fix” (Fischer, 1990). Miller (1985) claimed that most
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environmental problems are too complex for such an approach, and can only be dealt 
with adequately by addressing broader strategic issues.
Naturally, the behaviouralist approach to hazards has continued to develop since the 
paradigm was first established in an attempt to address these issues - most notably as 
a result of the significant growth since the 1960s in knowledge of the physical reasons 
for hazards (White, 1985). In addition to the quantitative improvement in knowledge 
there has been a qualitative improvement in understanding about hazards. New,
“elusive” hazards have been identified, such as global warming, which were 
previously unrecognized (Kates, 1985). According to J K Mitchell (1990) “multiple 
crises" have been recognized - highly complex problems such as famine, pollution, 
and disease (Currey and Hugo, 1984; Clark, 1986) which are “quasi-natural” - 
having causes which are partly in the physical environment and partly in the social 
environment (Sorkin, 1982).
The identification of multiple crises has led to the suggestion that the rapid transition 
to radically new technologies since the industrial revolution has led to a greatly 
increased - rather than decreased - level of risk (Perrow, 1984). This tendency is 
evident in Burton and Kates (1986) which described a general trend of increasing risk 
since the eighteenth century (“the Great Climacteric"), initiated by the revolutionary 
changes in the organization of society which the development of industrial capitalism 
has produced.
The move to identifying social causes behind hazards is part of a general trend in 
hazards research in response to the new ideas on humankind’s relationship with the 
environment, which developed in the late 1970s and 1980s when the relevance of the 
behaviouralist approach began to be questioned. A new paradigm began to emerge in 
hazards research based on criticisms of the social and political assumptions behind the 
behaviouralist paradigm.
2.3.3 S tructuralist research on environmental hazards
Radical criticism of the behaviouralist approach to hazards developed following the 
perceived success of the Marxist critique of human geography in the early 1970s. The 
Marxist critique had offered an alternative, structuralist explanation of the world 
(Holt-Jensen, 1988) and rejected the liberal human geography of the sixties and
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seventies which had been dominated by the demands of policy-relevance. The new 
structuralist paradigm in hazards research attacked behaviouralist research for 
alleged inadequacies in aims, methodology, and findings. By the late 1970s a number of 
writings on the political economy of the environment had begun to show that there was 
the need to take into account what Marston (1983, 342) called the “social, political, 
economic, and historical determinants” of hazards; and to reject the behaviouralist 
paradigm because of its disregard of the socio-cultural causes of disasters (Waddel, 
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Criticisms of the behaviouralist approach first crystalized around the purported 
inadequacies of Burton, Kates, and White’s The Environment as Hazard (1978). A 
number of reviews criticized the book for alleged academic failings - but also indicated 
unease with the state of hazards research. Torry (1979a, 377) criticized the book’s 
failure to deal with political constraints on the reduction of hazards: “risk detection, 
warning, and mitigation, and the management of loss, are all governed by systems of 
social institutions. Recognizing how physical forces impinge on these systems to create 
hazard conditions, of course, is equally necessary.” The book was, he concluded, “badly 
flawed by acute lapses of scholarship, dominated by feeble typologies, and lacking any 
unifying theory”. For Hewitt (1980, 306) the book “floated” in an “intellectual 
limbo”. He claimed its empirical evidence was too limited and prevented an adequate 
dissection of troublesome questions - notably analyzing why communities fail to adapt 
to hazards. Walker (1979) pointed to the books reliance on purposive rationality 
which (like Hewitt he concluded) prevented a discussion of the processes behind the 
“irrationality” diagnosed by Burton, Kates, and White.
The criticisms of The Environment as Hazard came at a time when discontent with 
inadequacies in the behaviouralist approach were growing - and, according to Marston
(1983), encouraged that discontent. As Burton himself later admitted, there developed 
“a widespread feeling of discontent and dissatisfaction with the ‘dominant view’ in 
hazards research - the ship is leaking badly.” (Burton, 1983, vi.) Critics began to 
suggest that the behaviouralist paradigm was oversimplified and ignored the political 
and economic factors involved in hazards. In the later words of Marston, (1983, 341) 
behaviouralist hazards research “has failed to examine the political and economic 
structures which influenced and very likely amplified the effects on population of 
extreme natural events.” There were four elements in the critique of behaviouralism:
First, in behaviouralist research, hazardous events are perceived as in essence the 
product of the physical environment, rather than the work of humankind. Although, as
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Hewitt (1983, 5) conceded, credit is given in behaviouralist analysis to the role of 
human involvement in hazards, the dominant role ascribed to the physical environment 
by the environmental determinists is retained: “Few researchers would deny that 
social and economic factors or habitat conditions other than geophysical extremes 
affect risk. The directions of argument in the dominant [behaviouralist] view relegates 
them to a dependent position... The implication always seems to be that disaster occurs 
because of the chance recurrences of natural extremes, modified in detail but 
fortuitously by human circumstances.” As the information presented later in this 
dissertation shows, the work on the causes of hazards has consequently been dominated 
by natural-science approaches which concentrate on monitoring and forecasting 
changes in the environment - rather than analyzing the complexity of interacting 
physical and social causes.
In hazards research the perceived split between humankind and the environment has 
produced three strands in the technocratic approach to the alleviation of hazards: 
monitoring, managing, and relief. Monitoring involves “An unprecedented commitment 
to the... scientific understanding of geophysical processes” (Hewitt, 1983, 6).
Managing involves “Planning and managerial activities to contain those processes 
where possible... and where it is not possible, physically to rearrange human 
activities in accordance with the objective geophysical patterns and probabilities."
(Ibid.) Relief involves “Emergency measures, involving disaster plans and the 
establishment of organizations for relief and rehabilitation.” (Ibid.)
Second, disasters are generally not perceived as the results of distributional extremes. 
“Hazards are taken as natural events that destabilise or violate ordinary life and 
relations to the habitat.” (Ibid, 11.) Disasters, consequently, come to be symbolically 
alien to society (Legadec, 1990; N Smith, 1990), as an antithesis to “everyday" 
normality. Because they threaten the “normality" of social order disasters come to be 
described as “discontinuities”, “islands of unorderliness” in a sea of “normal” 
everyday life. “The ‘worst case scenarios’ tend to become definitive or at least 
symbolic of the whole problem.” (Hewitt, 1983, 11), and the litany of 
“megadisasters” is familiar in even the most respectable of texts.
Third, because of their supposedly random nature, disasters are seen as not capable of 
being planned for. By implication, though the intensity of disaster which the hazard 
produces can be modified, disasters cannot be prevented. Consequently the 
organizations which seek to manage hazards are absolved from blame for their 
occurrence.
Fourth, technology is seen as a potential cure for hazards because it allows for the 
production, management, and alleviation of problems (White, 1961). Hence Burton, 
Kates and White’s (1978) emphasis on the role of technology in mitigation. As a result 
of this approach it has been claimed that behaviouralist research is in fact highly 
politicized - because its concentration on the technological fix as a means to evade 
environmental problems supports dominant economic and political interests (Torry, 
1979b, Hewitt, 1983). “In the technocratic style of work there is a structure of 
assumptions, and a use of science and management that always situates natural 
calamity beyond an assumed order of definite knowledge and of reasonable expectation. 
More importantly, it places disaster outside the realm of everyday responsibility both 
of society and the individual.” (Hewitt, 1983, 16.)
The criticism of behaviouralist hazards research allowed the conditions for the 
development of a new structuralist reinterpretation of hazards which its followers 
labelled the “radical” approach, in distinction to the “orthodox” or “dominant" 
approach of the behaviouralists (Hewitt, 1983).
The fundamental point of agreement among the structuralists was that it is possible to 
explain hazards from what Wisner, O’Keefe, and Westgate (1977, 48) described as 
the “human side of the man-nature relationship”. The key text in developing the idea 
of a social component in hazard was O’Keefe, Westgate, and Wisner (1976). They 
argued that inspite of no major geological or climatological changes - and consequently 
no major changes in the probability of extreme events - the number of disasters had 
increased, and the cause must be a growing vulnerability of the world’s population.
This vulnerability had social origins, they concluded.
In 1983 Marston claimed that although a potential for developing a new paradigm 
existed, there was still not enough coherence among the anti-orthodox writers to be 
able to describe their approach as a paradigm. But in the same year Hewitt’s 
Interpretations of Calamity gave a greater degree of coherence to the anti-orthodox 
writers, allowing the development of a genuine paradigm, based on a political-ecology 
approach later described as “linking society, political economy, and the environment” 
(Emel and Peet, 1989, 72). The essays in Interpretations of Calamity did not aim to 
break absolutely from the past of the orthodox approach but to salvage its findings and 
place them in a new intellectual context, as Hewitt himself (1983, 25) made clear:
In isolation, of course, in the absence of the behaviourist view described, our
emphases would also add up to an unbalanced view. It would be wrong to suggest
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that events with flood or earthquake in no way reflect the nature of these 
geophysical processes. It would be indefensible to argue that the disruption 
occasioned by disaster produce no distinctive, even unique, crisis phenomena.
There are particular aspects of hazard that can be helped by improved 
geophysical forecasting. Nor are any forseeable human actions going to remove 
the need to bring emergency assistance to ill-equiped victims of natural 
calamities.
In contrast to behaviouralist research, structuralist hazards research started from 
the concept that humankind is increasingly coming to have primacy in causing hazards.
Its three main principles were summarized by Hewitt (1983, 25):
First, “Most natural disasters, or most damages in them, are characteristic rather 
than accidental features of the spaces and societies where they occur." The 
increasingly significant interaction between humankind and the environment is well 
established, and consequently the nature of society will have an influence over the 
form of hazard which affects it.
Second, “The risks... flow mainly from what is called ‘ordinary life’ rather than from 
the rareness and scale of those fluctuations." As Dury (1980) and Kirby (1990a) 
showed, western society has become acutely aware of catastrophes in the years 
following the second world war. But catastrophes are only extremes, and they are as 
much a part of dynamic environmental systems as “normality”.
Third, “The natural extremes are, in a human ecological sense, more expected and 
knowable than many of the contemporary social developments that pervade everyday 
life.” (Hewitt, 1983, 32.) This is the heart of the problem. The advance of the natural 
sciences now allows the prediction or forecasting of many environmental changes, and 
the case of landslides shows how the occurrence of many hazards is often predictable 
and can be ameliorated (D K C Jones, 1992). Given the proposition that hazardous 
events are partially caused by society, it follows that their solution must be partly 
social too. Hazards research, aiming to be part of this solution, must be involved in 
issues which are not purely technical but are also political (Hewitt, 1983; Blaikie,
1985). What is needed is for there to be scientific knowledge and the social 
commitment for that knowledge to be used effectively.
Research on natural hazards shows them to be complex phenomena. The 
behaviourist approach to natural hazards stresses the importance of 
environmental phenomena as the cause of hazards, the radical approach to natural 
hazards stresses the importance of society as a manipulator of the environment. 
Indeed, the political-economy approach to hazards suggests that they tell us a lot 
about society: “in this view, environmental relations are instances of the 
production process and adaptive strategies or coping responses are grounded in 
the social relations of production in concrete historical circumstances;
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calamities thereby yield valuable information about the stricken society.”
[Watts, 1983b, 26.]
The following section analyzes landslides in the light of the potential they offer as an 
example of an environmental hazard, and discusses the respective importance of 
physical and social causes.
2.4 Landslides as an example of an environmental hazard
2.4.1 In troduction
Landslides are an important global hazard: yet there is relatively little emphasis on 
them in the environmental-hazards literature, as chapter one indicated. Bryant 
(1991) claimed landslides as the thirteenth most significant hazard worldwide - yet 
devoted only twenty pages of his 352-page book to slope instability of all forms (pages 
236 to 256). K Smith (1992) allocated only eighteen of 352 pages to mass-movement 
hazards (pages 160 to 178) of which just three were on rockfalls and landslides 
(pages 162 to 165). And in Hewitt’s Interpretations of Calamity there are just two 
references to landslides compared to drought, the most important, with twenty-six.
Paradoxically, the relevant literature is in precisely inverse relationship to the 
importance of landslides for hazards research - because it points to the “difficult-to- 
explain” nature of the hazard they pose. The complex nature of the causes behind 
landslides begs questions which neither the behaviouralist school nor the structuralist 
school fully explain. This dissertation argues that landslides are extremely varied 
phenomena and have a number of causes: it acknowledges that they are environmental 
phenomena, but show that in recent history they have increasingly been influenced by 
society.
Assessing the very complex causes of landslides can be difficult: it is also potentially 
an irrelevant process because abstract analyses of causation can, to quote Sayer 
(1985a, 50) “only remain agnostic, or make conditional statements about what 
actually happens”. According to Crozier (1986, 37-39) the conditional statements it 
is possible to make are that: transient triggering factors cannot alone be held to be the 
“cause” of a landslide. Triggering factors play only a part in causation, and attention 
must be paid to passive factors that tend to change only slowly. These important
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passive factors “may have brought the slope into a condition in which a minor change 
of regular occurrence could precipitate movement’ (ibid, 38).
The geotechnical factors involved in slope instability, the condition that leads to slope 
movements including landslides, were explained as follows by Crozier (ibid, 32):
In every slope there are forces (more accurately described as stresses) which 
tend to promote movement (shear stress) and opposing forces which tend to 
resist movement (resistance or shear strength). “Stable" slopes have a margin 
of stability equal to the excess of resistance over shear stress. Slopes at the point 
of movement, on the other hand, have no margin of stability, and resistance and 
shear stress are approximately equal. “Instability” in any slope represents the 
condition in which its margin of stability can be reduced to zero.
Slope instability is determined by the nature of a slope, modified by factors external to 
the slope which cause changes within the slope. The nature of a slope is a product of 
external factors (location factors such as climate, and site factors such as inclination) 
that interact with inherent factors such as material strength (which can be modified 
by changing circumstances over time). Slope instability can be seen as the result of 
both preparatory factors (which predispose a slope to movement), triggering factors 
(which initiate movement), and controlling factors (which dictate patterns of 
movement on a slope).
In most slopes, the relationship between preparatory, triggering, and controlling 
factors is both highly complex and changeable. The range of factors that can influence 
slope stability is very large (table 2.1) and dealt with in detail by Crozier. The range 
of factors includes both “natural” and “social” factors - often acting together. At 
different times many factors may act to prepare, or trigger, or control a given slope.
The way in which these factors work together can be highly complex and is naturally 
dependent on the scale chosen for analysis. At a regional scale the most significant 
factors are: relief, geology, tectonism and seismicity, climate, vegetation, and human 
involvement.
Relief can have a profound effect on landslides. Crozier (1986) showed that the 
probability of slope instability is increased by the presence of deep valleys, steep 
slopes, cliffs, and concave valley slopes. In addition, the probability of landslides is 
also increased by drainage characteristics associated with steep relief - including high 
drainage density, steep river gradients, and slope undercutting - which all promote 
local steepening of slopes. Deep valleys lead to increased slope heights, steep slopes act
Table 2.1: Factors affecting potential slope stability (source: Crozier, 1986, 216- 
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Factor
Relief
Valley depth 
Slope steepness 
Cliffs
Height difference between valleys 
Valley-side shape
Drainage 
Drainage density 
River gradient 
Slope undercutting 
Concentrated seepage 
Standing water
Recent incision
Porewater pressure fluctuation
potentially stable potentially unstable
small very great
low very steep
absent present
small very great
convex concave
low very high
gentle very steep
none very severe
absent present
absent present with rapid
drainage 
absent large
low very high
Bedrock
Joint density low very high
Joint openings tight wide
Joint fillings soft hard
Joint wedging (by vegetation and soil) absent present
Tension cracks absent present
Strike direction of structural discontinuities right-angles parallel
with respect to strike of slope
Dip angle of structural discontinuities greater lower
with respect to slope angle
Competent over incompetent strata absent present
Degree of weathering none high
Compressive strength high very low
Glauconite in contact with pelitic rocks absent present
Existing landslides none many
Activity of existing landslides none high
Regolith
Site flat steep slope
Coherent over incoherent beds absent present
Depth small very large
Shear strength high very low
Plastic index low high
Liquid limit high low
Activity number low high
Desiccation cracks absent present
Tension cracks absent present
Permeable over impermeable beds absent present
Nature of regolith/bedrock contact gradational abrupt
Subsurface depressions and drainage lines absent many
Existing landslides none many
Activity of existing landslides none high
Earthquake zone
Tremors felt 
Felt intensity 
Proximity to fault
Paleo-features
Fossil solifluction lobes and sheets 
Fossil gulleys 
Previous landslides 
Deep weathering
Climate
Rainstorms
Total rainfall variability 
Drought episodes 
Snow-cover melt 
Freeze-thaw cycles 
Cyclones
Vegetation 
Hydrophitic plants 
Potassium-demanding plants 
Biomass on steep, jointed slopes 
Biomass on other slopes 
Recent alteration to biomass
Artificial features 
Excavation depth 
Excavation position 
Fill compaction 
Reservoir
Drainage diversion across hillside 
Fluctuation of reservoir level 
Loading of upper slope 
Maintenance of control structures
none
low
close
absent
absent
absent
none
low intensity 
low
uncommon
slow
few
few
absent
absent
low
high
none
small
top of slope
high
absent
absent
small
none
high
many
high
fa r
many
many
many
much
high intensity
high
common
rapid
many
many
present
present
high
low
much
large
toe of slope
none
present
present
large
much
low
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to increase shear stress on the slope. High drainage density, steep river gradients, and 
slope undercutting all promote local steepening of slopes.
Geology, as Crozier (1986) indicated, can have profound influence on slope instability 
- an influence which he divided along lines based on lithology and regolith. The 
lithology of a slope and its structure determine the ability of the slope to resist 
instability: the greater a slope’s inherent strength, the more it will resist. Slope 
stability varies significantly with the type of slope-forming material. Given an 
erosional slope in equilibrium with its environment, the slope angles will be a 
function of rock strength, but these conditions are rarely attained and for a 
constructional slope the angle of repose will be the most important factor in 
determining the frequency of slope instability.
The strength of slope-forming material depends on whether, in engineering terms, it 
is a rock (having “true cohesion”) or a soil (having “apparent cohesion”). The 
behaviour of rock is determined by rock-mass strength - a relationship between 
intact strength and discontinuities within the rock. The behaviour of soil is determined 
by a combination of particle size and mineralogy - modified by dilatancy, which 
eventually will produce a residual cohesion in the soil. In rock, the susceptibility to 
slope instability is overwhelmingly determined by the presence and form of 
discontinuities; but in soils it is determined by the strength of interparticle bonding 
and the soil’s ability to take up water.
Structure is important because the probability of slope instability is increased by: the 
presence of high joint densities, wide joint openings, hard joint fillings, joint 
wedging, tension cracks, structural discontinuities with a strike direction parallel to 
the strike of slope, angles of structural discontinuties lower than the slope angle, the 
presence of competent over incompetent strata, intense weathering, low compressive 
strength, the presence of glauconite in contact with pelitic rocks, and the presence of 
existing landslides. The nature of the regolith is important because the probability of 
slope instability is increased by: the presence of coherent over incoherent beds, a deep 
regolith, low shear strength, high plastic index, low liquid limit, high soil activity, 
the presence of dessication cracks, the presence of permeable over impermeable beds, 
an abrupt discontinuity between bedrock and overlying regolith, subsurface 
depressions and drainage lines, and existing landslides.
Tectonism can have a profound effect on landslides, because it is the force that produces 
absolute relief. It increases the gravitational energy for slope instability and erosion;
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if it is severe it causes material to be subjected to the climatic conditions of higher 
altitudes and changed microclimatic patterns.
Seismicity can have a much greater effect on landslides than any other form of 
vibration (Crozier, 1986). Even small earthquakes can cause landslides, by imparting 
a shearing stress to a slope and reducing the resistance of the slope material. Keefer 
(1984), in his assessment of local magnitudes, found that landslides could be induced 
by earthquakes with a local Richter magnitude Ml  of £ 4.0. In the United States, Nilsen
and Bubb (1975) claimed that some landslides up to a year after the San Francisco 
earthquake of 1906 were probably a result of the shock. In Southern Italy, the 
example of the Calabrian earthquake of 5 to 6 February 1783 shows how an extreme 
event can cause changes to geomorphology. It led to “numerous huge landslides 
involving slumps, slides, falls, spontaneous liquefaction phenomena... numerous 
landslide lakes...” and other phenomena (Cotecchia, Travaglini, and Melidoro, 1969,
2 ).
Climate can have a significant effect on slope stability. Crozier (1986) showed that 
the probability of slope instability is increased by: rainstorms, droughts, rapid 
snowmelt, freeze-thaw cycles, and cyclones. Although climatic factors are most 
immediately obvious in their contribution to slope instability in acting as triggering 
factors, they are particularly important in their action as predisposing factors - by 
influencing the creation of morphogenetic regimes specific to particular climates. The 
impact of climate is more clearly evident in its influence on exogenic regimes (based 
on the relationship between climate, vegetation, soils, and topography) that has a 
significant influence on the response of slopes to environmental fluctuations. The 
triggering of landslides is particularly dependent on rapid rainfall or snowmelt, which 
may lead to surcharging and lateral pressures in the soil.
Vegetation is “one of the most influential and sensitive elements of the exogenic 
system" according to Crozier (1986, 156). Slope instability is increased by the 
occurrence of: hydrophitic plants, potassium-demanding plants, major changes in the 
biomass, or (on steep, jointed slopes) high biomass, or (on other slopes) low biomass.
The vegetation can be changed by a number of factors (climatic change, disease, fire, 
synecological competition, or browsing) but the most rapid changes are usually the 
result of humankind.
Particularly important in this respect, it has been claimed, is deforestation: though as 
Crozier (1986) explained, research on deforestation may exaggerate its significance:
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other factors may influence the data gathered, high-magnitude landslides under forests 
may go undetected, and vegetation can act to destabilize slopes under some conditions. 
Nevertheless, on balance deforestation seems to increase landslides: principally by 
reducing surcharge on the slopes, increasing soil moisture, reducing soil 
permeability, producing a less equable microclimate, and reducing the mechanical 
reinforcement of roots.
Humankind has always influenced the environment. At first these influences were no 
different than those of any other organism - indeed, less significant than many. As 
humankind has differentiated itself from other animals through the development of 
culture, it has increasingly influenced the environment through the application of 
technology (Gutkind, 1956). More specifically, it has increasingly come to manipulate 
the land through deforestation, agricultural practices, industrialization, and 
urbanization. The more humankind has come to know about the land, the more has the 
modification of the environment become a deliberate process.
The human influence on landslides has predominantly worked indirectly, by 
influencing the evolution of preparatory physical factors - rather than by directly 
triggering slope movements. The most widespread influence is through controlling 
vegetation - particularly for agriculture. Construction of roads and buildings is 
affecting a growing proportion of the land and through engineering programmes, and 
other forms of intervention such as reforestation, humankind has acted to stabilize 
slopes (Selby, 1987).
Landslides represent a significant hazard, but past research has differed in the 
significance given to causative factors. The ways in which the interaction of these 
factors has been analyzed is dealt with in the next section.
2.4.2 The approaches to landslides
The influence of a wide variety of environmental and social factors on slope instability 
makes landslides a relatively difficult research topic for either the behaviouralist 
school or the structuralist school. For the behaviouralists, landslides do not have 
clearcut physical causes (and their partly-social causes indict the societies which 
contribute to their existence). For the structuralists, landslides do not have clearcut
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social causes (and their partly-physical causes excuse the societies which contribute 
to their existence).
The behaviouralist approach to landslides stresses the significance of their physical 
causes (Burton, Kates, and White, 1978; Bryant, 1991; K Smith, 1992). It 
acknowledges that humankind has a role in modifying the environment but, as a result 
of the retention of the environments determinists’ view that society is essentially 
reactive to nature, has concentrated on an analysis of the geophysical mechanisms 
which trigger them - with a view to their monitoring, management, and control.
Also important has been the issue of vulnerability to landslides. The traditional 
explanation of environmental degradation has been that poor management is the cause 
of land degradation (Redclift, 1984; Blaikie, 1985). The transition to a modern, 
urban society has an acknowledged effect on this process - particularly through 
urbanization and associated rural depopulation.
Since the industrial revolution, humankind has become increasingly affected by 
environmental hazards such as landslides as a result of the increased demand for 
resources, an increasing concentration of population, and an increased interdependence 
of individuals and communities. Not only has humankind exploited more-marginal 
environments, it has also made those environments more susceptible to landslides - 
particularly through urbanization and the destruction of natural vegetation.
Destruction has been especially severe in poor, developing areas undergoing social 
transition and integration into the world market. There is disagreement over the 
significance of this trend: Boserup (1981) argued that rural decline in Africa has 
hindered stable land management by forcing the adoption of more extensive 
agricultural systems - though according to Knox (1984) it is essential for 
modernization and the longterm protection of the land.
The small amount of structuralist research on landslides indicates that humankind’s 
behaviour is of major importance. Social behaviour is mainly shaped by political and 
economic factors, though is dependent on contingent local factors which include the 
local structure of society - but also include the nature of the environment on which 
society works. This is evident in the work of Hewitt (1976) and Jefferey (1981), 
which shows that development has acted to change radically the use that has been made 
of the environment (producing more landslides) and has also made society less tolerant 
of landslides.
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Hewitt (1976) looked at the causes of landslides in north Pakistan after the 1974 
earthquake. He found that, under the influence of protoindustrialization, local people 
had carried out an ecological devastation which had profoundly modified those 
preparatory factors - and made the land more vulnerable to landslides. Although the 
triggering factor for many landslides was the earthquake, the main reason for those 
were the preparatory factors of widespread deforestation, overgrazing, and a reduction 
in concern for the land.
The changing relationship between humankind and landslides was an issue taken up by 
Jefferey (1981). In Indonesia, landslides have for long been a part of ordinary life for 
the local people, who had established a balance of tolerance with their “normal 
landslides”. However, the pattern she described in Indonesia was of landslides 
increasing with development. Perversely, development produced both an antagonistic 
attitude to the environment and a society which is more reliant on environmental 
stability.
2.4.3 Landslides in the Mediterranean
Landslides in regions such as Basilicata are influenced by a number of environmental 
and social factors specifically characteristic of the Mediterranean - most notably its 
climate, vegetation, and the range of cultural practices that have influenced its 
landuse.
The Mediterranean’s current climatic regimes and exogenic slope regimes, are 
relatively new. Recent research indicates that the last glacial retreat from Europe 
occurred about 10,000 BP. The general pattern across Europe since then is reasonably 
well understood (Barry and Chorley, 1987): a post-glacial climatic maximum was 
reached about 5000 BP; followed by a decline from about 2000 BP. Around AD 900, 
the medieval warm epoch set in, until around AD 1300, with temperatures perhaps 
0.5 to 0.8° higher than the European average for AD 1900 to AD 1950 (Flohn and 
Fantechi, 1984). From AD 1300 the weather became noticeably more changeable 
throughout Europe. The “Little Ice Age" reached its most intense in the period AD 
1550 to AD 1700, with temperatures perhaps 0.7 to 0.8° below the European average 
for 1900 to 1950. From AD 1700 to AD 1730 there was a marked warming. The 
nineteenth century saw cooler summers, but a consistent warming began at the end of 
the century which reached its peak between the 1930s and 1950s.
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The influence of broad changes in climate on landslides can be seen in the general 
pattern identified by Starkel (1966) in lowland Western Europe: according to which 
there have been three main phases of increased landslides linked to pluvials over the 
past 11,000 years. These were: up until 10,000 BP, from 7000 BP to 6000 BP, and 
from 2500 BP to 2000 BP. Similarly, in Italy, Flohn and Fantechi (1984) showed 
that the pattern of floods and wet years in Italy showed high levels between 200 BC and 
AD 200 (2150 to 1750 BP), and from AD 1000 (950 BP) onwards. They reported 
that the significant increase in floods in the sixteenth century led to an increase in 
landslides across the whole of Europe.
There is considerable debate over the significance of climate in environmental change 
in the Mediterranean. Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) showed that the debate over the 
causes of change has tended to polarize between environmental determinism, and social 
voluntarism. The complexity of the available information was reviewed by Roberts
(1989). Comparing the data on cultural and environmental change in the 
Mediterranean he concluded that environmental degradation in the region has a complex 
variety of causes:
The fact that alluviation began as early as 3500 yr BP in some areas... suggests 
that climatic oscillations were unlikely to have been solely responsible. On the 
other hand it would be wrong to assume that all eroded Mediterranean hillsides 
are anthropogenic landscapes...
In most cases historical soil erosion was a combined product of natural and 
cultural forces. (Page 142.]
The supposed importance of climate and climatic change as a major factor in the level 
of land degradation and landslides can be traced to the climatic-determinist school and 
has been revived principally by the work of Harris and Vita-Finzi (1968) and Vita- 
Finzi (1969, 1973, 1976). Harris and Vita-Finzi (1968) claimed to have found 
trends in erosion across the Mediterranean, and argued that they must be the result of 
climatic change. Vita-Finzi (1969) noted synchronous cycles of channel erosion at 
several sites from about 8000 BC to post-Roman times, which was then followed by 
deposition (“Younger Fill”) until recent years. He argued that the synchronicity of 
Younger Fill implied climatic origins. However, his later work (1973, 1976) led him 
to suggest that further south these changes occurred earlier.
A number of sources have agreed that climatic change has played the major part in the 
level of land degradation - implicitly including landsliding. Shaw (1981) concluded
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from his work in North Africa that climatic change has been responsible for 
degradation which was only modified by human activity.
In his review of the evidence on land degradation, Davidson (1980) pointed out that the 
causality of degradation is highly complex and argued that the Mediterranean 
experienced a much more intricate denudation chronology than Vita-Finzi allowed for 
- for example, accelerated soil erosion had already affected Santorini by 1470 BC. And 
Judson (1963) had found two periods of deposition in Sicily (after the eighth century 
BC to 325 BC, and a medieval phase) separated by an erosion phase. In Etruria he 
observed one fill period lasting from the late-Roman period to the medieval.
In addition, a range of research has suggested that environmental change cannot be 
divorced from social changes, and the two have acted together to produce environmental 
degradation. Particularly influential in this respect has been the contribution of 
Marsh (1864, 5-7) which acknowledged the importance of the environmental factors 
predisposing the Mediterranean to change, but stressed the importance of the 
correlation between social and environmental change:
The decay of these once flourishing countries is partly due, no doubt, to that class 
of geological causes, whose action we can neither resist nor guide, and partly also 
to the direct violence of hostile human force; but it is, in a far greater 
proportion, either the result of man’s disregard of the laws of nature, or an 
incidental consequence of war, and of civil and ecclesiastical misrule. Next to 
ignorance of these laws, the primitive source, the causa causarum, of the acts and 
neglects which have blasted with sterility and physical decrepitude the noblest 
half of the empire of the Caesars, is, first, the brutal and exhausting despotism 
which Rome herself exercised over her conquered kingdoms, and even more over 
her Italian territory; then, the host of temporal and spiritual tyrannies which 
she left as her dying curse to all her wide dominion, and which, in some form of 
violence or of fraud, still brood over almost every soil subdued by the Roman 
legions. Man cannot struggle at once against crushing oppression and the 
destructive forces of inorganic nature. When both are combined against him, he 
succumbs after a shorter or longer struggle, and the fields he has won from the 
primeval wood relapse into their original state of wild and luxuriant, but 
unprofitable forest growth, or fall into that of a dry and barren wilderness.
Several writers have followed this argument that there is a complex interaction 
between society and the environment - in which both act as agents of change. Braudel 
(1972-1973) argued that medieval erosion was caused by the inability of agriculture 
to cope with the climatic changes of the Little Ice Age. Similarly, Naveh and Dan 
(1973) showed that in Palestine the breakdown of complex agricultural ecosystems 
was principally the result of social crisis - but noted that “damage was more far- 
reaching and recovery much slower on the more sensitive natural environments”
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(page 124). And Hare (1977) concluded that desertification in the Mediterranean was 
largely the result of “unwise" social adaptation to drought.
However, many have claimed a primacy for human action. Tricart and Cailleux 
(1972), Budel (1982), and Blaikie and Brookfield (1987) all pointed out that 
humankind has significantly altered, and even reversed, “normal” processes in the 
Mediterranean. Some sources have even argued that some environmental changes have 
been solely the result of humankind. Murphey (1951) concluded that the breakdown of 
irrigation works in North Africa was the result of social pressures. Slicher Van Bath 
(1963) attributed the widespread degradation of the Mediterranean in the early- 
modern period to breakdown in farming systems due to economic recession. Mikesell 
(1969) argued that destructive deforestation in the Lebanon caused land degradation 
there. Van Ziedam (1975) found Younger Fill deposited in Zaragroza from about 700 
BC to AD 100, related to human activity. And, working in South-East Spain, A M 
Harvey (1978) found that the main changes during the Holocene were caused by 
vegetation and land-use changes.
The Mediterranean’s ecosystems are readily susceptible to disruption and degradation. 
According to Tricart and Cailleux (1972, 244) humankind in the Mediterranean “has, 
with only a few exceptions, completely modified the morphogenic system of the non­
cultivated land”. In the Mediterranean, according to Budel (1982, 324),
“anthropogenic effects on the soil and relief play a greater role... than in nearly any 
other climatic zone”. “Normal” geomorphological processes have been so greatly 
changed by humankind that geomorphological processes have altered and the land has 
become a social product - it has been “humanized”.
The destruction of much of the climax vegetation has increased erosion significantly 
because when the plant cover is reduced, the level of soil nutrients and fertility fall, 
bare patches develop on the soil, accelerating mechanical erosion, the soil loses 
cohesion, and at the same time the less cohesive B and C horizons will be exposed (as a 
result the re-establishment of vegetation becomes more difficult as erosion proceeds).
This may be followed by sheetwash and gulleying.
In areas with similar exogenic regimes to those found in Basilicata, vegetation has a 
significant influence on landslides. Sala and Adolfo (1990) described how the nature of 
litter and the root-binding characteristics of vegetation can markedly affect landslides. 
Cooke (1984) showed that in the Bell Canyon watersheds of California, the areas most 
prone to instability were those with a low vegetation cover: while only a small
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proportion of woodland was affected by landslides (1.2% of broadleaf chapparal, 2.6% 
of oak chapparal, 3.3% of chamise chapparal, and 5.3% of riparian woodland) but a 
much higher proportion of the area under other types of vegetation was affected (6.5% 
of annual grass, 11.9% of perennial grass, and 23.9% of sage and barren).
Humankind has modified the Mediterranean’s vegetation since the late Pleistocene, 
when hunter-gatherers began to use fire to replace the dense forest with more open 
woodland and grassland (Simmons, 1989). According to Delano Smith (1979) pre- 
neolithic peoples probably had a relatively limited impact on the land compared to the 
agriculturalists who replaced them. The pre-classical introduction of agriculture into 
the Mediterranean began a long period of deforestation with profound environmental 
effects (Morandini, 1977). Delano Smith (1979, 293) described the environmental 
effects of traditional methods of deforestation in Southern Europe as follows:
The herbaceous layer is removed entirely, shrubs are uprooted and canopies 
lopped from the very big trees. Trunks and stumps are left in the ground to rot.
After clearance comes years of cultivation... Crops do afford some sort of 
protection but this is by no means as effective as the original vegetation.
Cropping is seasonal and during the months of immaturity the plants cover only a 
small part of the soil. Then the soil is left bare, as fallow until a weed cover 
develops, scarcely adequate as a protection against erosion even after a year or 
two.
The extent of deforestation can be gauged by Glesinger’s estimate (1960) that in 
1960, forests occupied 18 million hectares in the Mediterranean, contrasted to the 
climax figure of between 100 million and 200 million hectares. Tomaselli (1977) 
identified three major phases of deforestation in the Mediterranean resulting from 
colonialism and from commercial pressures divorced from the productive capacity of 
the environment. The first was during the Roman Empire, the second during the period 
of medieval pastoral agriculture, and the third was from about AD 1500 onwards with 
the development first of mercantilism and later industrialization.
The cultural attitudes to the land have also had a profound impact on the mediterranean 
environment. Judeo-Christian culture has a tradition of living with disasters: and even 
now, according to Fabbri (1982, 39, translated) there remains a folk belief that 
“calamitous or catastrophic events are inevitable”. Passive acceptance of hurt as 
inevitable and “natural” is a widespread strategy for coping with hazards by 
individuals or groups who lack or have lost the power to control their own lives (see N 
Smith, 1990).
This fatalism was tempered by a faith in the protective power of religion and magic. 
The outside world was perceived to be in the control of powerful supernatural forces 
and the supernatural to give some hope of protection against the threatening world. 
Following Gutkind (1956, 12) the approach to the land in the Mediterranean can be 
seen as characterized by a change from a “hesitant and whispered dialogue between 
man and nature” to an “aggressive and loud exploitation". The change can be seen in 
the history of the struggle against landslides - a history which has been conditioned by 
the institutions and practices developed to manage the land.
Although the very earliest societies had the ability to modify the environment, this 
ability was rarely exploited. The roots of the inaction lie partly in social and 
technological impotence, but also in the ideology of an eternal, dominating nature (N 
Smith, 1990). This approach has continued in the popular consciousness in the rural 
Mediterranean until the recent past.
As Gutkind (1956) showed, the modern approach to the land and its hazards is very 
different. It aims to apply science in order to manage hazards and is characterized by 
the application of a range of techniques formed and constrained by the bureaucratic 
ethos which generated them (Hewitt, 1983). The sporadic nature of the bureaucratic 
response to landslides makes an inappropriate and inadequate allocation of resources 
unavoidable. For example, Griggs and Gilchrist (1983) commented that throughout the 
world many areas only use planning mechanisms for reducing the risk from landslides 
after a major landslide has aroused public opinion.
Although they may still be harmed by hazards, communities can benefit perversely 
from the bureaucratic response to disasters - because of a combination of an injection 
of outside aid, the beneficial effects to the local economy of the work of reconstruction, 
and possibly the opportunity to modernize the infrastructure of society (Dacy and 
Kunreuther, 1969; Friesma and others, 1979). Geipel (1982) claimed that damage 
after the earthquake of 1976 in Friuli, Northern Italy was exaggerated by local 
politicians, and that the aid which followed the earthquake had a generally beneficial 
effect on the local economy.
Having evolved policies to manage hazards and the funds which are available to cope 
with them, bureaucratic administrators in countries such as Italy have a vested 
interest that the hazard should continue. It provides work, it provides money, and it 
provides prestige for the bureaucracy. Consequently, although intervention after the 
event is usually more costly, and anathema to recognized good management practice
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(Koontz and Weinrich, 1988) yet It may satisfy the administrators’ direct electoral 
need for drama.
The result of the bureaucratization of hazards is a reliance on the state and its agencies 
for protection against hazards. The state’s response to landslides is shared with local 
government (also known as the “local state") which operates “those aspects of state 
policy that the central government considers should be administered within sub-areas 
of the national territory” (Johnston, 1985, 154-155). The way these parts of the 
state attempt to manage hazards is the result of compromise between the political 
society and civil society. According to neo-marxist analysis this compromise is 
structured by the functional requirements of capitalism (Urry, 1981; Johnston, 
1989). Most important in this respect is the state’s need to legitimize itself through 
organizing hegemonic consent for its actions.
Yet since the state embodies powerful class interests, its involvement in hazards 
creates the paradox identified by the Frankfurt School that technology may bring 
greater freedom from nature (N Smith, 1990) - but this is at the expence of 
conceeding freedom to powerful organizations and institutions. As Atkinson (1991) 
showed, the theme that the application of technology inevitably leads to a reduction in 
personal freedom has been analysed by a number of radical environmentalist writers. 
Particularly interesting in this respect was Gorz (1980, 60): “for the satisfaction of 
a ll  needs a person is first of all reduced to dependence on giant institutions and tools 
that are out of the individual’s control and grasp... a person depends on the mega-tools 
of bureaucratic and commercial mega-institutions and is reduced to only being their 
client - submissive, standardized, powerless, exploited, and always dissatisfied.”
Physical and social structuration factors have acted together in the Mediterranean to 
produce the pattern of landslides investigated in the remainder of this dissertation. 
These structuration factors are modified locally by the geographically-specific 
combination of factors that occurs in each locality and produces contingent triggering 
factors which are responsible for each incidence of landsliding. Some idea of the 
processes affecting regions such as Basilicata can be seen in Cooke (1984, 3) which 
described the situation in Los Angeles County, a climatic analogue for Basilicata:
The stage upon which the processes play is largely predetermined by topography 
and the pattern of drainage, the underlying geology and soils, the vegetation 
cover, and the external climatic forces... But fundamental to an understanding of 
geomorphological activity in the Los Angeles region is the fact that some of the 
predetermining condition and the geomorphological processes themselves are not 
constant: they evolve as a result of the changes in, for instance, the location, 
frequency, magnitude and duration of storms, tectonic activity and fire, the
/
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transformation of surface characteristics by the processes of urbanization, and
hazard management...
The pattern of landslides produced in Basilicata is investigated in chapter three, and 
the role of the causative factors specific to the region is investigated in chapter four.
2.5 Conclusions
This chapter has shown how hazards provide a salient reminder that humankind cannot 
dominate the environment. It has also shown that the appreciation of this reminder has 
been profoundly influenced by the ideological implications present in the paradigms on 
environmental hazards. The study of hazards first flourished under behaviouralist 
research, which concluded that humankind is essentially reactive to hazards, but can 
use technology as a cure. More recently, structuralist research has implied that 
humankind’s relationship with hazards is much more ambiguous, and that the political 
and economic structure of society influences hazards.
The structuralist approach provides a major challenge in hazards research: not just to 
the theoretical understanding of hazards, but to the very practical treatment of them: 
how much blame has society for the hazards that people experience, and how might that 
blame be reduced? It is evident that the structuralist critique of environmental 
hazards makes a reassessment of landslides necessary. In this assessment the 
knowledge and insight gained in research carried out under other paradigms should be 
criticized, but not rejected out of hand as irrelevant or misleading - the already- 
quoted suggestion by Hewitt (1983, 25) that “in isolation... our emphases would also 
add up to an unbalanced view” shows that he himself was of this opinion.
Indeed, there are some important points of concensus. Although the misleading term 
“natural hazards" continues to be used (for example even in the title of Bryant’s 
Natural Hazards) there is now a general concensus that society often has a profound 
influence on the occurrence, form, and magnitude of hazards. The impact of all 
environmental hazards is influenced by the nature of society, and the majority of 
hazards - including landslides - are at least in part influenced by humankind.
However, the influence of causative factors in the contingent circumstances which 
produce each individual hazard varies greatly, and many landslides occur without any 
human involvement.
Although most of the literature on political economy and on environmental hazards 
continues to be separate, some work has bridged the gap between the two - most 
notably, for the purposes of this discussion, Cooke (1984) and Crozier (1986). These 
two works draw not just on the insights of structuralist analysis (in Crozier’s case the 
use of structuralist sources is made quite explicitly) but also on the long tradition of 
research into environmental change which acknowledges the complex interaction of 
humankind and the environment. However, to accept that some elements of concensus 
exist should not be taken to imply that its components are of equal worth. This 
dissertation is designed to help in identifying the valuable research findings, by 
assessing the relative merits of the two main competing paradigms for explaining 
landslides in Basilicata.
The assessment of society’s role in environmental hazards which this dissertation's 
approach allows is of crucial importance for the future use of the environment: if 
society has no significant role in environmental hazards, the behaviouralist approach 
to hazards (and the liberal-technocratic approach to the environment) is vindicated. 
The implication is that society can use technology as a cure for hazards and as a tool for 
freedom. If, however, society has a major role in environmental hazards, then it is the 
structuralist approach to hazards (and the radical approach to the environment) that 
is vindicated. The implication would be that society may continue to use technology to 
protect itself from hazards, but only as a remedy - not as a cure. Any real cure would 
have to come through fundamental social change which would allow a fundamental 
change in the relationship between humankind and the environment.
To test for validity of the insights into environmental hazards requires a research 
question, which will provide the dissertation’s theme, that must be constructed to 
allow a critical examination of the differing approaches to hazards. This core is the 
role of humankind: and this dissertation consequently examines the question: how has 
humankind increased the intensity of the hazard from landslides in Basilicata, and why 
has this increase been caused? Such an assessment is of fundamental importance if the 
landslide hazard in areas such as Basilicata is to be tackled effectively in the future, 
and is made in the dissertation’s conclusion in chapter eight.
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Chapter 3: Landslides in Basilicata
This chapter examines the literature on landslides in Basilicata, and the damage they 
cause. By comparing several sources it assesses the intensity of urban landsliding 
during the twentieth century and examines the hypothesis that the level of landslides 
has not changed significantly over the past two centuries.
3.1 The current pattern of landslides
There is a very large contemporary literature on landslides in Basilicata. In its 
bibliography on landslides in the region, Regione Basilicata (1987) listed 125 items 
- of which 55 were published texts and 70 unpublished. Most importantly, there have 
been three main overviews of landslides in the region, produced by Almagte (1910), 
Ministero dei Lavori Pubblici (1964), and II dissesto idrogeologico della Basilicata
(1984). These regional reports have concentrated on the more significant landslides 
only. More intensive research has uncovered a much larger number of smaller 
landslides. In a 2,906 ha sample area in the municipality of Tricarico, for example, 
Alexander (1991) found 117 landslides with a mean size of 1.675 ha (covering 6.7% 
of the area), and 42 gulley and rill systems with a mean size of 2.171 ha (covering 
3.1% of the area).
The regional reviews have shown a widespread problem: it is especially intense in 
many of the urban areas, such as the town of Grassano which is taken as a case-study 
in chapters five to seven of the dissertation.
• Almagia (1910): showed landslides to be widespread in the region. On the 
subject of urban landslides he noted (on page 395) that 94 of the 124 municipalities 
then in existence were affected by landslides or the threat of them. However, some 
doubts must exist as his accompanying map showed 129 of today’s 131 municipalities, 
of which only 73 were shown as affected by landslides or the threat of them (figures
3.1 and 3.2).
• Ministero dei Lavori Pubblici (1964): recorded 158 major landslides in the 
region, and that 104 municipalities were threatened by landslides.
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Figure 3.1 Basilicata: settlements
Figure 3.2: Oliveto Lucano
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• II dissesto idrogeologico della Basilicata (1984): showed that superficial slope 
instability affects 18.4% of Basilicata’s 9,992 km2 , with deep landslides covering 
another 2.6% of the region. Approximately 6,300 sites of superficial erosion 
phenomena, surface landslides, or solifluction were noted which together covered 
184,000 ha of the region. There were approximately 1,800 deep landslides, covering 
a total of 25,800 ha; and 1,000 km of the drainage network was affected by severe 
erosion processes. The proportion of the region affected by various types of slope 
instability is given in table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Basilicata: proportion of the land affected by slope instability (source: I I  
dissesto idrogeologico della Basilicata, 1984)
Shallow processes: 
sheet erosion 
rill erosion 
calanchi erosion* 
debris flow/solifluction
Deep processes:
lateral spread 0 .92 %
rotational slide 0 .6 2%
translational slide 0 .02%
rockfall 0 .15 %
complex landslide 0 .80%
The data in II dissesto idrogeologico della Basilicata (1984) is very detailed, and is 
designed to satisfy requirements for geotechnical information across the region. 
Consequently, in order to allow a simplified, accessible mapping of the region’s
Calanchi is a form of badlands experiencing intense erosion combined with 
superficial landsliding. Calanchi has been defined as “heavily dissected terrain with 
steep, bare slopes and channels which rapidly incise and extend headwards, but which 
are frequently obliterated by mass-movement debris. They... are especially common on 
the Plio-Pleistocene marine clays of the Calabrian deposits.” (Alexander, 1982b,
7 1 . )
Calanchi is often initiated by shallow landslides breaking up the regolith and its 
morphology is derived specifically from the behaviour of cohesive sediments:
“Calanchi erosion involves a relationship between mass movement and the incision of 
channels, and morphological variations are complicated by the presence of pipes, 
which may be vertical or inclined, and which provide an alternative to surface 
drainage.” (Ibid, 85.)
3 .6%  
5 .5%  
1.5%  
7.7%
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landslides, landslide-inventory maps were constructed based on the approaches 
outlined in Griggs and Gilchrist (1983), Hansen (1984b), and Cooke and Doornkamp
( 1 9 9 0 ) .
For the inventory maps the region was divided into a grid of cells, 2’ longitude by 2’ 
latitude, which was superimposed on the 1:100,000 slope-instability map in I I  
dissesto idrogeologico della Basilicata (see Appendix A). Any gridcell half or more 
covering land was counted. There are 953 gridcells in all, giving a total surface 
equivalent of 9,911 km2 , assuming a mean size of 10.4 km2 - acceptably close to the 
region’s 9,992 km2 area. The longitude-latitude base of the grid has the minor 
disadvantage that, as the circumference of the earth varies with latitude, the distance 
subtended by 2’ of latitude is less at 41°08’ N (the north of Basilicata) than it is at 
39°54’ N (the south). However, the difference at its maximum is proportional to the 
ratio between the sines of 50°06’ to 48°52’ - which amounts to an insignificant 
1.9%.
Two classes of instability were analyzed, following the divisions made in II dissesto 
idrogeologico della Basilicata (1984): superficial instability (sheet erosion, rill 
erosion, calanchi erosion, and debris flow and solifluction) and deep slope instability 
(lateral spread, rotational slide, translational slide, rockfall, and complex landslides).
The percentage of each gridcells covered by a given type of slope instability was 
measured by constructing a rectangular grid, composed of 100 subunits of equal size, 
that was printed onto an acetate sheet and superimposed over each gridcell. For each 
subunit that the instability half-or-more covered, 1% coverage was recorded. The full 
results are given in appendix A.
To allow the chloropleth mapping of the distribution of instability, the data for all 
gridcells 1% or more affected by instability was divided into quartiles and plotted in 
figure 3.3 (for superficial instability) and figure 3.4 (for deep instability) - the 
areas of very highest instability were specially indicated. Data on the distribution of 
the instability scores is given in table 3.2 and shows a marked difference in the 
coverage of slope instability: 80.1% of gridcells were affected by superficial 
instability, 41.6% of gridcells were affected by deep slope instability. In addition 
there was a significant negative correlation between the two categories: for the 350 
gridcells (36.7% of the total) affected by both superficial and deep instability, the 
Rho when corrected for ties was -0.176 (significant for a two-tailed test at 0.001) 
because active superficial slope instability hinders the development of deep regolith 
which tends to promote landslides (see Crozier, 1986).
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Table 3.2: Landslide-inventory maps: superficial and deep instability (full data given 
in appendix A)
Count Missing Mean Standard Kurtosis Skewness
deviation
Shallow: 7 6 3  1 9 0  1 5 . 5 5 8  1 6 . 733  5 . 5 6 9  2 . 1 6 3
Deep 3 9 6  5 5 7  7 . 0 5 3  9 . 9 7 8  9 . 6 6 8  2 . 8 8 7
The distribution of the classes of slope instability showed marked differences, and 
noticeable correlations to the region’s geology (figures 4.1 and 4.3). Superficial slope 
instability affects almost all parts of Basilicata but is mainly concentrated in the area 
which would be contained between two o’clock and six o’clock were a clockface to be 
superimposed on the centre of the region. It is particularly associated with steep 
slopes on deforested clay and conglomerate deposits. Landslides are concentrated in the 
area between seven o’clock and eleven o’clock, mainly in the geologically-vulnerable 
schists and sandstones of the Apennines, and the area of most intense precipitation in 
the Apennines inland from the Tyrrhenian coast.
The maps produced can be compared to the qualitative assessment of landslides in the 
region produced by Neboit-Giulhot (1990) (figure 3.5). He distinguished between the 
Apennine landslides (influenced mainly by lithology) and the Bradano Trough 
landslides (influenced mainly by morphology). He identified three main areas in which 
the Apennine landslides are concentrated: First, in the southwest of the region around 
Monte Sirino - where landslides affect mainly the schists and the steep relief and high 
precipitation are contributing factors. Second, to the south of Potenza - where 
landslides affect mainly the schists and flyschs. Third, northeast of Potenza - where 
landslides affect mainly the flyschs and clays. In the Bradano Trough the landslides are 
particularly associated with steep slopes.
Regione Basilicata (1987) showed that Basilicata has a severe urban landslide 
problem, particularly in the Bradano Trough. By the 1980s landslides had damaged 
106 (81%) of the towns in the region (figure 3.6) - of which 56 towns (43%) were 
damaged in the decade 1977 to 1987. In 1987 a total of 26 towns (20%) reported 
urban expansion hindered by landslides and almost 10% of the population was 
estimated to live in accommodation seriously damaged by landslides.
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A clearer understanding of the hazard from urban landslides can be gained from 
Regione Basilicata’s (1987) analysis of the landslide problem affecting thirty-seven 
of the municipalities which the Basilicata regional government investigated in the 
1980s. The data is presented in table 3.3 with the municipality’s population in 1981, 
the grade of the landslide hazard as reported in Lazzari (1986b* *), and the date (if 
any) that orders had been made by central government to consolidate the town against 
landslides.
3.2 Historical trends in landsliding
The analysis of the historical trends in Basilicata’s landslides requires very careful 
interpretation. Insufficient research has previously been carried out on the dating of 
landslides to allow generally valid conclusions to be drawn on trends across the whole 
region. However, the ability of humankind to promote rapid changes in landsliding is 
well documented, and the results of geomorphological process studies, outlined in the 
next chapter, provide evidence that the recorded changes in the use of the land in 
Basilicata have modified many of the preparatory physical factors for landslides. In 
addition a comparison between primary evidence from the beginning of the twentieth 
century and published data from the 1980s points to the conclusion that there has been 
a change in the reported rate of landsliding. This change has been so rapid that, if 
genuine, it could not be accounted for by endogenous environmental changes and could 
only have occurred as a result of rapid social changes affecting the land.
The documents available refers principally to the recorded state of the land. This is not 
adequate on its own because evidence on environmental hazards is subject to 
manipulation by the cultural media through which it is passed (Guidoboni, 1987). In 
particular, as was demonstrated by Burton, Kates, and White (1978), and Redclift 
(1987), technocratic societies such as industrial capitalism are much more aware of 
the danger posed by environmental problems than were their predecessors. 
Consequently an increase in reports of an environmental hazard does not necessarily 
mean that the environment is becoming more hazardous, and may merely represent an 
increased perception of hazardousness.
‘ According to Lazzari’s scoring system, “five" indicates the highest level of damage: 
1 = “stable", 2 = “limited landslides", 3 = “localized landslides”, 4 = “significant 
landslides”, 5 = “very widespread landslides”.
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Table 3.3: Basilicata: selected urban landslides (source: Regione Basilicata, 1987)
• Accettura (population 2,672; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order 
made 1904): affected by a number of landslides, particularly in the south, east, and 
new sections of the town.
• Aliano (population 1,706; landslide hazard grade 5; consolidation order made 
1904): much of the town - including areas of new towns - is affected by very serious 
landsliding, which cannot be contained by consolidation works.
• Armento (population 1,137; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order made 
1904): the eastern part of the town is the worst affected by landslides, with some 
buildings damaged, and a number under threat. Gulley erosion is causing persistent 
landslides.
• Avigliano (population 1,392; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order 
made 1904): some widespread landsliding partly caused by remobilized paleoslides and 
poor foundations.
• Balvano (population 2,286; landslide hazard grade 3; consolidation order made 
1904): parts of the town have been abandoned, and a large number of households are 
homeless.
• Calvera (population 855; landslide hazard grade 3; consolidation order made 
1904): severely affected by landslides since the nineteenth century. Some of the 
landslides cannot be contained by engineering works.
• Castelsaraceno (population 2,086; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation 
order made 1904): landslides affect all parts of the town; some evacuations have been 
carried out, but not all the landslides can be contained.
• Castronuovo di Sant’Andrea (population 1,788; landslide hazard grade 4; 
consolidation order made 1904): affected since the first decade of the present century 
by frequent and serious landslides. The landslides cannot be contained.
• Cirigliano (population 657; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order made 
1904): serious landsliding affects the east of the town.
• Colobraro (population 2,049; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order 
made 1904): surrounded by landslides, which cannot be constrained by consolidation 
works.
• Corleto Perticara (population 3,668; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation 
order made 1904): the outskirts of the entire town is affected by landsliding, and the 
south of the town is threatened by a paleoslide remobilized by recent construction.
• Ferrandina (population 9,157; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order 
made 1904): gulleying has led to a number of landslides, particularly affecting the 
southeast of the town.
• Gorgoglione (population 1,456; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order 
made 1904): a number of landslides affect the town.
• Grassano (population 6,261; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order 
made 1904): landslides affect the centre, south, and southeast of the town, with partial 
transfer suggested.
• Grottole (population 3,163; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order made
1904): landslides affect the western edge of the town.
• Latronico (population 5,776; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order 
made 1904): the northeast section of the town is seriously threatened by a landslide, 
with frequent damage done to buildings.
• Lauria (population 13,477; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order made
1904): some districts of the town - particularly the new part of the upper town and
the entire lower town are severely threatened by serious landslides which will be very 
difficult to contain.
• Lavello (population 13,087; landslide hazard grade 1; consolidation order 
made 1904 and reordered 1935): affected by severe landslides, with widespread 
evacuations and a partial transfer of a section of the town.
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• Maratea (population 5,090; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order made 
1954): affected by a large sackung and smaller landslides, with a large part of the 
town left in a precarious situation.
• Misanello (population 848; landslide hazard grade 2; consolidation order made 
1904): a large part of the town, particularly its eastern sector, is affected by 
landslides.
• Montalbano Jonico (population 9,041; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation 
order made 1904): gulleying has led to a number of landslides, and the south and 
southeast of the town is particularly at risk.
- Nemoli (population 1,559; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order made 
1904): the future existence of the town is threatened, with landslides damaging its 
eastern, southern, and western edges.
• Noepoli (population 1,589; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order made 
1908): the town centre is under threat, as is the northeast of the town. Social housing
in the town is built on a landslide terrace.
• Oppido Lucano (population 4,080; landslide hazard grade 1; consolidation order 
made 1904): cellars underneath the town are prone to collapse. A number of homes 
have been abandoned due to a landslide.
• Pisticci (population 17,685; landslide hazard grade 5; consolidation order 
made 1904): a long history of landslides. Transfer of the town has been proposed.
• Pomarico (population 5,019; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order 
made 1904 and reordered 1935): large landslides threaten the town.
• Roccanova (population 2,092; landslide hazard grade 3; consolidation order 
made 1904): there are frequent landslides affecting the outskirts of the town. The 
southwest section of the town is particularly heavily damaged by landslides.
• San Fele (population 5,924; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order made
1904): subject to instability in a number of places, and in urgent need of 
consolidation. A serious landslide, last triggered in 1968, continues to give cause for 
concern.
• San Paulo Albanese (population 624; landslide hazard grade 3; consolidation 
order made 1956): affected by a number of landslides - particularly in the northeast 
section of the town.
• Satriano di Lucania (population 2,113; landslide hazard grade 3; consolidation 
order made 1904): a large number of dwellings damaged by landslides.
• Sant’Angelo le Fratte (population 1,630; landslide hazard grade 4; 
consolidation order made 1904): a number of studies since the beginning of the 
present century have suggested that the settlement should be transferred because of 
landslides, but little has been done.
• Sant’Arcangelo (population 6,704; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation 
order made 1904): very serious landslides, with partial transfer of the town 
suggested. Consolidation works have had only a limited success.
• Stigliano (population 7,267; landslide hazard grade 3; consolidation order 
made 1904): a number of serious landslides affect the town, and consolidation is 
urgently needed.
• Terranova di Pollino (population 2,016; landslide hazard grade 4; 
consolidation order made 1904): threatened by a number of landslides. The partial 
transfer of the settlement has been suggested.
• Tito (population 4,834; landslide hazard grade 3; consolidation order made 
1904): threatened by a number of landslides, including some caused by recent urban 
development.
• Tricarico (population 7,223; landslide hazard grade 3; consolidation order 
made 1908): landslides affect the east and centre of the town.
• Tursi (population 6,072; landslide hazard grade 4; consolidation order made 
1904): gulley erosion, aggravated by the collapse of cellars, has led to quite extensive 
damage.
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There is a range of very well established physical reasons why the environment of 
Italy, and Basilicata in particular, has long been susceptible to landslides. However, 
environmental degradation has only been recorded as a problem in Italy since the 
seventeenth century (according to Burato, 1976) or the eighteenth century (according 
to Delano Smith, 1979). Before that period, evidence of environmental degradation 
was suppressed or ignored: Pedio (1964) suggested this may have been because it was 
irrelevant to the needs of the feudal landowning class. Vita-Finzi (1969, 39), 
following Marsh, remarked on the well documented reports of degradation in parts of 
Italy since the Classical period.
Rivers that were navigable in Classical times, and in some cases as late as the 
sixteenth century, have silted up. The course of lowland streams has altered and 
continues to do so. Former ports - notably Ostia - now lie inland as a result of 
deposition at their mouths. Indeed, many Italian deltas have formed almost 
entirely in historical times, although at varying rates...
Similar changes have been noted in Basilicata, where landslides have long been facts of 
everyday life, and Zanardelli (cited in Corti, 1976, ix, translated) described 
conditions in the region as ‘ in contrast to its ancient flourishing state”. By the end of 
eighteenth century there had already been considerable evidence of landslides in the 
region - with reports from Pisticci in 1505 and 1555 (Guericchio and Melidoro,
1979) and from Stigliano in 1697 (Boenzi, 1974). At Pisticci, in 1688, a landslide 
killed several hundred (Almagia, 1910; Guericchio and Melidoro, 1979), and in the 
seventeenth century, the town of Oggiano - near present-day Ferrandina - was 
destroyed by landslides (Camera dei Deputati, 1954; Sebastiani and Sebastiani,
1979). According to Alexander (1989b, 229), many such settlements in Southern 
Italy “have successfully absorbed small disaster events from previous epochs, 
including landslides, minor earthquake damage, urban karstic subsidence, or the 
depradations of gully erosion at their peripheries”.
A number of sources show an increase in the level of reported landslides in Basilicata 
before the twentieth century. Almagfo (1910) listed 287 landslides in Central and 
Southern Italy which had occurred between AD 1103 to AD 1908. Of these, 69 were in 
Basilicata - the earliest recorded at Pisticci in 1698, with one further example 
reported for the seventeenth century, one in the eighteenth century, thirty-eight in 
the nineteenth century, and twenty-nine between 1900 and 1908.
From the eighteenth century a number of writers recorded the problem of land 
degradation and landslides, and pressed for soil conservation as a necessary condition
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for revitalizing the region - quite possibly in reaction to a worsening of land 
degradation (Boenzi, 1974). Afan de Rivera (1832) and Monticelli (1841) described 
the problem from land degradation in the Kingdom of Naples and stressed the economic 
importance of land reclamation. D’Errico (1846) drew attention to the hazard of 
urban landslides in Basilicata - which threatened damage to many towns and even 
destruction of some.
Documentary evidence on the number of landslides across the region implies that the 
hazard from landslides has reached historically-unprecedented levels in the twentieth 
century, and is continuing to intensify. The reported number of landslides in the region 
increased, but the reporting of them undoubtedly became more assiduous as a result of 
the developing ethic of managerialism. The rising concern over environmental 
degradation and landslides in Basilicata has been reflected in the growing 
documentation and analysis of them. This led to a growth in official concern over the 
problem during the late nineteenth century which culminated in the tour of Basilicata 
made by the President of the Council of Ministers, Zanardelli, in 1904 (Corti, 1976).
He found a widespread problem of intense erosion, with landslides common along the 
banks of the larger rivers and the gulleys.
As a result of Zanardelli’s report, and the shock which it provoked among the political 
classes, two laws were passed to allow government funding of consolidation against 
landslides, law 130 of 1904 and law 445 of 1908. Given the cautious nature of 
bureaucratic innovation, the large number of towns scheduled for consolidation by the 
government shows both the widespread existence of urban landslides at the time, and 
the real fear which they engendered. The distribution of these towns is shown in figure 
3.7.
A second source on the intensity of landsliding at the beginning of the twentieth century 
is an early official inventory of urban landslides. On 3 January 1906, a landslide at 
Genzano di Lucania caused the death of fifteen people. Requests were made for national 
assistance, and the Ministero della Real Casa wrote to the prefect requesting 
information on his administration’s reaction to the event (ASP, Prefettura di Potenza, 
Gabinetto, I, 280, letter from the ministero to the prefetto, dated 17.1.1906). The 
prefect’s inquiries broadened to encompass problems faced throughout Basilicata. On 
February 3 a circular was sent out which requested information from the 
municipalities. The circular (ibid, “Oggetto: condizioni di stability degli abitanti”, 
dated 3.2.1906) was intended to uncover information on landslides, in order to 
prevent a recurrence of the events at Genzano. One hundred and twenty of the 125
■  Order given 1904
■  Order given 1908
□  [V ith  date] order given a fter 1908
□  1970s □  No order given
□  1956  
□  1970s
Figure 3 .7  Basilicata: consolidation orders for urban centres 
(source: Regione Basilicata, 1 9 8 7 )
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mayors in Basilicata reported on the urban landslides in their municipalities. The 
results were summarized (ibid, “Condizioni di stabilita degli abitati - (Circ. 3/2 n 
169)”) (figure 3.8).
A third source is the pattern shown by Almagiei (1910). From his map of landslides it 
is possible to reconstruct the extent of landslides experienced by the town centres of 
129 of today’s 131 municipalities (there were 125 municipalities in Basilicata at the 
time, though four of the six towns which have subsequently become new municipalities 
were also shown). Almagia’s data, the validity of which has already been discussed, was 
collected between 1904 and 1906. It shows that of the 129 towns fully 56 (that is 
43%) were unaffected by landslides, 24 (19%) were “threatened” by landslides, and 
the remaining 49 (38%) had been “damaged” (figure 3.9).
A chi-square analysis of the regional landslide statistics (given in appendix B) shows 
that the number of urban landslides increased between the first decade of this century 
and 1986. The data on urban landslides from the first decade of the present century can 
be compared to that on urban landslides in 1986 (figure 3.10). Chi-square analysis 
shows there to be a very strong correlation between the data for 1906 and the data for 
1910 - this corroboration implies that both measures give a reasonably accurate 
description of urban landslides at the time. The null hypothesis that there is no 
similarity between the two sets of data was rejected, with a probability of 0.0013. 
Chi-square analysis shows there to have been a mild correlation between the data for 
1906/1910 and that for 1986. The null hypothesis that there is no similarity 
between the data for 1906 and 1986 was rejected, with a probability of 0.0296 and 
the null hypothesis that there is no similarity between the data for 1910 and 1986 
was rejected, with a probability of 0.0396.
That 1906 and 1910 were very much more strongly correlated to each other than to 
1986 implies a breakdown in the pattern of landslides which existed at the beginning 
of the present century. In addition, the contingency tables in appendix B show a 
number of cases where the reported level of landslides worsened between 1906/1910 
and 1986:
• Of the 49 towns reported as not damaged by urban landslides in 1906: only 13 
were reported as stable in 1986. Ten were reported as at risk from landslides, but 17 
were reported as affected by small landslides, 8 were reported as affected by localized 
landslides, and 1 was reported as affected by widespread landslides (see table 3.4).
□  Not damaged 
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Figure 3 .8  Basilicata: urban landslides in  1 9 0 6  
(source: ASP, P re ff., Gab., I ,  2 8 0 )
□ ■
15 km
Figure 3 .9  Basilicata: urban landslides in 1 9 1 0  (source: A1 magi a , 1 9 1 0 )
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Figure 3 .1 0  Basilicata: urban landslides in  1 9 8 6  (source: L azzari, 1 9 8 6 b )
Table 3.4: Basilicata: urban landslide data (sources: ASP, Prefettura di Potenza, 
Gabinetto, I, 280, ‘Oggetto: condizioni di stability degli abitanti", dated 3.2.1906; 
Almagi&, 1910; Lazzari, 1986b)
Town 1 906 1 9 1 0 affected
1 9 7 7 - 8 7
7 9 8 6 consolidation
order/s
Province of Matera:
Accetura 2 2 2 4 1 9 0 4
Aliano 2 3 2 5 1 9 0 4
Bernalda 2 2 1 3 1904
Calciano • 1 2 3 1 9 7 0
Cirigliano 2 2 2 4 1 9 0 4
Colobraro 1 1 2 4 1 9 0 4
Craco 1 2 2 5 1 9 0 4
Ferrandina 1 1 2 4 1 904
Garaguso 1 1 2 3 1935
Gorgoglione 1 3 2 4 1 9 0 4
Grassano 2 1 2 4 1 90 4
Grottole 2 2 2 4 1 904
Irsina 1 3 1 3 1 904
Matera 1 1 1 3 1 9 04
Miglionico 2 3 2 4 1 904
Montalbano Jonico 2 3 2 4 1 904
Montescaglioso 2 2 2 4 1 9 04
Nova Siri 1 3 1 4 1 9 0 4
Oliveto Lucano 2 3 2 4 1 90 4
Pisticci 2 3 2 5 1 9 04
Policoro • 1 0 1 none
Pomarico • 3 2 4 1904 and 1935
Rotondella 1 1 1 3 1 9 0 4
Salandra 2 3 2 3 1 9 0 4
San Giorgio Lucano 2 3 1 3 1 904
San Mauro Forte 1 3 1 2 1 9 0 4
Scanzano Jonico ♦ 1 0 1 none
Stigliano 2 3 2 3 1 9 0 4
Tricarico 1 2 2 3 1 9 0 8
Tursi 2 1 2 4 1 9 0 4
Valsinni 2 1 1 4 1 9 04
Province of Potenza
Abriola 1 1 2 3 given, but no date
Accerenza 2 3 1 3 1 9 3 4
Albano di Lucania 2 1 2 2 1 9 6 0
Anzi 1 1 1 2 1 9 6 0
Armento 2 3 2 4 1 9 0 4
Atella 1 1 0 1 none
Avigliano 2 1 2 4 1 9 0 4
Balvano 2 1 2 3 1 9 0 4
Banzi • 1 0 1 none
Baragiano 2 2 0 1 1 9 0 4
Bari le • 3 1 3 1 9 0 4
Bella • 3 2 4 1 9 0 4
Brienza 2 2 2 3 1 9 0 4
Brindisi di Montagna 1 1 1 2 none
Calvello 1 3 2 3 1 9 0 4
Calvera 2 3 2 3 1 9 0 4
Campomaggiore 2 3 1 4 1 9 0 4
Cancelfara 1 3 1 2 1 9 0 4
Carbone 2 2 1 3 1 9 0 8
Castelgrande 2 1 1 3 1 9 0 4
Castelluccio Inferiore 2 3 1 2 1 9 0 4
Castelluccio Superiore 1 1 0 1 none
Castelmezzano 2 1 1 3 1 9 0 4
Castelsaraceno 2 3 2 4 1 9 0 4
Castronuovo di Sant’Andrea 2 3 2 4 1 9 0 4
Cersosimo 1 3 1 3 1 9 0 4
Chiaromonte 1 1 1 3 1 9 0 4
Corleto Perticara 2 3 2 4 1 9 0 4
Episcopia « 2 2 4 1 9 3 4
Fardella 1 1 1 3 1 9 56
Filiano • 1 1 3 1 9 5 2
Forenza 1 3 0 1 1 9 04
Francavilla 2 1 1 2 given, but no date
Gallicchio 2 3 1 4 1 9 0 4
Genzano di Lucania 2 3 0 1 1 9 0 4
Ginestra ♦ • 1 2 none
Grumento Nova 1 • 0 1 none
Guardia Perticara 1 1 1 2 1 9 3 8
Lagonegro 2 1 2 3 1 9 0 4
Latronico 1 1 2 4 1 9 0 4
Laurenzana 2 3 2 3 1 9 0 4
Lauria 2 3 2 4 1 9 0 4
Lavelio 2 1 2 1 1904 and 1935
Maratea 1 1 2 4 1 9 5 4
Marsico Nuovo 1 1 0 1 1 9 1 6
Marsicovetere 1 1 0 1 none
Maschito 2 2 0 1 1 9 0 4
Melfi 1 1 1 2 given, but no cilate
Missanello 1 3 2 2 1 9 0 4
Moliterno 1 2 0 1 none
Montemilone 2 3 1 2 1 9 0 4
Montemurro 2 3 2 4 1 9 0 4
Muro Lucano 1 1 1 3 1 9 7 4
Nemoli 2 3 2 4 1 9 04
Noepoli 1 1 2 4 1 9 0 8
Oppido Lucano 2 3 0 1 1 9 0 4
Palazzo San Gervasio 2 1 0 1 1 9 7 4
Paterno • 1 0 1 1 9 7 0
Pescopagano 2 1 1 3 1 9 0 4
Picerno 2 1 1 3 1 9 5 5
Pietragalla ♦ 3 1 3 - 1 9 0 4
Pietrapertosa 2 3 1 3 1 9 0 4
Pignola 2 3 1 2 1 9 0 4
Potenza 1 1 1 2 1 9 7 4
Rapolla 2 1 0 1 1 9 0 8
Rapone 1 1 1 2 1 9 0 4
Rionero in Vulture 1 1 0 1 none
Ripacandida 2 2 1 2 1 9 0 4
Rivello 1 1 1 3 1 9 5 2
Roccanova 2 2 2 3 1 9 0 4
Rotonda 1 2 0 1 1 9 0 4
Ruoti 1 3 2 3 1 9 0 4
Ruovo del Monte 1 3 1 3 1 9 04
San Chirico Nuovo • 1 0 1 none
San Chirico Raparo 1 2 1 3 1 9 0 4
San Constantino Albanese 2 3 1 3 1 904
San Fele ♦ 3 2 4 1 904
San Martino d’Agri 2 3 2 4 1 904
San Paulo Albanese 2 1 2 3 1 9 56
San Severino Lucano 1 3 1 3 1 904
Sant’Angelo le Fratte 1 2 2 4 1 904
Sant’Arcangelo 2 2 2 4 1 904
Sarconi 1 2 0 1 1 9 0 8
Sasso di Castalda 2 2 1 3 1 908
Satriano di Lucania  ^2 3 2 3 1 9 04
Savoia di Lucania • 2 1 3 1 9 1 6
Senise 2 1 2 4 1 904
Spinoso 1 1 0 1 none
Teana 1 1 1 2 none
Terranova di Pollino 2 3 2 4 1 9 04
Tito 2 3 2 3 1 9 04
Tolve 2 2 1 3 1908 and 1955
Tramutola 1 1 0 1 1 9 55
Trecchina 1 1 1 3 1 9 1 6
Trivigno • 3 1 4 1904 and 1941
Vaglio Basilicata • 1 1 3 1 904
Venosa 1 2 0 1 1 9 08
Vietri di Potenza 1 1 2 3 1 9 53
Viggianello • 1 1 3 1 9 40
Viggiano • 1 1 2 none
Codes:
For 1906: 1 = not damaged by urban landslides, 2 = damaged by urban landslides, • = 
missing or ambiguous data (source: ASP, Prefettura di Potenza, Gabinetto, I, 280, 
“Oggetto: condizioni di stability degli abitanti”, dated 3.2.1906).
For 1910: 1 = not damaged by urban landslides, 2 = threatened by urban landslides, 3 
= damaged by urban landslides, • = missing or ambiguous data (source: Almagte, 
1 910 ) .
For affected 1977-87: 0 = never affected, 1 = not affected 1977-1987, 2 = affected 
1977-1987 (source: Regione Basilicata, 1987, Lazzari 1986b)
For 1986: 1 = sufficiently stable, 2 = at risk from landslides, 3 = affected by small 
landslides, 4 = affected by localized landslides, 5 = affected by widespread landslides 
(source: Lazzari, 1986b).
For the date of consolidation orders: 1904 [etcj = date consolidation order made 
(source: Regione Basilicata, 1987).
• Of the 56 towns reported as not damaged by urban landslides in 1910: only 15 
were reported as stable in 1986. Ten were reported as at risk from landslides, but 21 
were reported as affected by small landslides, 10 (including Grassano) were reported 
as affected by localized landslides, and none was reported as affected by widespread 
landslides (see table 3.4).
• Of the 24 towns reported as threatened by urban landslides in 1910: only 6 
were reported as stable in 1986. One was reported as at risk from landslides, but 9 
were reported as affected by small landslides, 7 were reported as affected by localized 
landslides, and 1 was reported as affected by widespread landslides (see table 3.4).
Corroboration of the pattern of worsening urban landslides is given by the 
government’s scheduling of towns for consolidation against landslides (table 3.4, 
figure 3.7). Rescheduling indicates the recurrence of problems, but the growth in 
consolidation orders shown in table 3.5 seems to represent an administrative 
recognition of a worsening position, rather than the acceptance of an existing one. It is 
not correlated with the growth in spending which only took place from the 1970s.
Table 3.5: Basilicata: consolidation orders (source: Regione Basilicata, 1987)
Year Towns H
1 9 04 8 2 .
1 9 0 8 9 -
1910s 3 1
1920s 0 2
1930s 4 (and 2 rescheduled) 1
1940s 1 (and 1 rescheduled) 1
1950s 8 (and 1 rescheduled) 1
1960s 2 1
1970s 8 0
3.3 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the wide variety of information on landslides in Basilicata, 
and showed instability to be both severe and widespread. It then examined the
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hypothesis that landslides have increased in recent centuries, according to the 
information reported on urban landslides, and at many towns such as Grassano the 
landslide hazard has increased significantly. There are, however, difficulties in 
assessing historical rates of landslides, because of a lack of evidence. Research on the 
dating of individual landslides is limited: though the evidence from process studies 
reported in chapter four implies that, as a result of recent environmental change, the 
number of landslides will have increased. Although this chapter has shown that the 
number of recorded landslides has increased, that could be the result either of more 
assiduous reporting or a real increase in landslides.
The pattern of increased reported landslides demands an explanation: a number of 
factors which may have accounted for it are outlined in the next chapter, and they 
imply that the reported increase was in part a real increase. Chapter five examines the 
reasons that.account for the documented increase at Grassano. Chapter six shows that 
there has been a real increase in landslides. Chapter seven takes up the issue raised 
here - whether and why there has been an increase in the sensitivity to landslides 
which may account for some of the reported increase in landslides.
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Chapter 4: The reasons for landslides in Basilicata
This chapter examines the factors involved in the apparent increase in landslides 
reported in chapter three. It assesses first the importance of the physical factors and 
then the importance of the social factors that have accounted for this change.
4.1 Introduction
As chapter two showed, landslides are environmental hazards that have highly complex 
causes which can be traced to both physical factors and social factors. This chapter 
considers the regional structuration factors which influence landslides throughout 
Basilicata - but are modified by contingent local factors.
Basilicata is a predominantly mountainous region at the southern end of the Apennine 
mountains, and there is a variety of physical factors that predisposes the region to a 
high “normal” level of landsliding. The mechanical instability characteristic of slopes 
is accentuated by climatic extremes of heat and cold, of summer drought and heavy 
autumn/winter rain; much of the vegetation is sparse and heavily degraded; a large 
proportion of the region is composed of fragile geological formations, and the mainly 
mountainous terrain produced by intense tectonism is heavily denuded and steeply 
sloping; in addition much of the region is subject to high-magnitude earthquakes.
The impact of these physical problems is made more intense by the longstanding 
economic poverty of Southern Italy, the “Mezzogiorno”, which Basilicata shares. Since 
medieval times Southern Italy has remained detached from the relative dynamism of 
Northern European culture: by the nineteenth century it was already relatively poor, 
and this poverty was accentuated when the North industrialized (King, 1987). 
Economic poverty has brought with it an environmental poverty, because much of the 
region’s land has been overexploited. The results of degradation, such as landslides, are 
widespread.
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4.2 The physical factors
4.2.1 Introduction
According to Ranieri (1972, 43-44, translated) the main physical factors which 
control the nature of slopes and the forces which act on them at the regional scale in 
Basilicata are: relief, geology, climate, vegetation, and tectonism and seismicity.
The prevalence of Tertiary deposits - flysch, silty clays, silty sandstones, and 
particularly clays - which show little coherence and are easily eroded by 
running water, and the very high levels of precipitation, make Basilicata the 
most landslide-prone part of the Apennines and of Italy...
It is easy to see how this tragic misfortune, which is without doubt mainly the 
result of the region’s geology, has been made worse by the widespread 
deforestation which occurred without hindrance between 1808 and 1880... The 
deforestation of the woodlands, which had acted as the major natural protection 
against rainfall, set in motion an intense period of soil erosion, which led to 
landslides and a number of other unfortunate consequences.
It should also be remembered that, in Basilicata, landslides and slope instability 
in general is also significantly increased by a high level of seismicity...
The physical factors are important in predisposing Basilicata to a high level of 
landslides - but they are not be the only triggering factors. The importance of other 
factors in explaining slope instability was commented on by Puglisi (1977, 92, 
translated): “Although the key to understanding the obscure causes of the slope 
instability is found in the rock lithology and in tectonic changes, other factors - 
climate and human action - also have a role in causing it.” The situation in much of 
Basilicata is similar to that in the neighbouring region of Calabria where human action 
has had a significant impact on what was already a very fragile environment, as was 
noted by Brunsden, Kirkby, and Kirkby (1973, 361): ‘Geological youth and mobility, 
the delicate vegetation and erodible lithologies combine with the extremes of 
mediterranean and mountain climates to produce circumstances which are favourable 
to high rates of erosion, rapid development of flood water and intensive landsliding.” 
These factors will be dealt with in the remainder of section 4.2.
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4.2.2 Rel ief
Basilicata’s relief is dominated by the Apennines, which the region straddles. From the 
Tyrrhenian coast in the west, the land rises rapidly to over 1,000 m above sealevel. A 
number of the Apennine peaks such as Monte Vulturino, Monte Alpi, and Monte Sirino 
approach or even exceed 2,000 m in altitude. From the Apennine highlands, the land 
descends towards the wide coastal plains of Metaponto and the Ionian Sea (figure 4.1), 
dissected by the main rivers Bradano, Basento, Cavone, Agri, and Sinni (figure 4.2). 
Mountain building, local tectonic instability, and active erosion processes working 
together have produced a steeply sloping relief: there are very few gentle slopes, and 
70% of the land is classified as mountainous, 22% as hilly, and 8% as flat (Ranieri, 
1972). Mean rates of erosion are very high: erosion for the Bradano basin averaged 
1,159 tonnes per km2 per year before the construction of the San Giuliano dam, for 
the Crati basin it was 1,003 tonnes per km2 per year, and 2,451 tonnes per km2 for 
the Sinni basin (Regione Basilicata, 1987).
High rates of erosion encourage slope instability by the removal of lateral or 
underlying support (Beaty, 1959), and localized surcharging and lateral pressure 
(see Regione Basilicata, 1987). Carrara and others (1978) found a Kendall 
correlation coefficient of 0.45 (significant at over 99%) between the intensity of 
erosion and slope instability in the Ferro basin on the boundary between Basilicata and 
Calabria. Gulleying is a very widespread phenomenon - as Rossi-Doria (1963, 42, 
translated) commented: “All the watercourses which cross the region... have a 
torrent-like character and more-or-less pronounced gulley features on their banks." 
Erosion can reach very high levels on some geological deposits in the region. According 
to Bruckner (1982, and 1990) rates of erosion, greatly accelerated by human 
occupation, have averaged 0.58 mm per year in the Basento valley near Ferrandina, 
and 0.61 mm per year in the Cavone valley since 636,000 BP. Locally, figures can be 
even higher. Working in Tricarico, Rendell (1982) found inter-rill erosion rates on 
clay varying between 5.3 mm a year and 36.4 mm a year (though these figures were 
later disputed: Yaalon, 1983; Rendell, 1983). Alexander (1982b) found rates as high 
as 20 to 30 mm per year on some clays.
As table 4.1 shows, all but one of the mass movement types identified in II dissesto 
idrogeologico della Basilicata (1984, 52-53) had its modal distribution in the slope
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class category 18-30° (the exception being rockfalls, much less dependent than other 
forms of mass movement on the thickness of regolith). Similarly Calcagnile, 
Palmentola, and Pennetta (1982) found close correlations between slope inclination 
and instability which are probably applicable for the rest of the region: slopes of up to 
10° were almost always stable, slopes of 10° to 20° produced some instability in clay 
lithologies, slopes of 20° to 40° were unstable for all lithologies, and slopes of over 
40° were very unstable.
Table 4.1: Basilicata: the relationship between slope steepness and type of slope 
instability (source: II dissesto idrogeologico della Basilicata, 1984)
Slope steepness (degrees) 0 - 5 5 - 1 0 1 0 - 1 8 1 8 - 3 0 3 0 - 4 5 >4i
Instability type
Sheet erosion 0 6 9 31 2 9 2 5
Rill erosion 0 7 7 3 7 2 2 2 7
Calanchi erosion 0 0 3 4 9 2 4 2 4
Superficial slips/ 0 8 1 0 5 5 1 8 1 0
solifluction
Lateral spreads 0 3 2 6 6 1 6 1 4
Rotational slides 0 4 4 7 2 1 1 1 0
Translational slides 0 3 5 4 2 1 4 3 6
Rockfalls 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 5 6
Complex landslides 0 0 2 7 6 1 2 1 0
4.2.3 Geology
Ranieri (1972) placed geology as of major significance, after relief, in the factors he 
listed as of importance in causing landslides in Basilicata - and the pattern of 
landslides in the region is substantially controlled by it. Located at the southern end of 
the Apennines, subject to intense and continuing orogeny, Basilicata has a complex 
geological structure (Pieri, 1975; Mudge, unpublished, 1991). This structure 
resulted from the formation of the Apennines which began in the Upper Miocene, 
during the subsidence of the Tyrrhenian post-orogenic basin. It came as a result of the 
movement of the Apennine thrust belt which is either an extension of the African plate 
(Channel, D’Argenio, and Howarth, 1979) or a separate microplate (Lort, 1971).
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The evolution of Basilicata’s geology is discussed in Mudge (unpublished, 1991). The 
main uplands of the Apennines are formed of calcareous dolomites and a mixture of 
arenaceous schists and clays. To the east are the more chaotic deposits of Pliocene 
sandy clays (“flysch”). Through the central zone of the region are areas of volcanic 
rocks, sandstones and sandy schists, and sandy conglomerates. Alluvium covers the 
valleys of the major rivers flowing towards the Ionian coast, and the coastal area is 
covered in marine deposits (figure 4.3).
Many of the region’s geological formations, particularly silts and clays, are 
vulnerable to erosion. These vulnerable formations cover most of Basilicata - 
Alexander (1982a) showed that at least 54% of Basilicata is underlain by fine­
grained cohesive sediments, and 19% of the region consists of overconsolidated Plio- 
Pleistocene marine silt clays which are prone to erosion once the overburden has been 
removed. Of the thirty-five lithological complexes identified by II dissesto 
idrogeologico della Basilicata, three had over 50% of their area affected by shallow 
mass-wasting processes and six had over 5% of the surface area covered by deep 
landslides.
More specifically, 81% of the area of heterogeneous chaotic clays were affected by 
landslides: they outcrop over 0.8% of the region; the complex is mainly composed of 
silicide varicoloured clays with a medium to high plasticity, strength, and 
compressibility. Permeability is very low: and as a consequence, instability, 
gulleying, and undercutting cause landsliding in many areas. Forty-seven percent of 
calcareous silty sandstones are affected by landslides, characterized by calcareous and 
sandy components, which outcrop over 0.6% of the region. Fifty-nine percent of 
paleolandslide deposits are affected by contemporary landslides: they outcrop over 
2.6% of the region and are composed of a wide variety of rock types with a large range 
of characteristics.
Deep landslides affect 42% of paleoslide deposits - far more than the next-highest 
figure of 7.6% of calcareous silts (which outcrop over 2.9% of the region); 7.0% of 
heterogeneous clays (which outcrop over 3.1% of the region); 5.9% of conglomerates 
(which outcrop over 0.6% of the region); 5.4% of chaotic heterogeneous clays (which 
outcrop over 4.6% of the region); and 5.3% of sandy silts (which outcrop over 1.1% 
of the region).
The control of lithology on landslides has been confirmed in a number of specific case 
studies. For example, Carrara and others (1978) found a Kendall correlation
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coefficient of 0.38 (significant at over 99%) between rock type and slope instability 
in the Ferro basin. Contingency-table analysis showed a Kendall correlation coefficient 
of 0.09 between the two - significant at over 99%. They found the modal class of 
landslides for Albidonian flysch was slide/flow, for varicoloured clays it was 
slide/flow, for Miocene deposits it was slide, for Plio-quaternary deposits it was 
slide/flow, and for alluvium it was flow (table 4.2).
Table 4.2: Ferro Basin: the relationship between lithology and the type of landslide 
(source: Carrara and others, 1978)
Lithological type Percentage affected by each type of instability
slide fa ll flow slide/flow
Albidonian flysch 33.8 0.6 16.3 49 .3
varicoloured clays 31 . 5 0 .3 17.4 50 .8
Miocene 60 . 2 6.0 7.2 26.5
Plio-quaternary 33.3 6 .7 13.3 46 . 7
alluvium 23.1 1.0 38.5 37 .5
mean 33 . 7 0.8 17.2 48 .4
Similarly, Van Asch (1980), working in northern Calabria, found a number of 
significant correlations between the distribution of landslides and the four main 
lithologies: metamorphic, silt-claystones, sandstone, and granite. Most resistant to 
landslides were metamorphic rocks, outcropping over 53% of the studied area and 
accounting for 28% of the area of landslides. By contrast, silt-claystones outcropped 
over 28% of the studied area but accounted for 42% of the area of landslides. 
Sandstones and granite tended to produce the most superficial landslides, silt- 
claystones the deepest (table 4.3).
Table 4.3: North Calabria: the relationship between lithology and the size of landslides 
(source: Van Asch, 1980)
Lithology % of area % number % area % volume
of landslides of landslides of landslides
Metamorphic 5 3 2 9 2 8 2 3
Silt-claystone 2 0 3 6 4 2 58
Sandstone 2 7 3 2 2 8 1 9
Granite 0 .7 3 1 0 .3
Kayser (1963) noted the importance of soil structure as a factor determining 
landslides in Basilicata. Soils based on more coherent bedrocks tend to be less affected 
by soil erosion - and consequently by gulleys and landslides. He found that landslides 
most frequently affect areas of sandy soils - especially those that have lost their 
topsoil and are desiccated - and areas of plastic clay soils. He classified almost 40% of 
soils he tested throughout Basilicata as clay soils, and over 30% of the remainder had 
high sand contents.
Alexander (personal communication) has suggested that the neotectonic instability of 
Basilicata makes discontinuities very important as a preparatory factor for landslides 
- though an underrated one. Some direct links have been found between structure and 
landslides in Basilicata. In the case of the Orco-Sativo river basin, in the municipality 
of Vaglio Basilicata, Alexander (1990) found that intense fracturing was highly 
significant in the creation of unstable land. Similarly, Guericchio and Melidoro 
(1979) found that neotectonic movements have often acted as preparatory factors in 
landslides, and have been one of the causes of the widespread calanchi erosion in the 
municipality of Pisticci. Throughout Basilicata numerous paleoslides have been 
reactivated (Regione Basilicata, 1987) - probably including the paleoslide at 
Grassano which is discussed later in this dissertation.
4.2.4 Tectonism and seismicity
Basilicata is subject to significant neotectonic activity. Ghisetti (1981) quoted data 
for the neighbouring region of Calabria which demonstrated significant uplift rates - 
past and present: on deposits laid down by 1.4 million years BP he found uplift rates of 
0.06 to 0.63 mm a year, 0.03 to 0.08 mm a year since 700,000 BP, 0.1 to 0.8 mm a 
year since 200,000 BP, and 0.93 to 1.5 mm a year since 80,000 BP. Rates of uplift 
were probably similar in Basilicata (Cotecchia and Magri, 1967; Neboit, 1981- 
1982), though Valentini (1979) reported that the uplift had apparently been more 
intense towards the south of Basilicata along the boundary with Calabria. The effects of 
tectonic activity, compounded by isostatic changes of 100 m since 13000 BP 
(Ghisetti, 1981), have produced a highly active rejuvenation associated with 
intensified gulleying and landslides.
As a result of its location astride the tectonically-active Apennines, Basilicata is 
chronically unstable in seismic terms and has been affected by numerous earthquakes. 
Calcagnile and others (1977) identified no fewer than 119 recorded earthquakes 
which have affected the region with intensities of VI or above on the Mercali scale. Of 
these, 70% have been in the last 170 years (an indication of improved documentation, 
they suggested). Seismicity is concentrated in the west and northwest of the region 
(Regione Basilicata, 1987) (figure 4.4).
The intense tectonic activity which affects Basilicata “actively determines and 
predisposes numerous and at times impressive mass movements” (Cotecchia and 
Melidoro, 1974, 23). Calcagnile and others (1977) found that earthquakes with an 
intensity of MSK VII (capable of causing rock slumps - according to Keefer, 1984) 
have a current return period in Southern Italy of eight years (with a confidence limit 
ranging between six and ten years). Earthquakes with an intensity of MSK X have a 
return of 58 years (with a confidence limit ranging between 27 and 122 years).
Many large landslides have occurred in Basilicata after earthquakes. Landslides after 
the earthquake of 17 and 18 December 1857 killed probably 500 at Montemurro 
when gulley slopes slumped after the seismic shock (Regione Basilicata, 1987) - 
though Almagi& (1910) gave the number of deaths as 5,000. No other earthquake has 
produced an equivalent disaster: but many have had a considerable effect on Basilicata’s 
geomorphology. The shocks associated with the 23 November 1980 earthquake 
produced mass movements, local uplift, small surface cracks, fractures in rocks, and 
surface movements of faults (Lippmann, 1984). At the epicentre of the earthquake in 
Campania (MM IX, or X), there were major landslides - especially where structural 
features like faults and old landslides could be re-activated.
4.2.5 Cl imate
The current climate of Basilicata is highly conducive to the development of landslides.
It is characteristic of the “warm temperate” zone which includes the Mediterranean 
area, typified by alternating drought and wetness (promoting landslides and torrential 
streams) and a relatively thinner A-soil horizon than more temperate areas (which 
leads to lower storage of precipitation and more flashy hydrological regimes, and a 
quicker and more frequent inundation of the subsoil - Tricart and Cailleux, 1972).
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The climate varies mainly by altitude and distance from the (western) Tyrrhenian 
coast. The east of the region is warmer in summer and drier (an effect accentuated by 
the rainshaddow from the Apennines). Higher altitudes are cooler and wetter, but all 
parts of the region have what can broadly be described a mediterranean climate. 
Ranieri (1972) divided the climate of Basilicata into three sub-types on the basis of 
longitude, relief, and altitude. They were: the Apennine (for example Potenza, altitude 
826 m); the Eastern Hills (for example Tricarico, altitude 698 m); and the Ionian 
Coast (for example Metaponto, municipality of Bernalda, altitude 3 m) (table 4.4).
Table 4.4: Basilicata: selected climatic data for 1926 to 1955 (source: Ranieri, 
1 9 7 2 )
Station Mean temperature: in 0 Mean precipitation: in mm
January July January July per year
Potenza 3 .5 21 . 9 1 00 2 5 7 6 3
Tricarico 4 .2 23 . 2 71 2 5 6 4 7
Metaponto 8 .0 26 .0 7 2 1 5 551
Precipitation is highest in the Apennines, rising to over 2,000 mm a year around 
Lagonegro (figure 4.5). It falls to under 600 mm a year between Venosa and the Ionian 
coast, with less than 500 mm a year near Metaponto. The southwest and, particularly, 
the southeast of the region experience the most intense precipitation: in the period 
1921 to 1970, for example, almost all of Basilicata had experienced a maximum 
precipitation of over 100 mm in a given twenty-four-hour period - with the area 
around Pisticci having one event over 300 mm (Regione Basilicata, 1987).
Kayser (1963) described precipitation as the major triggering factor for landslides 
in Basilicata. Many significant landslides have been recorded after heavy rain, 
particularly notable recent examples being the landslide at Ferrandina in 1959, and 
the storm in November 1976 which caused landslides at Giarossa, Grassano, and 
Pisticci (Regione Basilicata, 1987). Some of the damage produced by landslides after 
the earthquake of 23 November 1980 can be put down to the heavy rain which fell on 
several days after the shock (Alexander, 1983).
Summer drought (especially pronounced towards the Ionian Coast) can lead to 
desiccation and cracking in the soil combined with a die-back in plant cover. It is most
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pronounced in the centre and north of the region. North of LaveJIo, and between 
Montalbano Jonico and Pietrapertosa, the mean absolute drought in August exceeds 
twenty-five days (Regione Basilicata, 1987). After the end of the summer drought the 
intense precipitation of the autumn (particularly in the Apennines), combined with a 
crop and vegetation cover reduced by desiccation, actively promotes erosion and 
landslides (Kirkby, 1980).
Most significantly for the development of landslides the climate is now drier than 
during the sixteenth or nineteenth centuries (D’Arrigio, 1951; Vita-Finzi, 1969): 
yet as chapter three shows, reported landslides are increasing. This indicates that 
although climate is of fundamental importance in determining exogenic regimes, it is 
not a major controlling factor in the reported increase in landslides since the 
nineteenth century. The changes that have occurred in Basilicata can as a consequence 
only be understood in the context of the human modification of the region’s vulnerable 
environment.
4.2.6 Vegetation
The natural vegetation of Basilicata is characteristic of the Mediterranean and can be 
divided into three principal zones according to Ranieri (1972). Between sealevel and 
500 m is the the Mediterraneo (lowland) zone composed of macchia, moorland, and 
meadow species. Between 500 m and 1,800 m is the Piano Montano (upland) zone 
composed of woodland, meadows, and alpine species with dwarf oak forest. And above 
1,800 m is the the Piano Alpino (alpine) zone composed of alpine species. However, 
the area occupied by the natural vegetation is very limited in Basilicata (figure 4.6). 
According to Istituto Centrale della Statistica (1985a and b) 85.8% of the land in 
Basilicata is used for cultivation, although agriculture is largely confined to below
1,000 m altitude (Ranieri, 1972). Some woodland remains, mainly in the uplands and 
covers 19.9% of the whole region (Istituto Centrale della Statistica, 1985a and b) - 
or 22.4% according to II dissesto idrogeologico della Basilicata (1984). The figures 
given in II dissesto idrogeologico della Basilicata for the use of the land are given in 
table 4.5.
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Table 4.5: Basilicata: landuse (source: II dissesto idrogeologico della Basilicata, 1984)
Landuse area (ha) coverage of region (%)
Grain 5 8 6 , 2 2 7 58.6
Pasture and uncultivated 1 2 1 , 7 3 2 12.2
Woodland (high quality) 1 5 8 , 8 6 9 15.9
Woodland (low quality) 6 5 , 2 9 5 6.5
Reforestation/consolidation 4 0 , 9 0 0 4.1
Other 2 6 , 9 6 9 2.7
Total 9 9 9 , 2 0 0 1 00
Accelerated erosion caused by deforestation is very widespread (Kayser, 1961). Given 
the vulnerability of the region’s ecosystems this is unsurprising. Basso and Linsalata 
(1983) detailed the result of experiments carried out on plots near Guardia Perticara 
between July 1973 and June 1976. The mean yield of soil sediment dry matter varied 
significantly: meadow gave 0.915 tonnes per ha per year with cross-slope ploughing; 
but under the same conditions grain gave 4.480 tonnes per ha per year.
The significant differences which various types of land uses have on landslides can be 
gauged from the data on the percentage of land-use types affected by mass movement 
phenomena given in table 4.6. Meadowland and uncultivated land is more vulnerable to 
all processes than either woodland or cropland. Although woodland is more vulnerable 
to shallow landslides than cropland (this is probably a spurious correlation - 
woodland tends to be at higher altitudes than cropland) it is less vulnerable to deep 
processes.
Table 4.6: Basilicata: landuse and landslides (source: II dissesto idrogeologico della 
Basilicata, 1984)
SHALLOW MOVEMENTS
Landuse sheet
erosion
r i l l
erosion
calanchi
erosion
superficial
sl ips/
solifluction
(total)
Woodland 4 .2 6 .2 0 .8 4 .2 15.4
Cropland 2 .5 4 .0 0 .4 8 .4 15.9
Meadow/ 9 .4 14.8 8.1 16.6 49 . 9
uncultivated
DEEP MOVEMENTS
lateral rotational translational rockfalls complex (total)
spreads slides slides landslides
Woodland 0 .7 0.1 0 .03 0 .2 0.4 1.5
Cropland 0 .8 0 .8 0 .04 0.1 0.6 2.3
Meadow/ 2 .8 1.1 0.1 0 .4 2 .9 7 .4
uncultivated
A similar influence of vegetation on slope instability was discovered by Carrara and 
others (1978) (table 4.7). They produced a contingency table showing the correlation 
between five degrees of slope instability and seven landuse types. Although the 
relationship between slope instability and vegetation was not significant at 99% there 
were some interesting correlations evident, which indicated that land clearance has 
increased slope instability: for example, while active slope instability affected 8.6% 
of “bush" observations, it affected 34.6% of ploughed observations.
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Table 4.7: Ferro Basin: landuse and landslides (source: Carrara and others, 1978) 
Instability Landuse
Bush degraded
bush
olive
grove
ploughed 
and trees
ploughed abandoned barn
None 24 . 3 6 .0 2.7 2.4 27 . 0 12.2 25 .3
Stable 58 . 2 6 .5 0 .0 1.3 19 .4 9.9 4.7
Dormant 15.6 14.0 1.0 3.1 35 . 2 22 .0 9.1
Active/dormant 7 .6 9 .2 1 .8 3 .9 34 . 9 36.1 6.6
Active 8 .6 9.1 2 .5 4 .5 34 .6 34.2 6.6
Mean 16.2 9.1 1.8 3.3 32 . 2 26 . 7 10.8
Vegetation is an important factor in determining the level of landslides, but in an 
environment such as Basilicata’s the vegetation that exists is largely dependent on the 
social needs which determine landuse.
4.2.7 Conclusions
This section has described the influence of physical factors on landslides in Basilicata. 
It has shown that Basilicata is a region vulnerable to landslides because of a 
combination of relief, geology, climate, and vegetation. However, it is clear that the 
environment of the region cannot be discussed in isolation from the work of 
humankind. The remainder of this chapter goes on to discuss the ways in which 
humankind has altered the environment of Basilicata, and has begun to humanize it. 
With this humanization, environmental hazards such as landslides have been changed 
significantly.
4.3 The social factors
4.3.1 Indirect impacts on the land
4.3.1.1 Introduction
The evidence already presented in chapter three suggests that in the case of Basilicata, 
humankind has greatly increased the number of urban landslides during the twentieth 
century. This does not mean that all landslides are influenced by humankind, but in a 
large proportion of them, human influence seems probable.
In Basilicata the most important element in the humanization of the land has been the 
acceleration of land degradation - the chronology of which is reasonably well known, 
particularly as the result of work in the region by Bruckner (1982, 1983, and 
1990). Studying the terrace deposits of the major rivers flowing to the Ionian coast of 
Basilicata, he found there have been four phases of erosion in the region during the 
Holocene: the first in the late Pleistocene/early Holocene, the second from round 700 
BC to AD 200, the third from the eighth century to the eleventh/twelfth or 
fourteenth/fifteenth centuries, and the fourth during the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries. The first phase he ascribed to climatic and/or eustatic causes, but 
he found that human action had subsequently multiplied rates of erosion in the region 
and that all three subsequent phases were caused by humankind. Bruckner’s second 
phase, suggesting a classical phase of erosion caused by farming and clearance, was 
supported by Neboit (1977) who suggested that the extensive valley-bottom alluvial 
deposits dating from that time were produced by deforestation and 
agricultural/pastoral expansion during Greek colonization. In this erosion phase up to 
12 m of sediment was deposited at Bruckner’s study sites.
Siltation due to soil erosion was probably the cause of the spread of malaria across the 
coastal plains of Basilicata. This had begun by the third century BC according to 
Alexander (1985), or by at least 65 BC according to Ciasca (1928). By the first 
century AD all of Basilicata’s Ionian coast was infected with malaria. Although erosion 
probably began to slow during the economic decline which marked the end of the 
Western Roman Empire, the inferential evidence on malaria implies that it continued
during the medieval period, and this is confirmed by Bruckner (1982, and 1983). In 
the period between AD 800 and (depending on location) the eleventh/twelfth or the 
fourteenth/fifteenth centuries, he found between 1.5 and 3.0 m of sediment was 
deposited at his study sites. Similarly, in Treia, Marche region, rates of surface 
lowering rose from their pre-Roman estimated figure of 2 to 3 cm per 1,000 years to 
a post-Roman figure of 100 cm per 1,000 years (Alexander, 1985).
Extensive alluviation continued during the medieval period, having become 
particularly severe after AD 550 (Ciasca, 1928). Monticelli (1841, 2, translated) 
estimated that almost four-fifths of Basilicata’s coastline was malarial and “Most of 
today’s unhealthy areas were in ancient times very healthy, or at least not unhealthy” 
and that most of this change had occurred by the eleventh century.
The first documentary evidence from Basilicata of landslides comes from the sixteenth 
century (Almagte, 1910; Boenzi, 1974; Regione Basilicata, 1987). It is difficult to 
provide estimates of the extent of the problem, but it must have been reasonably 
widespread because Racioppi (1902) noted that trade in Basilicata at that time was 
made particularly difficult in the winter as the roads were often damaged - 
presumably by landslides.
By the nineteenth century, a growing pressure of population on the land had led to 
renewed land degradation - particularly as a result of contemporary deforestation and 
agricultural changes. Afan de Rivera (1832, 226, translated) noted that “the valleys 
and plains are almost everywhere subject to the infection of stagnant water”. This 
process has continued during the twentieth century, giving rise to the fourth period of 
alluviation identified by Bruckner. Erosion has been reduced by regional soil 
conservation programmes and for the first time in several thousand years, the sea has 
started to encroach on the Ionian coast (Regione Basilicata, 1987).
The prolonged periods of erosion accelerated by humankind experienced in Basilicata 
have not been continuous, but their significance nevertheless demonstrates the 
commanding role which humankind has come to have over slope instability in the 
region during the last several millenia. Although recent soil conservation programmes 
have begun to reduce erosion, their effectiveness must be balanced against the 
cumulative effects of deforestation, agriculture, urbanization, and industrialization.
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4.3.1.2 Deforestation
Neolithic people reached Southeast Italy by about 5000 BC, and by about 4000 BC they 
were farming. This demanded a sedentary way of life, and caused a revolution in the 
intensive use of the land - though it was mainly practised in the lowlands. Bruckner 
(1983) found relatively low levels of erosion in the period from 4150 BC to 1400 BC 
which implies that the first agriculture did not lead to a significant acceleration of land 
degradation across the region - either as a result of its small scale or its low impact.
The extent of woodlands during the classical period in Italy is not certain, but a large 
number of contemporary references were made to woodlands subsequently lost to 
agriculture in areas such as Basilicata (see Darby, 1956). A number of writers 
described the decline of the forest, and some areas such as Campania had already 
experienced considerable deforestation by the end of the Western Roman Empire in the 
fifth century (Simmons, 1989). Those forests which remained by the end of the 
classical period were mainly in the mountains (Darby, 1956).
Information on deforestation during the medieval period is limited, but it is known that 
severe damage had already been done to the forests throughout Southern Italy by the 
modern period. In the Kingdom of Naples in the first half of the eighteenth century 
there were 105 million hectares of cultivated land, 35 million ha of pasture and 
woodland, and 42 million ha of uncultivated land (see Izzo, 1976). The greatest 
concentration of woodland was in the regions of Calabria, Abruzzo, and Basilicata.
A further period of deforestation had begun by the nineteenth century. Estimates vary 
of the wooded area that has covered Basilicata in the past, though undoubtedly there was 
extensive deforestation during the nineteenth century (see Puglisi, 1977). In 1908 
Nitti claimed that “very much more” than 200,000 ha had been deforested since 
1860. La Cava estimated that 137,000 ha had been deforested in the period 1877 to 
1903: though VOchting suggested that the figure was 170,000 ha - with the major 
losses coming after 1887. The probably reliable estimate of Rossi-Doria (1963) 
suggested that woodland covered about 290,000 ha in 1800, 240,000 ha in 1860,
180,000 ha in 1908, 126,000 ha in 1930, rising to 169,000 ha in 1962.
The spread of capitalism into Basilicata by the nineteenth century, coupled with the 
rapid rise in population, led to an even more extensive deforestation associated with 
agricultural expansion. Deforestation was encouraged by the release of clerical lands,
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the growth of the railways - which acted as consumers of wood and the vanguard of 
industrialization - and freer forestry regulations. Zuccagni-Orlandini (1844, 461, 
translated) described the problem as follows: “Almost all the mountainous slopes, 
lowered by floods and other physical causes, sent their detritus down their waters to 
form deposits in the lowlands: not a few of these heights have become uncultivated and 
naked because of the intemperance of deforestation.”
The growing use of the forest led to overexploitation and an increasing danger from 
landslides: “As consequences of the long lasting extensive use of the forest (i.e. 
pasture, charcoal burning, fires) and the active deforestation (i.e. clearing) must be 
considered the destructive landslips (franae [sic]) of various scale [sic] and manifold 
forms, particularly in the flysch mountains and Pliocene hills with clay soils.”
(Tichy, 1957, 288.). D’Errico described the results in detail as they affected 
Basilicata on the eve of the disastrous December 1857 earthquake (1865, 34, 
translated):
This was the state of things at the end of 1857: the population involved 
exclusively in agriculture, and lured by bumper crops, unwisely cut down the 
woodlands, taking cultivation right up to the highest mountain summits: this was 
the deplorable cause of disasters which were to force misery on many areas. The 
disruption of the wooded slopes led to earthslips and landslides: on the high 
summits of the Apennines the snow rapidly melted with the first warmth of 
spring, and the waters discharged furiously through the glens and gulleys, 
dissipating themselves in the growing torrentbeds and riverbeds, causing 
immense damage to the adjacent land.
The development of capitalism in the region was accompanied and eased by a revolution 
in the tenure of forests (table 4.8). The abolition of feudalism led to the 
dismemberment of feudal forests and, although a large proportion of the woodlands was 
protected by the state or placed in commons, a significant proportion was sold off. The 
proportion increased as the century progressed, with the dissolution of the commons.
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Table 4.8 Basilicata: changes in forest tenure from 1809 to 1870 (source: Tichy, 
1 9 6 2 )
Deforestation raised widespread popular discontent among both the educated and the 
uneducated. Afan de Rivera (1832, II, 483, translated) had warned that the damage 
already done by deforestation was “against the design of creation”. And D’Errico 
(1865, 147, translated) went on to argue that “it is undoubtedly the case that the 
fatal destruction of the woods being carried out could lead to a serious and profound 
damage to the population, enterprise, and the future prosperity of the region”.
The behaviour of the peasants over deforestation demonstrated an understandable 
complexity. They were partly responsible for deforestation, but many were also aware 
of the destructive effects of the action which poverty forced on them. In an 
unsympathetic account of deforestation in Calabria and Basilicata, N Douglas (1915, 
218) described the behaviour as follows:
To denude slopes in the moist climate and deep soils of England entails no risk; in 
this country it is the beginning of the end. And herein lies the ineptitude of the 
Italian [forestry] regulations, which entrust the collective wisdom of rapacious 
farmers with measures of this kind, taking no account of the destructively 
utilitarian character of the native mind, of that canniness which overlooks a 
distant profit in its eagerness to grasp the present - that beast avarice which 
Horace recognized as the root of all evil. As if provisions like this of the “vincolo 
forestale" were ever carried out! Peasants naturally prefer to burn the wood in 
their own chimneys or to sell it; and if a landslide then crashes down, wrecking 
houses and vineyards - let the government compensate the victims!
Sections of the poor seem to have been just as vociferous in their complaints as the 
educated. Having travelled around Basilicata in the first decade of this century, Nitti 
noted that ‘Everywhere proprietors and peasants said that the ruining of the woods has
In 1809:
Feudal forest 
Common forest 
Royal forest 
Private nobles’ forest 
Church forest 
Private forest
35 . 7%
30. 6%
23 . 0%
6.3%
3.0%
1.4%
In 1870:
State forest 
Common forest 
Private forest
11.4%
54 . 0%
34.6%
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been their ruin. Not a soul disagreed.” (Nitti, 1968, 63, translated). And Azimonti 
(1921, 48, translated) recorded that “The people living in the mountains make it 
plain that they are aware that their immediate needs should be reconciled with the 
inevitable needs for land reclamation... for the restoration of the mountains. ’
The increase in the forested area during the twentieth century was originally begun by 
the Fascist government, which introduced a programme of land reclamation and 
reforestation in the 1920s (Ciasca, 1928; Mercandino and Mercandino, 1976) and 
gave limited protection to woodland in 1923. However, it was only under the post-war 
state that the centuries-long decline in the area of woodlands was reversed, 
particularly through the agency of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. Although many old 
woodlands continue to be destroyed, 800 reforestation projects have been undertaken, 
affecting a total of 40,900 ha. The total planted peaked in the early 1970s (table 4.9).
Table 4.9: Basilicata: reforestation from 1950 to 1980 (source: II dissesto 
idrogeologico della Basilicata, 1984)
1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 5
1 9 5 6 - 1 9 6 0
1 9 6 1 - 1 9 6 5
1 9 6 6 - 1 9 7 0
1 9 7 1 - 1 9 7 5
1 9 7 6 - 1 9 8 0
I,500  ha 
5,250 ha 
10,300 ha 
8,450 ha
I I , 4 0 0  ha 
4,000 ha
The quality of the wooded area of the region remains generally poor. Of the forested 
area in 1962, about 50,000 ha were defined by Rossi-Doria (ibid, translated) as 
“heavily degraded”. Similarly, in 1980, 65,295 out of the total 224,164 wooded 
hectares were defined as in poor condition (II dissesto idrogeologico della Basilicata) . 
Yet despite problems of fire (which destroys between about 0.6% and 2.5% of the 
forested area each year, according to Rendell, 1986) the wooded area of Basilicata had 
increased to 224,164 ha, (22.4% of the region’s area) by 1980. Although this 
growth goes some way towards repairing the decline of the last century, it is still 
significantly below the 290,000 ha of woodland in 1800.
4 .3 .1 .3  Agr icul ture
The demands placed on the land are proportional to the population and its consumption 
of resources. Basilicata’s population has grown slowly over the past two thousand
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years (particularly so in comparison to the whole of Italy) because the region has been 
affected by poverty and high emigration. However, consumption per person has 
increased very quickly since the last war with the rapid, if partial, integration of the 
region into modern industrialized society.
For some periods, little is known about the number, growth, and concentration of 
Basilicata’s population. However, there is a reasonably detailed knowledge about the 
population of Italy as a whole (McEvedy and Jones, 1978), which give an approximate 
guide (figure 4.7).
The first population figures for Basilicata come from Racioppi’s estimates (Sebastiani 
and Sebastiani, 1979). He calculated that by 250 BC the population of the Lucani (who 
occupied most of present-day Basilicata) was between 200,000 and 250,000. In 
1277 the population of Basilicata was about 100,000. It fluctuated greatly, reaching 
about 152,000 in 1669, 491,000 in 1901, and 590,000 in 1981 (Istituto Centrale 
della Statistica, 1984 a and b) (see figure 4.8).
Although agriculture had begun in Southern Italy by 4000 BC the first intensive 
agriculture was introduced by the colonial expansion of the Etruscans, Greeks, and 
later the Romans (Almagici, 1959). This colonial agriculture was run on a commercial 
basis and in Basilicata was particularly intensive around the Greek colonies of the 
Ionian coast. By the first century BC, it was serviced by a relatively sophisticated 
money economy (Heichelheim, 1956). Basilicata became a major exporter of wine, 
olives, and wheat: first to Greece, and later to Rome (Burato, 1976).
In practice, the demands on the land were such that its productive capacity declined 
during the classical period. Under Roman rule, according to Ciasca (1928, 25, 
translated), Basilicata’s land was “sacrificed’’ to Rome. Much of the land, particularly 
on the large slave estates, was “undermanaged and overfilled” (Alexander, 1985,
123). Some experiments in management were carried out but a combination of light 
cross-ploughing and no rotation caused soil exhaustion. Dauberry (1857) recorded 
that soil exhaustion was considered inevitable and unavoidable - the land was 
popularly believed to be worn out by cultivation like a woman worn out by childbirth.
From the third century AD significant decline began in the Roman economy. Trade and 
banking went into recession, and agricultural land began to be abandoned. Many of the 
large estates were let to peasants for subsistence farming which came to replace 
market farming (Heichelheim, 1956). By the fourth century AD large tracts of
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Campania were already deserted (Darby, 1956); and by the fifth century the 
countryside of Southern Italy had begun to take on its medieval appearance with large 
areas depopulated, declining cities, and subsistence farmers isolated from the wider 
market. By the sixth century some abandoned land had reverted to scrub and forest 
(Thirgood, 1981); and invasions and economic decline accelerated depopulation, 
abandonment, and degradation of former agricultural land.
The original tenure of the big estates which covered much of Basilicata had been slave 
labour. This came to be supplemented by serf labour from the fourth century when the 
poor were forced to place themselves under the power of their landholders (Evoli, 
1931) and feudalism was generally established by the seventh century. Almost all the 
slaves were freed by the tenth century, and the serfs themselves began to be freed 
from the twelfth century onwards (Burato, 1976).
Cultivation under feudalism had a generally detrimental effect on the land, according to 
Evoli (1931, 206, translated), the landed nobility was assured of a high income 
“without the need to put themselves out to ensure that the land they had abandoned to 
the peasants should be fertile". Feudal contracts contained requirements for protection 
of the land (De Stefano and Lombardi, 1976) but, as Evoli (1931) made clear, the net 
effect of feudalism was the marginalization of farmers, and their alienation from their 
own land. Not only did absentee landlords frequently take short-term receipts at the 
expense of longterm sustainability, but the tenant, fearful of wasting labour, “limited 
himself to strip [the land] as if it were a subject” (ibid, 214, translated).
The medieval period was characterized by relative technical stagnation in agriculture, 
as Burato (1976) made clear, but some progress was made. There were some 
clearances and a limited number of soil conservation measures, such as drainage and 
irrigation, were carried out across Italy - but according to Almagi& (1959) these 
were mainly confined to the North (under the new municipalities and some religious 
orders) and Sicily (under the Arabs). From the thirteenth century, agricultural 
production - and with it the population - once again began to decline (Burato, 1976). 
This was perhaps because of the greater frequency of cooler, wetter weather (Flohn 
and Fantechi, 1984). In Northern Italy, grain prices rose, reflecting scarcity, from 
around 6 Dutch Guilders for 100 kg in the early 1500s to over 15 Dutch Guilders in 
1600.
The dislocation caused by economic and demographic decline led to widespread 
unemployment, abandonment of land, and further land degradation (Boenzi, 1974).
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Settlements were abandoned, and the population fled to the uplands: in 1268 there 
were 150 settlements in Basilicata, but by 1445 the number had shrunk to 96 - 
possibly for reasons of defence, health, or to enable patriarchal control of the family 
(Banfield, 1958; Blok, 1969; Ranieri, 1972). The dispersion of population has only 
recurred since the nineteenth century (Dickinson, 1956).
The abandonment of land and its subsequent degradation was worsened by the stagnation 
of feudalism after the Kingdom of Naples’ Norman rulers. The power of the barons 
grew, and with it the expansion of the baronial forests and pasturage. Although 
protecting some of the countryside, these trends placed an even greater strain on the 
small areas of productive land and, as Slicher Van Bath (1963) noted, the agricultural 
system was ill-suited to increasing production. The result was greater soil erosion and 
more landslides. On the Ionian coast, deposition led to the growth of malarial marshland 
and whole areas of the coast were abandoned - most notably around Metaponto 
(Sebastiani and Sebastiani, 1979).
The stifling strength of feudal power, combined with rural poverty, prevented the 
accumulation of capital, and capitalism was slow to develop in Basilicata (Evoli,
1931). By the beginning of the eighteenth century the nobility and church together 
owned 75% of the land in the Kingdom of Naples: but their social supremacy was 
increasingly under threat by the rise of the bourgeoisie (Izzo, 1976). The 
development of capitalism, slow though it was, seems to have been a major factor in 
the reversal of agricultural decline from the end of the seventeenth century - but the 
cause of new strains on the environment too.
The most significant changes to the environment came about through the development of 
agriculture in the eighteenth century. Nobles began to return to manage their own 
land, and improvements were increasingly made in production methods. Output grew 
slowly, but not enough to feed the growing population. Monticelli (1841, 48, note 8, 
translated) described the results:
The government of Charles III and the peace enjoyed from 1744 to... [1790] 
caused a considerable growth of our population which, forced by the needs for 
greater subsistence, increased agricultural production, not only without taking 
care to increase pasturage but indeed doing it damage. The mountains were 
deforested to get a scandalous profit from the wood, and virgin land from the 
woods which - in the early years - gave a very good return.
While the population grew, the threat of starvation increased the pressure on the 
environment. Galanti (1794, 197, translated) noted that in areas such as Basilicata, 
“the fertility of the country is... in contrast with the poverty of the inhabitants”. The
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situation alluded to in the Gaudioso Report of 1736 was of a most degrading poverty, as 
described by Pedio (1965, 15, translated):
peasants wasted away and starving, aged before their time, tormented by malaria 
and forced to overwork a sterile land... women who carried, engraved into the 
face, the signs of the most frightful poverty; priests who lived in a way wholly 
beneath their social standing; a few gentry, who were distinguished from the 
lowest only because the lowest considered them superior; a few lawyers and 
doctors, morally and materially degraded...
The price of food rose significantly: according to Macry’s figures (1974), by 75% 
between 1734 and 1800. Cultivation expanded into more vulnerable environments: by 
the mid-eighteenth century around the city of Matera, for instance, the steep hills 
were already used for cereal production (Baldassare, Boenzi, and Loiaccono, 1976). 
Macry noted that “the woods were destroyed, pasturage reduced, and the possibility of 
selling grain at a high price led to the introduction of wheat... despite the fact that the 
cultivation of wheat sterilizes the ground...” (Cited by Izzo, 1976, 257, translated.) 
As Izzo commented, starvation forced the poor to destroy the land: “For their own 
survival, those who had sought refuge on the mountains were forced to sacrifice the 
woodland for grain” (ibid, 246, translated).
With the end of feudalism large parts of the region, previously subject to feudal 
controls and a degree of protection from over-exploitation, were given over to private 
landholders - almost exclusively to the bigger landholders (De Stefano and Lombardi, 
1976). According to Boenzi (1974, 289, translated) the municipalities “were not 
always able to control the use of the woodlands” which they received, while the new 
private landholders “tended to put as much land as possible into cultivation”. During 
the nineteenth century, grain production continued to increase at the expense of 
meadow, and the forested areas were reduced further - notably on the big estates (see 
Baldassare, Boenzi, and Loiacono, 1976).
When national unification came, the benefits went primarily to the rising rural 
bourgeoisie, with the peasants becoming increasingly impoverished. The development 
of capitalism in Basilicata, slow though it was in national terms, meant that changes 
like the abolition of internal tariffs gave very little advantage to agriculture. Church 
lands, accounting for just under 8% of the cultivated land in the South, were sold off 
between 1864 and 1900 - which increased the area of land deforested. Payback rates 
for the land were high enough to impoverish many peasants, and further encourage the 
transference of land to big landholders.
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Agriculture entered a crisis at the end of the nineteenth century as regional problems 
were compounded by falling world prices, the spread of new diseases such as 
phylloxera, and a tariff war with France. Production declined, land was abandoned, and 
emigration increased rapidly. The number of people leaving the South for abroad rose 
from 22,000 in 1880 to 401,000 in 1913. Technical changes such as the 
substitution of rotation for fallowing were used increasingly, particularly under the 
influence of the new capitalist farms and improving education. According to De Stefano 
and Lombardi (1976) the last half of the nineteenth century saw a reduction in the 
area of woodlands and meadows, with an increase in the area covered by tree crops and 
a slow increase in the area under grain (table 4.10).
Table 4.10: Southern Italy: landuse from 1861 to 1970 (source: De Stefano and 
Lombardi, 1976)
Landuse grain tree crops meadows woods uncultivated other
and pastures
1861 44 . 6  7 .0  2 5 . 7  15 . 0  7 .7
1 9 2 9  45 . 6  13.8  22 . 8  10 .9  6 .9
1 9 7 0  3 5 . 8  17.3  26.1 13 .6  - 7 . 2
Throughout the twentieth century agriculture in Southern Italy remained poor in 
relation to that of the North. The return per hectare of land was among the lowest in 
the country: on the plains in Basilicata it was L119, compared to an average of L762 
in Piedmont; in the mountains it was L97 in Basilicata, compared to L228 in the 
mountains of Liguria (ibid). After the first world war, conditions deteriorated 
further. Postwar protectionism led to agricultural exports falling by 93% between 
1913 and 1924. Similarly, migration controls meant that emigration fell by 98%. 
From 1925, devaluation of the lira, to favour manufacturing industry, led to a fall in 
agricultural prices and widespread unemployment.
In 1924, nearly half of Italy’s balance-of-payments deficit came from grain imports 
and the government declared the “Battle for Grain", in order to overcome the problem 
(Mercandini and Mercandini, 1976; King, 1987). Grain prices were raised above 
world market levels in order to increase production, principally to the benefit of the 
market-oriented farms in the North (De Stefano and Lombardi, 1976). Although the 
Battle for Grain had only a relatively small effect on the agriculture of Southern Italy, 
changes continued on the land. There was a reduction in the number of workers on the
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land and an expansion of intensive cashcrop production. In Basilicata the growth in the 
population was heightened by the effects of anti-migration laws abroad and the growing 
pressure of the land led to a greater fragmentation of landholdings (Camera dei 
Deputati, 1954; Davis, 1973). There was a desperate expansion of production in 
Basilicata, principally on marginal land, vulnerable to degradation (Baldassare, 
Boenzi, and Loiacono, 1976).
Since the last world war, there have been fundamental changes in agriculture in 
Basilicata, encouraged by rapid economic growth. Modern agriculture in the South of 
Italy, and particularly in areas such as the Ionian coastal plains of Basilicata, has 
become increasingly capital-intensive. It is characterized by a growing mechanization, 
specialization, and concentration, while some areas are being abandoned entirely as a 
result of rural exodus (Baldassare, Boenzi, and Loiacono, 1976; De Stefano and 
Lombardi, 1976; King, 1987). As King (1987) noted, agriculture has consequently 
changed in character from a “‘refugee sector’ for those unable to find work” (page 
42) to a more developed sector - though still less modernized than that in most other 
European countries (page 54).
Six land reform agencies were established in Italy after the war with the dual purpose 
of reducing political protest over land tenure and redistributing the land in order to 
ensure the existence of smallscale agricultural capitalism in the future (King, 1987). 
Land reform aimed to address the very unequal distribution of land - in 1947 the 
major 0.2% of landowners in Italy owned 26.4% of the land. Eventually 28% of the 
country’s land was requisitioned (four-fifths of which was in the South), and
618,000 ha were assigned to 113,000 families. The Ente di Riforma Puglia-Lucania- 
Molise (which includes Basilicata) had requisitioned 200,000 ha by the 1970s.
The structure of land tenure has undergone a significant change, with a decline in the 
importance of the big landowners, and a growth in medium-sized farms. Although 
control over the land is fragmented, the increasing influence of the European 
Community, the state, and agribusiness has ensured new investment (Boenzi, 1974; 
King, 1987) - but this intensification of agriculture has had a significant impact on 
land degradation and the number of landslides because, according to Chisci (1979,
248, translated), it has been carried out without “an adequate programme of 
mechanical and biological protection for slopes”.
A number of sources back Chisci’s claims. In research carried out in the Central 
Apennines, he himself (1986) found that the new agricultural techniques had caused a
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significant increase in landslides since the 1950s. Field levelling (to allow
mechanization) had become common, up-and-down tillage had been “largely adopted”
(page 7), forage crops had been reduced, and mechanical structures for regulating 
waterflow and soil erosion had been reduced. Although less labour was devoted to land 
(between 1954 and 1976 the number of hours devoted to each hectare of vineyard fell 
by 60%) the proportion of time devoted to soil conservation fell even faster. In 1954,
10% of labour had been used on water and erosion control: in 1976 the figure had 
fallen to only 3%.
There is widespread evidence of the impact of these processes on landsliding.
Insufficient drainage, and field-levelling to allow the extension of vineyards led to an
86.8% rise in the area affected by landslides in a part of Tuscany studied by Canuti, 
Garzonio, and Rodolfi (1979). In Calciano (Basilicata) Alexander (1990) found that 
deforestation of 77 ha of land in the 1960s has provoked a 125,000 m3 flowslide. And 
in the Orco-Sativo basin of Vaglio Basilicata, more intensive cultivation and deeper 
ploughing was probably the cause of greater gulley flow, and the development of 
mudflows and debris flowslides - which in turn caused further abandonment of the 
land.
4.3.1.4 Urbanizat ion
Settlement and its associated infrastructure has affected the landslide hazard in 
Basilicata in two main ways: the location of settlements has been an important element 
in their vulnerability, and construction work has disrupted slopes throughout the 
region.
The location of settlements in Basilicata is often a vulnerable one, with many towns 
located on hillslopes. Following the definitions given by Franciosa (1951) 28 (that is, 
21%) of the town centres can be defined as located on hilltops, 86 (66%) as located on 
hillslopes, and only 17 (13%) on plains (figure 4.9). Many of these sites are 
vulnerable because of a combination of relief and geology: this is particularly the case 
for the settlements such as Grassano which are located in the Bradano Trough with its 
friable geology and steep slopes. Cotecchia (1957, 9, translated) described such towns 
as “almost without exception at some altitude, close to very steep slopes and, in 
particular, at the zone of transition between the clays and the sands”. Consequently 
only 18% of the 131 towns in the region are located on stable geological formations, 
and the vulnerability of many of the settlements has been made worse by erosion.
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B  Slope settlement 
□  Plain settlement
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Figure 4 .9  Basilicata: settlement sites (source: Franciosa, 1 9 5 1 )
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The statistical findings of Carrara and others (1978) give further evidence of the 
impact of construction on slopes, though their findings showed considerable ambiguity 
in the relationship between specific cultural artefacts and the intensity of slope 
instability (to which they gave a points score, with a high score indicating high 
instability), probably as the result of spurious correlation. Villages tended to be most 
closely associated with areas of relatively high stability - but consolidation measures 
were most closely associated with areas of low stability (table 4.11).
Table 4.11: Ferro Basin: artefacts and slope instability (source: Carrara and others, 
1 9 7 8 )
Artefact Instability score total
<10 1 0 - 1 6 1 6 - 2 3 2 3 - 32 . ,6
none 17.4 9 .5 36.3 36.8 1 00
main roads 26 . 0 10.2 43.1 20 .7 1 00
secondary roads 10.7 6.7 68.0 14.7 1 00
pipelines 36.1 14.5 37 .3 12.0 1 00
consolidation 14.7 2 .9 29.4 52.9 1 00
country houses 12.1 7.4 46.2 34.2 1 00
villages 33.3 9.5 47.6 9.5 1 00
mean 17.5 9.1 40.1 33.3 1 0 0
Regione Basilicata (1987) reported that settlements in the region have caused 
landslides in a number of ways, the most frequent being: unwise (and often illegal) 
urban development on vulnerable land, saturation of slopes through leakage from 
water and sewage pipes, oversteepening of slopes by excavation, inadequate 
consolidation against landslides, and the abandonment of agricultural land on the 
outskirts of towns. Carrara and others (1978) attributed 2% of the landslides that 
they analyzed to “human activities” (by which they meant direct activities). 
Alexander (1981) documented that some landslides after the 1980 earthquake were 
reportedly caused by fractured drains.
The effects of building have been multiplied by the rapid rebuilding programme partly 
financed by the government since the 1980 earthquake. During the 1980s a total of 
over L2.000 billion was spent on repairing earthquake damage and slope instability 
affecting over fifty settlements in the region (Regione Basilicata, 1987). Of this huge
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sum over 90% was to be spent on reconstruction following the 1980 earthquake; on 
new, more stable urban developments; and on the protection of urban areas.
4.3 .1 .5  Industria lization
Industrialization has led to a transformation of Basilicata and its society, and the 
development of new, urban social relations with the land. Its development throughout 
Southern Italy has been a slow process, hampered because unification allowed it to be
dominated by the competitiveness of Northern industry (King, 1987). In addition
Basilicata’s isolation has long held back industrial development, and Macry (1974) 
described the region in the nineteenth century as characterized by relative isolation 
from Naples and the lack of a local market. The region’s first metalled road had only 
been built in 1792 (Racioppi, 1902).
Even though it was short-lived, early industrial development in Basilicata further 
contributed to deforestation. For example, charcoal-burning and ironworking - 
especially near Lagonegro, Spinoso, and Sarconi - destroyed a large proportion of the 
neighbouring woodland (Racioppi, 1902; Tichy, 1957).
Industrialization in Basilicata was mainly the result of postwar moves to integrate the 
South into the national economy. In Basilicata it accelerated with particular rapidity
during the 1960s: though industrial concerns have been damaged by the recession of
the 1980s (Mannella, 1985). Between 1951 and 1981 the proportion of the working 
population employed in agriculture fell from 73% to 31%, in industry it rose from 
15% to 27%, and in services from 12% to 42%. Although industry is limited by a 
local scarcity of resources and capital in the region, and much remains based on 
undercapitalized artizan production, Basilicata has changed from a rural to an urban 
society within the past forty years.
4.3.2 Direct impacts on the land
Following Gutkind (1956, 12) the approach to the land in Basilicata can be seen as 
characterized by a change from a "hesitant and whispered dialogue between man and 
nature’ to an “aggressive and loud exploitation”. The change can be seen in the history 
of the struggle against landslides - a history which has been conditioned by the
institutions and practices developed to manage the land.
Although the very earliest societies had the ability to change the land, this ability was 
rarely exploited. The roots of this inaction lie partly in social and technological 
impotence, but also in the ideology of an external, dominating nature (N Smith,
1990). This premodern approach has continued in the popular consciousness in 
regions such as Basilicata. For example, according to Cornelisen (1969, 15) in 
Basilicata hazards such as landslides “are understood to be God’s punishment for sins 
committed”. According to Banfield (1958, 112) many people in Basilicata then looked 
“to the saints and to God to ward off calamity”. The persistence of this faith in 
Basilicata has been widely documented (De Martino, 1987; Lucano, 1983; Bronzini, 
1984). Levi (1982, 79) described its effects on the peasants of Basilicata in the 
1930s:
They live submerged in a world that rolls on independent of their will, where 
there can be neither happiness, as literary devotees of the land conceive it, nor 
hope, because the two are adjuncts of personality and here there is only the grim 
passivity of a sorrowful Nature. But they have a lively human feeling for the 
common fate of mankind and its common acceptance.
Following from the hesitant approach of premodern societies to the land, early 
attempts to control the problem of soil degradation and landslides in Basilicata were 
limited by a restricted understanding of the problem, and low levels of technology. The 
subsistence ethic ensured that some soil-conservation techniques were carried out, 
such as the disruption of rill-erosion (Kayser, 1956; Molfese, 1978). The 
significance of the protection given by these works in such a hostile environment 
should not be underestimated: Braudel (1972-1973, I, 243) commented that “In the 
Mediterranean the soil dies if it is not protected by crops... It is a miracle if it is ever 
preserved or reconstituted by the labour of peasants." However, there was no miracle. 
The longstanding marginalization of the peasantry led to land degradation.
Some organized soil conservation programmes were undertaken in Italy during the 
medieval period - but these had little impact in Basilicata (Ciasca, 1928). Against the 
increasingly evident signs of land degradation the government of Basilicata, 
particularly under Spanish rule, acted fitfully and ineffectively to conserve the soil. 
This ineffectiveness was only slowly reversed - a development which can be seen to 
have begun with the disastrous famine of 1764 that damaged the government by 
exposing significant weaknesses in the economy. From the late eighteenth century, 
writers in the Kingdom of Naples began to interest themselves in the need for social 
change to reverse environmental degradation and laws were passed to conserve the 
woodlands, and to reforest landslides. However, the works carried out were too little
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and too late, and they remained largely ineffectual - particularly because of a lack of 
policing.
Feudalism was abolished in 1806 by the French, who had then occupied the Kingdom.
Much more was spent on the country’s infrastructure (for example the Corps of 
Bridge and Road Engineers was increased from fifteen employees to forty-four), but 
the return of Bourbon rule in 1815 led to retrenchment. Soil conservation measures 
were reduced: in 1818, for example, the municipalities spent a total of 830,000 
Ducats on all public works but the government’s spending on land reclamation and soil 
conservation fell, from D600.000 in 1816 to D240.000 in the middle of the century.
By the mid-nineteenth century the Neapolitan government was forced to reconsider its 
approach to soil conservation, described in an 1855 report by the corps of water and 
road engineers as of utmost urgency. After the 1855 law on land reclamation and soil 
conservation slow progress was made in the introduction of new technology such as 
windmills, but only one programme was started under that law and the money provided 
for the maintenance of all government schemes continued to be insufficient.
Southern Italy remained essentially untouched by the laws on land reclamation and soil 
conservation under the new unified state. The law on land reclamation of 20 March 
1865 committed the state to contribute to reclamation where it was of “national” 
importance, or beyond the resources of the local municipalities. From the 1880s a 
number of laws were brought in to promote specific aspects of land reclamation, such 
as the Baccarini law for the reclamation of the marshlands (law of 23 June 1882), 
and to improve internal navigation (law of 2 January 1910). Under the Baccarini law 
the state began to contribute 50% of the cost of those projects for which health was the 
primary consideration but there was a significant Northern bias in spending. By 1915 
while the proportion of soil conservation carried out in the South was only 0.4% of 
that designated for eventual conservation, while in the North it was 33.9% (De Stefano 
and Lombardi, 1976).
The first major government programme for consolidation against landslides in 
Basilicata came after the Zanardelli inquiry with law number 293 of 1904 (Regione 
Basilicata, 1987). The programme was to last twenty-one years, but projects were 
slow to materialize and some were cancelled (Zanotti-Bianco, 1926). It was only from 
the advent of the Fascist government that the rate of land reclamation was accelerated, 
but the government concentrated on the more spectacular lowland drainage schemes 
while neglecting watershed management and erosion control (King, 1987).
1 17
In 1928 the Mussolini law gave adequate funding for land reclamation and soil 
conservation for the first time (De Stefano and Lombardi, 1976). And in 1933, the 
Serpieri law reaffirmed the need for soil conservation and reclamation to take into 
account soil, drainage, health, and colonization. Six land-reclamation agencies were set 
up, which today oversee 61% of Basilicata (Unione Regionale dei Consorzi di Bonifica 
della Basilicata, 1978). The work of the agencies, notably drainage and (initially 
limited) reforestation, included implementing management strategies designed to 
reduce landsliding. Little was done in Basilicata, and by the end of the war although 
71.1% of the projected reclamation projects had begun only 0.3% had been completed.
Government has increasingly intervened in soil conservation since the last world war. 
This intervention was conceived as, according to a number of commentators such as 
Sassoon (1986, 39), as “an instrument of social control” to prevent the growth of the 
Communist Party, ensure the electoral basis of the Christian Democratic Party, and to 
provide private enterprise with favourable conditions for growth.
The Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was a major element in this intervention in Basilicata 
and has carried out extensive land reclamation projects (// dissesto idrogeologico della 
Basilicata). Throughout Southern Italy the Cassa spent L500 billion between 1950 and 
1980 (in addition to the sums spent under the Special Law for Calabria) of which: 6% 
was spent on consolidating 22,000 ha of land against landslides; and 46% was spent on 
watercourses, 43% was spent on 150,000 ha of forestry projects, and 5% was spent 
on irrigating 20,000 ha of agricultural land. Of the L500 billion, L75 billion were 
spent in Basilicata: L46.5 billion on reforestation and the reconstruction of landslide- 
prone land, L27 billion on watercourses, and L1.5 billion on irrigation.
Since the 1970s the growing scare over the threat posed by landslides in Italy has led 
to a significant increase on spending on their prevention. This change can be traced 
back to a ministerial proposal made in 1971 (never acted on) to spend L10 trillion on 
landslides nationwide during the remainder of the century. This was designed in 
addition to the L3 trillion which had already been allocated for the 1980s. After the 
widespread floods of 1973 the government invested heavily in protection against 
landslides as part of soil conservation: law number 731 of 1973 led to investment in 
engineering works, which has continued to the present day with total costs coming to 
L60 billion by the mid 1980s (Lazzari, 1986b). Spending on intervention against 
landslides and earthquakes totalled L150 billion between 1973 and 1986.
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The central government’s spending on landslides in Basilicata increased significantly 
during the 1980s. This increase was produced by a combination of: a L60-billion 
research project funded in 1975 to analyze the problem of slope instability in the 
region (which had begun to uncover significant problems by the end of the 1970s), the
international publicity of the 1980 earthquake, and the dramatic impact of the death of
seven in a landslide at Senise in 1986. By 1987, 116 of the total 131 towns were to 
be consolidated against landslides (the figure includes 19 to be wholly or partly 
transferred). L122.5 billion was spent directly on consolidation against landslides: 
including drainage, engineering works, soil conservation, and reforestation projects.
Most of this came after the Senise landslide - which brought a total of L200 billion
from central government, to be spent on 26 settlements in the region (of which
L108.5 billion was to be spent on the consolidation of 21 towns). In addition to the 
money from central government, the regional government had itself raised an 
additional L40 billion to be spent in the period 1986 to 1988, on additional 
consolidation against landslides in a number of towns deemed to have a less serious 
problem (figure 3.7).
This approach has not always been without its problems. One senior official of a 
government agency claimed, for instance, that in Basilicata the scarcity and crisis- 
orientation of funds and administrative energy precludes regular maintenance of 
facilities - which leads to further breakdowns in the retaining structures (anonymous 
interview). In a similar vein Alexander (1987, 1) criticized the bureaucratic 
inflexibilities which prevented a response to the warning signs of the 1982 Ancona 
(Marche) landslide. He described the event as “clearly the result of misunderstanding, 
and even gross negligence, on the part of those who might have been able to recognize 
the warning signs." Alexander found that the landslide was predictable, but ignored - 
either as a result of confusion, incompetence, or perhaps corruption.
Communities can benefit from the sporadic intervention of the bureaucracy. However, 
very often the involvement of the state has given an opportunity for improving the lot 
of vested interests, as chapter two indicated. The bureaucracy and politicians 
themselves benefit because vigorous, dramatic reconstruction allows a new start, a 
symbolic attack on the “stones that caused the hurt” (Binaghi-Olivari, 1981) and the 
revenge of culture on disobedient nature. In addition, demolition and construction have 
also often been linked with organized crime and fraud (Russo and Stajano, 1981).
In Italy, the state has almost completely taken over the management of important 
collective aims like the amelioration of hazards (Catalani, 1982). The result of
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intervention based on pragmatic political needs is that the attempts by the state to 
manage the environment have often been poorly planned and poorly executed, 
characterized by “the incapacity of public authority... the dominance of private over 
public interests, and cultural problems." (Mercandino and Mercandino, 1976, 358, 
translated.)
In addition to direct funding by the government, since the 1950s money has also come 
from the former Cassa per Opere Straordinarie di Pubblico Interesse nell’ltalia 
Meridionale (the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno) - now reborn as the Azienda per la 
Promozione dello Sviluppo del Mezzogiorno. This organization was set up in 1950 and 
given its own budget to fund agricultural modernization in Southern Italy - 
subsequently its aims were extended to include promoting industrial modernization 
(Barberis, 1986; King, 1987). As part of its modernization scheme the Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno was responsible for funding extensive land-reclamation programmes 
throughout Southern Italy.
The response to landslides is made through a variety of state agencies, the working of 
which has been examined by Alexander (1987). A number of these agencies have a role 
in combatting landslides affecting specific types of landuse. The historical contribution 
of these agencies to land reclamation in the municipality of Grassano is dealt with in 
chapter seven and in appendix C. The most important agency is the Genio Civile, the 
state Engineering Corps, which was founded in the early nineteenth century. Its work 
was at first limited to small works connected with bridges and roads, but after national 
unification it began to be involved directly in landslides (F. F., 1932; Morrone, 1987; 
Centini, 1987). The Genio Civile is responsible for all items of extraordinary 
expenditure in the construction and maintenance of public works, and also directs 
work carried out by agencies and local authorities or subcontracted to private 
companies. Most of the Genio Civile’s operations (except for the water agency, the 
Servizio Idrografico) have been under the direction of the regions since 1972 
(Morrone, 1987).
Regular maintenance against landslides depends on the aims and objectives of the 
respective agencies, but some work is also carried out by:
• The Azienda Autonoma delle Strade Statali (ANAS) which oversees major 
national roadways (Morrone, 1985).
• The Corpo Forestale, set up in 1877 to supervise the conservation and 
exploitation of woodlands (Morrone, 1986b). The Corpo Forestale is responsible for 
the protection of woodlands against overexploitation, erosion, and landslides.
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• The Consorzi di Bonifica (land-reclamation agencies) set up from 1933 
onwards (Morrone, 1986a). The Consorzi di Bonifica have been responsible for an 
upgrading of large areas of land across Southern Italy, and their work has included 
reforestation, and the protection of land against degradation and erosion.
• The Enti per Irrigazione (irrigation agencies) (see King, 1987). The Enti di 
Irrigazione have been responsible for the provision of irrigation water, and have 
required to protect watercourses against land degradation.
In Italy the role of the central state is complemented by the local state, which consists 
of twenty regions, divided into ninety provinces and over 8,000 municipalities 
(Presidency of the Council of Ministers Information and Copyright Service, 1976)*. 
The municipalities have a limited autonomy: they can represent the wishes of local 
people, but are restrained by the central state and by pressure from private 
organizations (Zink and others, 1957; Cappelleti, 1963).
According to Johnston (1989) the political parties, which compete for power within 
the state, can both respond to popular feelings about issues such as the environment 
and act to mould them as well. But their structure, which empowers them, also 
restricts the range of action which they can take. Political parties have traditionally 
had a remarkable strength in Italy (Sassoon, 1986), and are genuinely popular 
institutions - 6.5% of the adult population in Matera province belongs to a political 
party according to CENSIS (1986) but an imperfect democracy prevents them from 
always responding efficiently to people’s needs.
One of the main hindrances to democracy in Italy is clientalism, the trading of political 
favours, and associated corruption. Most academics have described it as widespread in 
Southern Italy (Zuckerman, 1979; Chubb, 1982; Willey, 1984; Walston, 1988) and 
the recent tangenti scandal has begun to confirm even the wildest rumours. Corruption 
severely restricts the effectiveness and equity of the local state’s power. Banfield 
(1958, footnote 5, page 95) cited the example of an American journalist’s interview 
in the early 1950s with the mayor of Grottole. The mayor refused the journalist’s 
parting gift with the explanation: “If I were to accept this gift which / understand, 
these people in the street would soon ask if there had not been more and how much I had 
kept for myself.”
* The municipalities’ main functions are local policing, public health, and planning. 
They are run by an elected municipal council (consiglio comunale), with a municipal 
giunta (giunta municipale) and a mayor (sindaco) who are elected by the council. Most 
municipal affairs, particularly in the smaller municipalities, are now dealt with or 
supervised by the mayor (Cappelletti, 1963).
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Bureaucratic bottlenecks are perceived to make clientalism in politics not only 
desirable but necessary: “Italian party activists... are essentially political 
entrepreneurs... who use their party affiliations to open up a network of contacts in 
seeking resources for their communities.” (Tarrow, 1977, 182.) This includes the 
manipulation of projects such as consolidation against landslides for clientalistic 
reasons. Willey noted that in Basilicata, the allocation of aid after the 1980 earthquake 
reflected the political skill of the administrators, and Walston (1988, 93) claimed 
that the aid available to Calabria after natural disasters has been “dispersed in ways 
which helped local notables rather than the homeless”.
Such is the influence of corruption on the allocation of aid that, according to Alexander 
(1989b, 234), “Unevenness in government policy can be traced to the flux of national 
interest in disaster impacts; and more surely to the success or failure of local 
politicians of greater or lesser eminence to influence the national cabinet.”
The effectiveness of the programmes used in Basilicata remains in doubt. Proponents of 
land-management programmes have pointed to their technical success in achieving 
specific goals for the reduction of hazards (Burton, Kates, and White, 1978). Their 
effectiveness in semi-arid environments was summarized by Lai (1990) who 
concluded (page 193): “Erosion control on agricultural land can be achieved by soil 
and crop management systems that ensure a good cover close to the ground surface... 
Slope gradient and length can be reduced by installing terraces or dams at intervals 
across the slope... Establishment and maintenance of good vegetative cover, however is 
the best way to control erosion.”
Public policy of intervention against landslides was described by Lazzari (1986a) as 
aiming to use a flexible range of capital and organizational adjustments. Its key 
methods in the 1980s were:
• The completion and continued maintenance of all existing engineering works.
• Avoiding wherever possible “passive” defences such as retaining walls; and 
promoting in their place the use of “active” defences such as drainage works, 
canalization, and revegetation (which have the advantage of using local labour, 
upgrading the local environment, being cheaper, and being more effective for large 
tracts of land).
• Encouraging new housing developments on less vulnerable sites (if necessary 
away from the old urban centres) and ensuring their economic and social viability.
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The techniques used for consolidation in Basilicata include:
• Reforestation, which has proved a popular option throughout the region. As 
Rendell (1986) indicated, some soils are simply too poor to allow tree growth - 
through reforestation using hardy local shrub vegetation can be a useful first step to 
land reclamation. Even when reforestation has been viable, it has often been carried 
out in an insensitive manner, and biodiversity has in many cases been harmed by the 
serried ranks of the fast-growing softwoods such as Pinus radiata.
• The use of check dams. Rendell showed that they are vulnerable to subsurface 
channelling, especially in dispersive clays. However, the Consorzio di Bonifica di 
Bradano e Metaponto (1972) claimed as evidence for the success of check dams in 
Basilicata that there has been: a decreased volume of transported material, and the 
grading of some of the less steep slopes; a reduction in erosion upstream of the check 
dams; and only 2% to 3% of the check dams installed between 1952 and 1972 were 
destroyed or severely damaged.
• Other techniques used include: the adoption of contour ploughing (which can be 
very effective if properly applied); the bulldozing of calanchi features (an expensive 
method, the efficiency of which it is difficult to assess); and the suppression of 
dispersive clays by the application of calcium hydroxide or humus (mulching is an old 
agricultural technique).
Rendell (1986) concluded that the success of these techniques was far from complete 
because of a lack of understanding of the very complex erosional processes at work, and 
because the aims of conservation have often been in conflict with the aims of 
agriculture. The effectiveness of consolidation on urban landslides was described as 
follows by Lazzari (1986b, 95, translated):
in the majority of cases the interventions have had a theraputic effect on the 
places at the point of collapse or where there is an advanced state of degradation 
affecting a large part of a town. However, it has not always been possible to 
prevent all problems, and this has given rise to a second type of town when, by 
force of circumstances, conditions give rise to the frequent emergencies which 
have affected the entire [region’s] territory.
In addition to the imperfect technical successes of soil conservation, many sources 
have suggested that the programmes act to foster state clientalism, the “culture of 
dependency". When the authorities grant a project the community “pays’ by 
returning loyalty. Aid for the consolidation of landslides consequently acts to 
strengthen that which King (1981, 147) described as “the dependence of the
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underdeveloped South on the metropolitan, industrialized North” while preventing a 
“radical reordering of the economy and society of the region.” In his analysis of events 
following landslides at Africo (Calabria), Stajano (1979, 188, translated) 
interviewed a local functionary who claimed that intervention to ameliorate landslides 
in his area is carried out for clientalistic, rather than technical reasons.
“In our river basins, the forestry organization has worked only as a clientalist 
organization encouraging dependency, even though it seems there are many useful 
public works to be carried out here: retaining walls for the areas which slide 
after every flood, an analysis of the soil to find which are the plants that could 
grow and flourish. There’s the lack of a programme, and intervention has only 
been in dribs and drabs: every time that the people of Africo, of Plati, of San Luca 
are up in arms, to calm everyone down, to get them to go home, there’s news that 
there are 300 posts, a hundred for each town, but without regard to the need of 
the territory, or the type of work needed to remedy these age-old problems."
Alexander (1987) warned that the ad hoc nature of state spending on hazards in Italy 
makes it very prone to the sort of personal intervention on which clientalistic 
influence relies. Interviews carried out with the Democratic Left mayor Luigi Cesano 
of Irsina and with the Socialist mayor Mario Atalante of Calciano confirms this opinion. 
Cesano (interviewed 3.8.1992) said that his administration has to fight for funds 
from the regional government, but said that this struggle ensures that money for 
consolidation is not a clientalistic “concession” - as he claimed it is for Christian 
Democrat towns like Grassano. Atalante (interviewed 6.8.1992) broadly agreed with 
Cesano’s argument but was more pessimistic on the possibility of avoiding the stain of 
clientalism: politics in Basilicata “is all clientalism”, he claimed.
The effect of these clientalistic relationships is that patrons have a vested interest in 
never fully satisfying the needs of their clients for soil conservation; and in 
prolonging the situation whereby, rather than looking for a long-term solution, the 
state is waging a reactive campaign against hazards. Partly through conspiracy, partly 
through incompetence, the state teeters from one ill-managed crisis to the next: which 
ensures the continuation of the problem, and the preservation of the local political 
relationships based on it.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter has set out the factors accounting for the severe intensity of landslides in 
Basilicata. It has examined, at a regional scale, the links between physical factors and 
landslides, and between social factors and landslides. It has shown that Basilicata is a
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region in which climatic extremes combine with a fragile ecology and geology, steep 
relative relief, and intense tectonic activity. But the region has been significantly 
changed by a long human occupation which has modified the environmental processes 
which occur there, particularly by the degradation of the vegetation and soil, the 
development of settlements, and the land improvement policies carried out over the 
centuries.
At the regional scale, a number of broad conclusions can be drawn. Chapter three 
showed that the current level of urban landslides is unprecedented, which can only be 
the result of human modification of the environment. This chapter has shown that the 
factors which give Basilicata a vulnerable physical environment, and a high “normal” 
level of landslides have combined with social factors to cause additional landslides.
Of the social factors, deforestation and agriculture have occurred for several thousand 
years and, at least at first, had no significant impact on the level of landslides. By as 
early as the end of the classical period they had begun to cause environmental change in 
Basilicata, but the rate of change increased significantly with the final destruction of 
the natural economy of the region by capitalism. It is also through the development of 
capitalism, particularly during the twentieth century, that industrial development and 
urban growth have come to have an increasingly important impact on the land.
The relationships examined in this chapter show physical and social factors behind the 
regional pattern of landslides which has already been identified. As section 2.4 
indicated, these factors can only be seen as producing tendencies in landsliding across 
the region, and the way they have interacted can only be adequately understood in the 
context of a detailed case study of the contingent circumstances affecting specific 
landslides. Detailed research was carried out in the municipality of Grassano, which is 
introduced in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Landslides at Grassano
This chapter introduces the town of Grassano and its landsliding hazard. It examines 
both the physical factors and the social factors that have made the town vulnerable to 
landsliding.
5.1 Introduction
Grassano experiences the vulnerable physical environment common to most 
municipalities in Basilicata. Physical factors predispose the land to landslides but, in 
addition, the land has been subject to considerable modification by humankind. Chapter 
three showed that during the twentieth century there has been an increase in the 
recorded frequency and intensity of landslides at Grassano, and this chapter allows an 
assessment of the factors behind that increase. The identification of these factors and 
the manner in which they have interacted allows a clear understanding of the changing 
pattern of landslides affecting the town, which is given in chapter six.
5.1.1 The landslides
5.1.1.1 The urban landslides
Grassano (figure 5.1) is typical of the rural settlements in the foothills of the 
Apennines. Its bleak glory was described by Levi (1982) as “a streak of white at the 
summit of a bare hill, a sort of imaginary Jerusalem in the solitude of the desert” 
(page 13) and characterized by “poverty and desolation... set in a monotonously sad 
landscape empty of softness and sensuousness” (page 155).
The town probably dates from the eleventh century and is located on a ridge of three 
hills, facing south, overlooking the Basento valley; its geology consists of a mixture of 
conglomerate, paleolandslide deposits, sandstone, and clays, with a relief rising up to 
577 m above sealevel. It had a normally-resident population of 6,261 in 1981. The
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Figure 5.1: Grassano
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town’s plan is shown in figure 5.2. It consists of a historic core to the north and west 
of the Via Meridionale, an area of postwar housing mainly to the south and east of the 
Via Meridionale, and an area of modern housing to the northeast of Via Capitano 
Pirrone.
The landscape around Grassano is the product of the town’s economic poverty. Grassano 
is affected by extensive slope instability and very large urban landslides (figures 5.3 
and 5.4). Almagia (1910) noted that the slope facing north to the Bilioso, tributary to 
the Bradano, was incized by gulleys and affected by landslides (ibid, 147). On the 
south side of the slope, the position was more serious:
Typical examples of landslides... can be seen on the southern slopes of the 
highground of Grassano (577 m). These are formed in banks of clay overlaid by 
sandy strata. As can also be seen from the [geological] map (200 I) the 
highground is cut into by gulleys which form a bed for the muddy deposits, and 
which are continually cutting upslope, threatening the edge of the sandy area 
above. As a result of this process, the town has been damaged several times by 
serious landslides, for example on 10 January 1895 and in the winter of 1902. 
[Ibid, 157-158, translated.]
Boenzi (unpublished, 1973, 5, translated) described the landslides around the town as 
characterized by a general stability on the north (Bilioso) slope, but instability on the 
southern (Basento) slope: “on the northern slope there are visible effects of ancient 
movements which now seem to have reached a degree of stability; on the southern 
slope... the landslides are fairly active.” At places, he noted, there was active calanchi 
erosion (particularly on the southern slope) and gulley erosion was very widespread.
The landslide hazard affecting the town in the 1980s was described by Regione 
Basilicata (1987, 108, translated) as follows:
In the sandstones to the southeast of the town there are three large landslide 
scars. In the areas between the gulleys Fontana and Marruggio Secondo there are 
major landslides which affect most of the old town centre. A large rotational 
landslide affects the area of the Corso Umberto... On the right hand [western] edge 
of this land in the Calvario area there is a large rotational landslide. The left hand 
[eastern] edge of the landslide is also active and affects the cemetery.
The new part of the town is located in an area affected in the past by a large 
composite landslide.
5 .1 .1 .2  The town-centre paleoslide
The town has grown on a site underlain by paleoslides (figure 5.4) on which detailed 
research has already been carried out - notably Del Prete (1981), Radina and Vignola 
(1981), and also Cotecchia and Del Prete (1992). Conclusions on the stability of the
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paleoslide have been contradictory in the past. This section consequently reviews the 
published evidence and, by combining it with a number of previously-unused sources, 
examines the stability of the paleoslide.
Following the definition by Varnes (1978) the paleoslide can be described as a 
complex rotational landslide (Del Prete, 1981; Radina and Vignola, 1981; Cotecchia 
and Del Prete, 1992). Past movement has created three terraces on which the town 
has been built. The highest terrace lies between Corso Umberto Primo and Via Appia: it 
slopes downwards with an inclination of around 15°. The middle terrace is occupied by 
the social housing south of Via Appia. And the third terrace is the area covered by the 
cemetery. The paleoslide has a maximum depth of about 100 m, a maximum width of 
about 550 m, and a length of around 950 m. The foot is at 380 m above sealevel - at 
the level of the Mindel terrace - and as a result Cotecchia, Del Prete, and Puglisi 
(unpublished, 1983) inferred that it first moved in the Mindel-Wurm period, giving 
it an age of at least 100,000 years. They suggested that it was probably formed by a 
catastrophic shock or extreme rainfall event.
They calculated that the paleoslide is marginally stable. It has a factor of safety of only
1.2 so could easily be reactivated by a severe seismic shock, or even exceptional 
weather conditions. Destabilized by undercutting, it has probably evolved in a series of 
“small and repetitive” stages (ibid, 14, translated). At the foot of the gulleys Fosso 
Marruggio Primo and Fosso Marruggio Secondo, the eastward diversion of the slope 
crest indicates that the paleoslide has moved after its formation (Del Prete, 1981). It 
has been undercut by erosion at its foot - and movements of the slope, triggered by 
erosion, were noted at the beginning of the century by Almagfe (1910).
Del Prete (1981) indicated that one of these movements may have been recorded after 
the November 1980 earthquake. Over 500 of the 3,800 homes in Grassano had to be 
evacuated because they were so severely damaged, and 15 homes collapsed (figure 
5.4). These damaged homes were mainly grouped in the town centre, where 475 out of 
the 1,362 were damaged - of these 475 homes, 230 were destroyed or in need of 
demolition, and the remaining 245 were made unfit for use (Radina and Vignola,
1981). Eighty-five percent of the damaged homes were in three zones: east-west along 
the Corso Umberto Primo and parallel below it; northwest-southeast on the northern 
side of the town; and to the southwest of the town centre. Del Prete (1981), and 
Cotecchia, Del Prete, and Puglisi (unpublished, 1981) argued that this was a result of 
the paleoslide being reactivated by the seismic shock.
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A horizontal movement of 3 mm was detected in the debris of the paleoslide between 12 
January and 3 February 1981 by an inclinometer in the town centre. No movement 
was detected after February 3. From this it has been deduced that the total movement 
would have been a matter of centimetres (Del Prete, 1981). However, Radina and 
Vignola (1981, 167, translated) suggested that no such reactivation took place: “As 
far as it was possible to observe during the numerous and detailed inspections in the 
town centre, no evidence was observed of any mass movements whatsoever on the 
roads, nor signs of landslide phenomena produced at the outskirts of the town”.
The damage was predominantly caused, Radina and Vignola (1981) suggested, by the 
depth of the paleoslide deposits. Most of the damaged homes were at the foot of the 
landslide scarps in the town where the debris mantle is at its thinnest, and where the 
transmission of seismic energy is consequently at its most efficient. The structure of 
the town centre makes some buildings particularly vulnerable where there is a steep 
drop between the upslope and downslope sides of the house. Many of the older dwellings 
have very poor foundations: rarely over 0.5 m deep, and sometimes none at all. Vignola 
(personal communication) suggested that the inclinometer readings which appeared to 
show a movement may have been the result of instrumental error. In their only 
concession to criticism, Cotecchia and Del Prete (1992, 163) denied this possibility: 
“...though the fact it [the movement] is so small gives rise to some doubts, it becomes 
entirely indicative within the whole gamut of symptoms”.
Although evidence on the reactivation of the paleoslide in 1980 is inconclusive, but 
information from similar earthquakes in the past may allow a more confident diagnosis 
to be made. The first major earthquake affecting Grassano on which information is 
available is that of 8 September 1694, which “threw Basilicata and the provinces of 
Salerno and Avelino into mourning and desolation” (Martuscelli, cited by Claps, 1982, 
28, translated). The earthquake had an intensity of MS VIII at Grassano (Regione 
Basilicata, 1987; Cotecchia and Del Prete, 1992). Little is known about its effects.
There were two contemporary reports on the earthquake, two editions of the same 
pamphlet. Anonymous (1694a, translated) reported: “In Grassano damage was done to 
the Chiesa Madre and the church of Santa Maria, with some houses cracked.” 
Anonymous (1694b) has no information on Grassano. The limited extent of the damage 
described in Anonymous (1694a) is unsurprising, given the paleoslide hypothesis. At 
the end of the seventeenth century, the town extended over a much smaller area than it 
does (Camera dei Deputati, 1954; Bolettieri, 1991). Even by 1750 only a few 
buildings had been built on what has subsequently been identified as the paleoslide
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(Camera dei Deputati, 1954). The built-up area would therefore have been less 
vulnerable to any possible movement of the paleoslide*.
Grassano seems to have received relatively little damage in 1694 compared to its 
neighbours. In Tricarico (MS VII, according to Regione Basilicata, 1987) the 
earthquake “Made numerous houses collapse, without injuring anyone, the rest were 
left damaged” (Anonymous, 1694a, translated). Accounts of events in Salandra vary 
(MS VII, according to Regione Basilicata, 1987). “Many houses were ruined, with the 
death of six people, and another who died later from fear of the earthquake.”
(According to Anonymous, 1694a, translated.) Or: “Many houses fell, with the death of 
a little girl” (Anonymous, 1694b, translated). Anonymous (1694a) also recorded 
that the Chiesa Madre at Calciano (MS VII, according to Regione Basilicata, 1987) was 
damaged.
A little more is known about the effects of the earthquake of 16 December 1857. At 
Grassano the earthquake had an intensity of MS VIII (Cotecchia and Del Prete, 1992). 
Damage at Grassano was severe: the Giornale del Regno delle Due Sicille of 30 
December 1857 reported “About 100 houses fallen; all the other buildings are more 
or less injured. A young girl of fifteen years of age was killed, and a lady had her leg 
broken." (Quoted and translated in Mallet, 1862, 225). The records of Grassano’s 
main church, the Chiesa Madre, confirm there was one victim: “Philomena D’Araio, 
fifteen years old, daughter of Dominici and Angela Bolettieri, killed by the 
earthquake...” (ACMG, Liber mortuorum parochialis ecclesia tre Grassani inceptus 
mense lanuarii 1848, Die 16 Xbris 1857, translated). An official report (ASP, 
Intendenza di Basilicata, 1364, 24 “Stato dei morti, feriti, e danni cagionati dal 
tremuoto della note de’16 Dicembre 1857”) gives the same figure of one killed and 
one injured - and damage which was estimated at D18,000 [<approximately L500 
million at 1988 prices] by the mayor.
A letter from the mayor to the  ^Intendente of Basilicata confirms the damage was 
serious. He reported on the work of builders busy “carrying out urgent repairs on
Two main sources of inaccuracy affect the map. Only the buildings standing in 1954 
were dated. Many sites have been rebuilt in the course of time, or simply abandoned, so 
the map can only be taken to show the approximate minimum of the town’s size. There 
were some errors in dating of the buildings, and these problems were dealt with 
briefly in Bolettieri (1991). For instance, observations made for this dissertation 
showed the second, un-numbered, house on the left of Via Maggiore Lotrionte - going 
up from Via Vittorio Emanuele Secondo - is dated as “probably between 1750 and 
1875”. Above the door is quite plainly carved the date “1658”.)
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many collapsing and collapsed buildings in this municipality’ (ASP, Intendenza di 
Basilicata, 1366, 35, letter from the sindaco to the intendente, dated 26.12.1857, 
translated). Especially interesting is a list of the work carried out on damaged 
buildings deemed to be threatening public safety. The pattern was slightly different 
from that described for 1980 by Del Prete (1981) and Radina and Vignola (1981), 
although the sample is very small and quite possibly unrepresentative. Only nineteen 
buildings are mentioned, their locations (figure 5.2) are given in table 5.1. Damage 
was concentrated along Corso Umberto Primo (one in that street, one in Via Piazza, one 
in Via Sotto la Chiesa, one in Via Chiesa, one in Via Sotto la Piazza). The five houses 
destroyed in Via Carmine, and the four in Via Macinnola, indicate intensive damage in 
the southeast of the town centre. And there was an evident movement in the area of the 
Calvario landslide of 1956 (one in Strada Pontone, two in Contrada Pontone).
Table 5.1: Grassano: earthquake-damaged buildings in 1857 (source: ASP, Intendenza 
di Basilicata, 1366, 35, letter from the sindaco to the intendente, dated 26.12.1857)
Urban area:
Strada Carmine (now Via Carmine) 5
Strada Chiesa (now Via Chiesa) 1
Strada Macinnola (now Via Macinnola) 4
Strada Piazza (now Corso Umberto Primo) 1
Strada Pontone (now Viale della Rimembrenza) 1
Strada Sotto la Chiesa (now Via Sotto la Chiesa) 1
Strada Sotta la Piazza (now Via Sotto la Piazza) 1
Outside the urban areas:
Contrada Chiesa (north of the Chiesa Madre) 2
Contrada Macinnola (near Via Macinnola) 1
Contrada Pontone (near the Piazza della Repubblica) 2
The evidence, if reliable, indicates a pattern of damage very difficult to explain by the 
hypothesis of Radina and Vignola (1981). Why should there have been no damage in the 
Via Garibaldi area? It is possible that the area became more vulnerable to seismic 
shock because of the landslide movements there in the twentieth century. But in that 
case, why should the rest of the area affected by the Calvario landslide be apparently 
more vulnerable to damage in 1857 than in 1980? Possibly the area around Via 
Garibaldi was in better repair in 1857 than in 1980 (as chapter six shows, most of 
the west side of the street was abandoned in the 1950s because of a landslide) although 
damage in 1980 was not confined to the west (abandoned) side of the street (see Del 
Prete, 1981). In addition, the area around Via Carmine and Via Macinnola was of about
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the same age and (being a poorer part of town) was probably in worse repair. Even 
though the buildings there are generally only of one storey there is evidence of severe 
damage in that part of the town.
The damage to Grassano in 1857 resembles that of 1980 in that it was a little worse 
than in most of the surrounding towns. At Tricarico (MS VII, according to Regione 
Basilicata, 1987) there were “a few injuries to buildings; no deaths” (Giornale del 
Regno delle Due Sicilie, 26.12.1857, quoted and translated in Mallet, 1862, 226).
But at Salandra (MS VIII, according to Regione Basilicata, 1987) it was first reported:
“A few houses destroyed, three deaths; churches and houses injured” (Giornale del 
Regno delle Due Sicilie, 26.12.1857, quoted and translated in Mallet, 1862, 222).
And then: “Forty houses demolished; the rest more or less injured and falling. One body
disinterred...” (Giornale del Regno delle Due Sicilie, 30.12.1857, quoted and 
translated in Mallet, 1862, 225.)
Severe damage from the earthquake of 23 July 1930 was confined to the northwest of 
Grassano. “Towns like Acquilonia and Melfi were almost destroyed; in others... the 
damage rather than being to people was to property. Infact, many houses were reduced 
to ruins, others severely fissured” (Claps, 1982, 78, translated). Very little 
documentary evidence is available on the effects of the earthquake in Grassano. The 
earthquake had an intensity of MS VI (Regione Basilicata, 1987; Cotecchia and Del 
Prete, 1992). No contemporary newspaper reports were made of damage in the town; 
very little attention was paid to towns away from the epicentre, and almost no council 
documents survive from the period.
The only existing documents concerning the effects of the earthquake at Grassano relate 
to the rehousing of the Pirrone family. In 1956 they sent the following statement to 
the prefect:
“We are the owners of a house, made up of two rooms of which one was on the 
ground floor, the other was on the first floor, number 65 Corso Umberto Primo 
in the town of Grassano. Following the earthquake of July 1930 the house was 
fissured to such an extent that after about a year - to be precise 19 June 1931 - 
it collapsed entirely without doing any harm to us and to the family who had left 
as a precautionary measure.
“The Genio Civile of Matera reinforced the area building a wall at the northern 
end making the present day Piazza Mazzini, which occupied the area of our house 
and the houses of others who had suffered the same misfortune.
“The authorities occupied the various areas needed for the construction; 
promising us that as soon as the government constructed new buildings we would 
be among the first occupants, without being charged any rent...
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“TWENTY-FIVE years have gone by and only now are the promised houses being 
built here at Grassano...” [AMG, Anno 1956, X, copy made by the prefetto’s office 
of the letter from Coiugi Pirrone Innocenzo and Carchio Maria Teresa to the 
prefetto, dated 11.5.1956, translated.]
A number of related documents include a letter from the mayor. The cause of the 
problem, he explained, was “an act of expropriation by the Genio Civile around thirty 
years ago, to be precise when the said organization expropriated some houses in Piazza 
Mazzini (on Corso Umberto Primo), to erect the wall to enclose the area which was 
subject to landslides and dangerous." (AMG, Anno 1956, X, letter from the sindaco to 
the Prefettura, dated 26.9.1956, translated.)
Some corroborating evidence comes from the thirteen people who lived through the 
earthquake, and some of their friends, who were interviewed in 1988 as part of this 
research (see appendix G). Only three were able to be specific about the events of July 
1930. Vittoria used to live in Vico Primo San Giovanni. She remembered an earthquake 
(she thought 1937 or 1938), when “Quite a lot of the houses collapsed” in her area. 
Particularly affected was Via Regina Margherita [nearby to the house of the Pirrone 
family]. She reported that on the roads running down towards Via Meridionale, the road 
surface collapsed, and cracks ran at right angles to the slope. Similarly, Giacomo’s 
wife recalled an unlocated “tiny landslide”, triggered by the earthquake of 1930.
Francesco remembered that there had been an earthquake but “it did very little 
damage". However, his wife remembered the earthquake at Rionero - though she said it 
was when she was “about six or seven” [this would, in fact, have made it in the 
1910s]. There was damage at Grassano but it was light and mostly affected the areas of 
old housing near the Chiesa Madre, Rione Calvario, and the area by Via Appulo Lucano. 
Giacinto, a young child at the time, claimed to remember the event vividly. It has 
haunted him all his life, he said. The shock was in the early hours of the morning. He 
was taken out of his bed by his parents and carried to safety. People flocked to the cross 
on Via Appulo Lucano to pray for the earthquake to stop. He remembered the crying 
people. “That fear has stayed with me...oh! tremendous fear!... There were very many 
houses damaged...! can never manage to forget.”
Six of the people recalled little or no damage. Beatrice: “I remember. We all went 
outside... Without damage, nothing.” Arcangelo: “Very little happened here”. Vincenzo 
explained “I was a boy aged four or five [in fact, he would have been six] but there 
wasn’t much [damage]... no damage.” Antonio’s friend said there was “really very 
little” damage. Antonio (in agreement): “There’s always damage, but what can I say?” 
Leonardo remembered an earthquake at Rionero, in 1927, ’28, or ’29, he said, but it
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was “like an echo” of the 1980 shock. Five of the thirteen (Pietro, Michele, Luisa, 
Santia, and Donato) remembered nothing specific at all. Pietro claimed “nothing ever 
happened”.
Most important for understanding the landslide was Vittoria’s statement. She 
remembered the damage and - whilst being unaware of its significance - she mentioned 
the transverse cracks in the road. Although Radina and Vignola were unable to find 
cracks in 1981, Vittoria’s statement, combined with that of Giacomo’s wife, and the 
meagre documentary evidence seems to confirm that they were there in 1930.
The evidence on the paleoslide from the earthquake of 1694 is not conclusive. Grassano 
had scarcely expanded onto the vulnerable areas where houses could have been damaged 
significantly by the seismic shock or any landslide movement. The damage done was 
less severe than in the neighbouring towns. For the earthquake of 1857, as in 1980, 
the damage to the town was as severe or more so than to its neighbours. The grouping of 
the (known) damaged houses is, given the smaller size of the town at that time, similar 
to that in 1980 - though the differences that there are imply some sort of landslide 
movement in addition to that from the seismic shock alone. In 1930 relatively little 
damage was done. The few existing documents and some of the oral testimonies suggest 
the damage was relatively similar to that in 1857 and 1980. The combined evidence 
from the earthquakes of 1857, 1930, and 1980 indicates that the paleoslide under the 
town centre has probably been reactivated by seismic shocks.
5.1.1.3 Other landslides
The landslides which threaten the greatest hazard to the community are the urban 
landslides - particularly those affecting the Calvario district of the town and the 
cemetery (both of which are segments of the large paleoslide - figure 5.4). With its 
scar beginning immediately below Viale della Rimembrenza, the Calvario landslide 
runs through Via Appulo Lucano, down to 335 m above sealevel. The most important 
recorded movements of this landslide were on 14 February 1956, 2 February 1957, 
and 14 January 1960 (Cotecchia, Del Prete, and Puglisi, unpublished, 1981). 
Movement still continues: “This is a landslide which has never become extinct and up 
until now has moved slowly downslope causing sinking, cracks, and steps sometimes 
affecting the Appia State Road (Via Appulo Lucano, the state road 7].” (Ibid, 14, 
translated.) On the eastern side of the paleoslide, incision of the Fosso Marruggio 
Secondo has eaten away and undercut the terrace on which the cemetery was built. The 
most dramatic movement of this landslide was on 21 November 1976 (ibid).
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The eastern part of the town, the main area of post-war building, is underlaid by a 
rotational landslide in sandstone and detritus. The landslide is up to about 40 m thick, 
and is between 490 and 460 m above sealevel (Picarelli and Viggiani, 1986a). The 
landslide was probably caused by a seismic shock after the Riss glacial period, and has 
been significantly affected by erosion in the Fosso Spineto which has undercut it. There 
was probably some settling of the landslide after the earthquake of 23 November 1980 
(Cotecchia, Del Prete, and Puglisi, unpublished, 1981).
On the western edge of the paleoslide, in the Petrino district, a large landslide 
undercuts the national road SS7. Movement of this landslide caused a number of 
significant disruptions to traffic during the 1980s.
Ranged around the town are also a number of landslides which may affect the urban 
area in the future. Along the crest of the Serra Martella, and on its southern slope, are 
the remains of an ancient landslide in the process of being destroyed by erosion. On the 
Bilioso (north) slope of the ridge on which Grassano sits there are a large number of 
rotational landslides at 300 to 450 m above sealevel. They mainly affect the Mulino, 
Pianella, Sant’lnnocenzo, and Marche districts and are probably reactivated by 
exceptionally heavy rainfall.
5.2 The physical factors
Grassano has a physical environment which makes it vulnerable to landslides. Steep 
slopes, weak and unstable geology, intense tectonism and seismic shocks, climatic 
extremes, and sparse and degraded vegetation, have combined in the locality to produce 
the preconditions for widespread and intense landsliding.
Grassano is located on the interfluve between the Basento and the Bradano rivers 
(figure 5.5). From the town the land slopes away steeply southwards to the Basento. 
There are four alluvial terraces on the slope at 397, 339, 303, and 250 m above sea 
level; which have been attributed to the Mindel, Riss, Riss, and Wurm glacials 
respectively (Boenzi, Gennaro, and Pennetta, 1978). The present-day level of the 
Basento is 179 m above sealevel at the eastward point where it leaves the 
municipality.
A lt itu d e : □  <200 m □  2 0 0 -4 0 0  m 03 >400 m ♦ spot height 
T. = "T o r re n te "  F. = "F o sso "
□  perm anent w a te rcou rse  □  ephemeral w a te rcou rse
□  boundary not along w a te rcourse
Figure 5 .5  Grassano: drainage and re lie f  
(source: Is titu to  Geographico M ilita re )
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Extremely aggressive erosion affects the slopes around Grassano. This reflects the high 
relative relief of the steep slope south from the town to the Basento, and the even 
steeper slope north to the Bilioso (tributary of the Bradano). The mean erosion rate 
for the Bradano valley is 1,159 tonnes per km2 per year - which, assuming a mean 
rock density of 2.5 tonnes per m3, amounts to an erosion rate of 0.46 m over the 
1,000 years since the town was first developed. However, Alexander (1982) found 
local inter-rill erosion rates of 20 to 30 mm per year, which indicates that in places 
total erosion on the present site could have exceeded 20 metres over 1,000 years. The 
loss of topsoil and widespread gulley erosion caused by these very high rates of erosion 
means that almost the entire interfluve on which Grassano is located is prone to 
landslides (Almagi&, 1910; Boenzi, unpublished, 1973; Del Prete, 1981; Cotecchia 
and Del Prete, 1992).
Grassano is located in the west of the Bradano Trough and shares the general geological 
characteristics of that zone, notably the vulnerability to landslides which typifies 
other towns such as Irsina, Grottole, Miglionico, Montescaglioso, Ferrandina, Pisticci, 
and Craco (Neboit-Guilhot, 1990). The town’s underlying sedimentary deposits are 
sub-horizontal Plio-Pleistocene marine deposits (Boenzi, Palmentola, and Valduga, 
1971), with a relatively simple solid geology: predominantly clays, overlaid by 
weakly-cemented sandstones, and capped by conglomerates (Del Prete, 1981)
(figures 5.6 and 5.7). Details of mechanical tests on the rocks are given in appendix D.
The clays (argille subapennine) rise up to about 525 m above sealevel. They are illitic 
and stratified with sand - particularly so at higher altitudes, close to the sandstone. 
They were described as “solid to the touch, plastic, and pseudo-coherent” by Boenzi 
(unpublished, 1973, 10, translated).
Above the clays are sandstones (sabbie di Monte Marano) varying in thickness between 
30 m to the south of the town and 70 m beneath the Serra Martella. The sandstones are 
in general loose or weakly cemented. They are well stratified and are interbedded with 
marl and gravel. The sandstones contain quartz, mica, and calcareous fines. Boenzi 
(ibid, 10-11, translated) described them as “coloured grey or yellow, generally with 
little coherence and incomplete in their diagenesis”. He added that in the upper part of 
the series “they can however present discrete coherence, and become genuine 
sandstones, often exposed by differential erosion” (ibid, 11, translated).
CD A llu v ia l and lacustrine  
deposits (g ra v e lly )  
A llu v ia l and lacustrine  
deposits (c layey-sandy
□  Landslide deposits
□  Sands
□  C lays
♦ Chiesa Madre /T h e  SS7
Figure 5 .6  Grassano:lithology
(source: II dlssesto idrogeologico della Basilicata)
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Figure 5 .7  Grassano: geology
(source: Serv izio  Geologico d’ lta lia )
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Above the sandstones is a layer of conglomerates (conglomerati di Irsina) about 20 m 
thick. The conglomerates are polygenic in origin, laying in beds two or three metres 
thick. The clasts in the conglomerates are of Apennine provenence, well rounded, and 
held together by siliceous cement.
Spread over the slopes is a cover of detritus from the breakdown of the conglomerate 
and sandstones. The detritus includes sandstone fragments and is best preserved on the 
east of the town and on the southern (Basento) slope, particularly at around 380 m 
above sealevel. Del Prete (1981) concluded that the coherence of the mantle, the 
lithofacies, and the poor state of coherence of the fragments imply the material is 
ancient, formed in a warm-wet climate - probably from the Mindel-Riss interglacial.
At Grassano, earthquake shocks have been implicated several times in the reactivation 
of the landslide over the past several hundred years, as the previous section showed. 
This is because the Bradano Trough, in which the town is located, has probably been 
subject to uplift since the late Calabrian period (Boenzi, Palmentola, and Valduga, 
1971) as a result of the neotectonism, intense earthquake activity which has affected 
the whole of Basilicata.
There is no fully operative climatic station for Grassano, but the figures for the 
neighbouring town of Tricarico (Ranieri, 1972) probably give a reasonable 
appproximation. Data for Tricarico shows the climate to be semi-arid* * (table 5.2):
Table 5.2: Tricarico: climatic data for 1926 to 1955 (source: Ranieri, 1972)
J F M A M J J A  S O N D  Total
Temperature0: 4.2 5.3 7.6 11.4 15.3 20.9 23.2 24.0 20.4 15.0 10.3 6.1
Precipitation mm: 71 57 66 50 41 37 25 22 49 63 80 86 647
Following Cantu (1977). The definition used De Martonne’s aridity index 1 = 1/2 
(P/T+10 + 12p/t+10): where T is mean annual temperature, P is total annual 
precipitation, t is temperature of the most “arid” month, p is precipitation of the 
most “arid” month). Tricarico has an index of 17.8: within the values of 10 to 20 
which define the sub-arid; giving it “the climate of the typical Mediterranean 
vegetation" (ibid, 147).
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There are also, for comparison, some more recent but incomplete measurements also 
taken at Tricarico (table 5.3):
Table 5.3 Tricarico: weather details (source: Compendio statistico della provincia di 
Matera 1986 ( 1986 ) )
Year
1 9 7 5  
1 9 8 1  
1 9 8 2
Temperature* 
max. min.
3 9 . 0
3 5 . 9
3 7 . 5
- 6 . 0
- 3 . 0
mean
m onthly
1 2 . 5
Precipitation mm 
annual m onthly
to ta l maximum
5 3 0 . 4 4 1 . 0
frequency
(days)
8 5
The climatic statistics which are available were reviewed by Rendell (1975, 
unpublished). Daily rainfall data is available for Grassano from 1922 to 1941 and 
from 1951 to 1967. This indicated a fairly rapid increase from 1922 until the mid- 
1930s - though the trend was probably spurious, the result of a more-assiduous 
reporting of low figures. From the period 1951 to 1967, total precipitation was 
13,062 mm - giving an average precipitation of 768 mm per year, with a mean 
length of dry periods of 5.1 days (6.56 days in summer).
As Boenzi (unpublished, 1973) pointed out, the seasonal variation in the weather 
leads to extreme changes in slope dynamics. He estimated that at Grassano the rates of 
erosion in July and August are about one-twelfth of the rate in the maximum months of 
November, December, January, and February.
Grassano’s altitude, between 179 and 576 m above sealevel for the whole 
municipality, implies that most of the unmanaged vegetation can best be characterized 
as of the “mediterraneo” type with predominantly macchia, moorland, and meadow 
species (see Ranieri, 1972). However, very little natural vegetation survives. Of the 
3,803 ha (92.6%  of the municipality) surveyed for the catasto land tax in 1988, only 
131 ha (3.8%  of the total surveyed) was uncultivated. There is very little woodland in 
Grassano: under the definitions of the 1970 agricultural census covered only 0.6%  of 
the municipality (Istituto Centrale della Statistica, 1974), and this is mostly 
reforested land in the Bilioso valley, with some remnants of the old woodland on the 
banks of the Basento and around the Serra Martella (see figure 5.8).
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Figure 5 .8  Grassano: d is tric ts  
(source: f ie ld v o rk )
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Physical factors account for the vulnerability of the municipality to landslides, and 
show that even without human intervention there would be landslides at Grassano. Yet 
they do not explain the increase in the reported level of landslides in the twentieth 
century. If it is assumed that the growth of reported landslides was real, and as it has 
been shown that it cannot be accounted for by endogenous changes in the physical 
environment, it must - by implication - have been the result of human activity.
5.3 The social factors
The assessment of the social factors influencing landslides at Grassano is an important 
but neglected topic. According to Rendell (unpublished, 1975, 208-209): “Man tends 
to be blamed for the severe erosion occurring in the Basento valley, and although some 
idea of critical moisture conditions for runoff and shallow landsliding has been 
obtained, the historical background of land use and erosion within the Basento valley 
still requires elucidation." This section gives such a background.
Since the first occupation of the site of Grassano, the inhabitants have continued to 
modify the environment around them. With the breakdown of a peasant society and the 
introduction of an industrial society the scope and intensity of interference has 
accelerated. The number of people living in the town has grown, creating greater 
pressure on the land. The development of agricultural technology, particularly since 
the last world war, has allowed higher crop yields but the intensification of production 
by the introduction of new technology (particularly mechanization) has increased the 
pressures on the environment and increased soil erosion and landslides.
5.3.1 Deforestation
Historical evidence shows that Grassano was formerly heavily wooded. In the medieval 
period such was the density of woodland that the Duke of Salandra, the feudal lord, had a 
number of towers built in the woods around the municipality to spy out and signal the 
presence of game for hunting (Bolettieri, 1991). One of these towers survives, close 
to present-day Rione Gramsci.
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Place-name analysis, discussed in appendix E, allows some of the former landscape of 
Grassano to be reconstructed. Seven of the districts (figure 5.8) were formerly at 
least partially wooded and have subsequently been largely or wholly deforested: Serra 
Martella, Capolaserra, Difesa, Serra, Cugno di Noci, Serrauzzi, Spinetto. By 1740 at 
least two of the districts were probably subject to degradation and landslides: Le 
Machitelle, and Calanconi. The British Library map “Terra di Bari et Basilicata"
(K83 (30), dating from 1662) gives what seems to be a pictoral record of woodlands 
at Grassano which confirms these patterns (figure 5.9). Both Grassano and Tricarico 
were shown as surrounded by light woodland, Grottole was shown without.
By the nineteenth century there was little woodland left around Grassano, as two 
documents show. A report for the French government in 1808 described a lack of 
woods (ASN, Ministero Interno, I, 2183, 7), and noted that wolves and foxes were 
consequently only migrants in the territory. In addition, the first plan of landuse for 
the municipality - referring to 1792 and successive dates - is that of the La 
Machitella district, dated 1854 (ASP, Intendenza di Basilicata, 619, 12, “Pianta della 
Macchitella di Grassano secondo le diverse epoche”; republished in Camera dei 
Deputati, 1954). It shows that squatters took hold of the area in the early nineteenth 
century, and cleared much of the woodland.
The earliest exact description of woodlands in the territory is a 1: 250,000 map 
showing the position in 1860 and 1910 - Camera dei Deputati (1910, Volume V, 
Section III, Part I, map “Zone con boschi esistenti in Provincia di Potenza secondo dati 
dell’lspezione Forestale di Potenza”). With this map the position becomes very much 
clearer. The pattern is much as today with the hilltops treeless and the remnants of 
woodland - in the La Machitella area and bordering the Bilioso (the latter of which 
disappeared between 1860 and 1910) confined to the periphery of the municipality 
(figure 5.10).
5 .3 .2  A gricu ltu re
Scott (1976) noted that for peasants the main aim in life is a reliable source of 
subsistence, and while the peasant society existed at Grassano there was a real fear of 
starvation. For example, Scottelaro (1986, 142, translated) quoted Michele Mulieri, 
born at Grassano in 1904, as saying “I’ve always worked in agriculture, which gives 
the most secure bread”. Even in the 1950s there was still starvation: although
Figure 5.9: Grassano in 1662 (source: “Terra di Bari et Basilicata”, K83 (30))
1 km
♦ Chiesa Madre
E3 Woodland cleared between 1860 and 1910  
S3 Woodland in 1910
 Woodland extending beyond the m unicipal boundary
Figure 5.1 0 Grassano: deforestation from  1 860  to 1910  
(source: Camera dei Deputati, 1 9 1 0 )
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members of one-person households consumed an average of 4,014 kilocalories a day, 
those members of households with nine or more members consumed a mean of only 
2,733 kilocalories a day. The diet had, compared to a number in Italy, low levels of 
animal protein and fat, and high levels of carbohydrates (Camera dei Deputati, 1954).
The town of Grassano is newer than its neighbours. A prehistoric and a Roman tomb 
have both been found seven kilometres northwest of the town in the Bivio Calle area, 
but the earliest evidence of occupation of the town comes from much later. Gattini 
(1910) reported that in 1280, mention was made of “Tricarico cum Craciano” - 
which was previously thought to be the earliest documented reference to Grassano 
(Camera dei Deputati, 1954). But evidence found in the writings of Allesandro di Meo 
indicates that settlement had begun around Grassano’s castle by around the eleventh 
century - and founded even earlier. Allesandro di Meo (1795-1819) recorded that in 
1060 mention was made of “Castellum, quod vocatur Crassanum” as being part of the 
territory of the Bishop of Tricarico (III, 18). In 1070, the parish of Tricarico 
included “Castel Grassano” (III, 98). And in 1123 the Pope confirmed “Crassano” to 
the Bishop of Tricarico (IX, 292).
Grassano grew slowly. By 1447 it had 16 hearths, indicating probably between 64 and 
96 inhabitants (Sebastiani and Sebastiani, 1979). Early settlers probably came to the 
town after the abandonment of Irso in the mid-twelfth century, and after the 
destruction of Altojanni - the date of which is unknown (Camera dei Deputati, 1954; 
Sebastiani and Sebastiani, 1979). Growth continued slowly until the nineteenth 
century (figure 5.11).
The peasant society had begun its slow transition to industrialism by the end of the 
nineteenth century. Fundamental in this process was the demographic transition from 
the 1870s (see Camera dei Deputati, 1954). Average life expectancy at birth rose 
from 25.5 years in 1810-1811 to 42.9 years in the years 1950 to 1951.
Particularly important in the fall of the death rate was the rapid decline of endemic 
diseases which followed the infrastructural improvements of the Fascist period. 
Diarrhoea and entiritis accounted for 19.2% of deaths in the period 1921 to 1927, 
and 6.3% in 1948 to 1952; malaria accounted for 0.7% of deaths in the period 1920 
to 1927, and none after the 1940s. The population of Grassano was 5,426 in 1861; it 
reached a peak in the 1950s; falling to 6,261 in 1981 (Sebastiani and Sebastiani, 
1979; Istituto Centrale della Statistica, 1984b).
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Figure 5.11 Grassano: population
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Poverty and opportunities abroad encouraged significant emigration from the 1860s, 
which accelerated after 1875. From 1901 to 1929 there were 3,026 emigrants 
(2,554 of whom had been dependent for a living on agriculture): 59% went to the 
United States, 28% to Argentina (Camera dei Deputati, 1954). The closure of 
emigration in the 1920s led to still greater pressure on household resources, and an 
increased poverty - although migration to elsewhere in Italy became a partial 
substitute for migration abroad. Between 1934 and 1953, 1,399 people left Grassano 
for other municipalities, and 902 arrived. The last world war, with its opportunities 
for higher earnings, led to a temporary improvement of economic conditions for some 
- but after it, migration continued. With the exception of 1973 there was a negative 
migration balance for every year from 1961 to 1985 (Rota and Latronico, 
unpublished, 1986). remittances from abroad have always proved helpful to Grassano, 
and a sureiy-conservative estimate put the figure at L373.691 in 1971 (II 
Politecnico, unpublished, 1972-1973).
The poverty of the town is a legacy of its marginal agricultural status in the past - a 
status shared by many settlements in Southern Italy (Blok, 1969; King and Strachan,
1978). From the foundation of Grassano, until around 1500, the local economy was 
mainly based on pastoralism. Although the relatively low intensity of early agriculture 
at Grassano would have prevented widespread environmental disruption, it is likely to 
have caused substantial deforestation. Intensive cultivation of vegetables and vines was 
carried out close to the medieval town. Some local names, as an interview with 
Leonardo Pontillo showed, retain records of former intensive landuse: of particular 
interest being U Chian Fafal (“bean plain") downhill of present-day Piazza della 
Repubblica; and A Vegn u Due (“the Duke [of SalandraJ’s vineyard") near present-day 
Rione Gramsci. The steep slopes close to the town, like those of the Calvario and 
Fontana districts, were particularly vulnerable to environmentally-insensitive 
production and have been substantially eroded (Almag&, 1910; Regione Basilicata, 
1 9 8 7 ) .
From 1500 there were substantial social changes in Grassano. Gentry and peasants 
arrived from Tricarico, Garaguso, and Ferrandina (and particularly after the 
destruction of Oggiano by landsliding in the seventeenth century). The number of 
hearths in the town rose to 310 in 1648 (a population of 1,240 to 1,860) and to 637 
hearths in 1745 (a population of 2,548 to 3,882). The first time the population was 
measured directly was in 1745, when it stood at 2,503 (Sebastiani and Sebastiani,
1 9 7 9 ) .
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From the beginning of the seventeenth century at Grassano the accumulation of small 
amounts of land by a number of agricultural workers enabled them to begin a 
consolidation of property and the development of small, market-oriented farms 
(Camera dei Deputati, 1954). In the period 1600 to 1745 the new agriculture became 
progressively more important than pastoralism to the local economy as the diffusion of 
grapes, olives, and fruits helped stimulate a more profitable and more intensive 
cultivation of the land.
The slow accumulation of wealth by farmers, traders, and artizans allowed the 
development of a new middle class. By 1745, 94 farmowners controlled 20% of the 
local income (Ambrico, 1964; Giura Longo, 1967) and Grassano was linked 
increasingly closely to the national economy. Gaudioso (in Pedio, 1965, 72, 
translated) described the importance of these new, larger farms to the local economy. 
By the late eighteenth century, the people of the town were ‘Living with the labours of 
sowing and working on the larger farms.”
Accumulation was helped by a tax regime that was not quite as harsh as in the 
surrounding towns. The Relazione Gaudioso of 1736 (Pedio, 1965) showed that the 
province of Matera paid a disproportionately high 13.1% of the total direct tributes to 
the crown of the Kingdom of Naples while the province had only 10.3% of the 
population of the Kingdom - excluding the capital, Naples (data from Pepe, 1965). 
Grassano had a marginally easier burden of taxes to its feudal authorities - having 
1.35% of the province’s hearths (households) but paying 1.01% of its total feudal 
dues (data from Pedio, 1965; and Pepe, 1965).
There are few descriptions of the land at the time. For example, Antonini (1797, first 
published in 1745) passed over Grassano but wrote of Tricarico that “it continues to 
be one of the best areas in the region, and contributing to this in no small way are the 
soils - excellent for grain, and for meadows - and the woods, in which there is a great 
deal of game, serve to fatten up large numbers of pigs.” (1797, 56-57, translated.) 
However, there was some evidence of environmental problems. He described the 
countryside of Grottole, which borders on the east of Grassano, as: “similar to its 
neighbours... though rather more degraded, but... excellent for meadows and grain.” 
(Ibid, 56, translated.)
Capitalist agriculture became progressively more important in the local economy as 
accumulation progressed. By the nineteenth century the rates of return on the land
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became high enough to allow some of the more affluent peasant farmers to obtain mules 
and donkeys. As the land became more intensively used around the town, farming 
spread outwards to land which had previously been uncultivated - by the nineteenth 
century, for example, areas of land around the feudal reserve of La Machitella had 
already begun to be squatted (ASP, Intendenza di Basilicata, 619, 12 “Pianta della 
Machitella di Grassano secondo le diverse epoche”; reproduced in Camera dei Deputati, 
1954). Grassano became noted for its cash crops: Giustiniani described the 
municipality (1802, 106-107, translated) as “situated in a mountainous area, and 
in the territory wheat, wine, oil, and cotton are produced. There are about 3,000 
inhabitants, for the most part engaged in agriculture and in trading their surpluses in 
and outside the province [Basilicata].”
The Catasto land tax allows a partial reconstruction to be made of the way that land was 
used in Grassano at the beginning of the nineteenth century (ASM, Vecchio Catasto dei 
Terreni della Provincia di Matera, 91, 1). It shows that the most intense production 
was concentrated around the edge of the town - though this was where the slopes were 
steepest. The districts around the town had most, if not all, of their land under 
viticulture. Serra Martel la had 12.8 ha surveyed, all of which was under viticulture. 
Similarly, all of the 8.8 ha of Calanconi was under viticulture. Grain production was 
concentrated in the outlying districts, particularly on the relatively flat terrace 
plains of the Basento valley. Most of these districts contained farmhouses, which 
allowed their occupants extended stays away from the town. All of the 203.8 ha of 
Pianella were under grain (the district included farm buildings belonging to two 
families); Cugno di Noce had 109.3 ha of which 95.1% was under grain and 5.0% was 
under viticulture; while at Coste di Rizziano 99.2% of the 136.0 ha was under grain 
and 0.9% under horticulture (the district included four farmhouses).
The abolition of feudalism and the subsequent concentration of landownership had the 
result of encouraging the growth of a rural bourgeoisie responding to and exploiting 
the needs of the market (see Izzo, 1976). Some redistribution of land also took place at 
Grassano, with the remains of the feudal reserve of La Machitella which had not been 
squatted becoming municipal property. Some land in Grassano was also sold off by the 
former landowners, often at very low prices (Camera dei Deputati, 1954). Most 
importantly, farmers from Grassano were able to obtain new land in the surrounding 
municipalities.
The population continued to grow during the nineteenth century, and a number of 
strategies were adopted to feed it. There was a slow extension of the area of cultivated
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land (table 5.4) - particularly the area under grain (table 5.5), and a subdivision of 
plots which continued up until the last world war. The expansion of grain production, 
particularly in marginal areas, has significantly increased environmental degradation, 
as Bolettieri (1991, 24, translated) indicated: “to have land to give over to grain, an 
indiscriminate deforestation was carried out, leading to continuous landslips after 
r a i n . ”
The number of poor peasants increased during the latter half of the nineteenth century 
and although there was a decline in the death rate, the latter years of the century saw 
widespread destitution in the town and increasing emigration. The land was 
increasingly subdivided to accommodate the growing population. In 1814 the average 
landholding had been 2.98 ha, but by 1942 it had shrunk to 1.28 ha (Camera dei 
Deputati, 1954). In response to the growth of poverty two mutual societies were set 
up to provide some protection from want.
The impoverishment of the peasantry continued into the twentieth century. Levi 
(1982, 159) described the situation in the 1930s as follows: “The peasants of 
Grassano lived off advance payments for the crops, but when the harvest came around 
they were rarely able to pay back what they had borrowed. Every year their 
obligations grew and they were more and more entangled in a web of squalor and debt.”
Although the available statistical data is not comprehensive, some general conclusions 
can be made about agricultural changes at Grassano. The deforestation and land 
degradation that characterized the nineteenth century were accelerated by the Battle 
for Grain in the 1920s and 1930s, which raised prices and encouraged a more 
intensive use of more land (tables 5.4 and 5.5). Mussolini himself visited Grassano in 
1936 and, in a promotion for the programme, helped thresh grain in the Cacciatori 
district (Bolettieri, 1991).
Table 5.4 Grassano: proportion of land cultivated from 1929 to 1970 (source: II 
Politecnico, unpublished, 1973)
1 9 2 9  9 2 .4 %
1 9 4 2  9 3 .3 %
1 9 5 3  9 3 .8 %
1 9 7 0  8 8 .3 %
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By the middle of the twentieth century the uncultivated area of the municipality, 
wasteland or woodland, had shrunk considerably. Most of the land was taken up by 
grain, but there had been a significant growth in horticulture and a decline in pasture 
(table 5.5). The third agricultural census (Istituto Centrale della Statistica, 1985) 
was measured on a different statistical basis - the 5,458.18 ha occupied by residents 
of Grassano - of which 70.9% was under grain, 10.9% permanent pasture and 
meadow, 7.9% permanent cultivation, 15.6% woodland, and 8.7% other landuses.
Table 5.5: Grassano: landuse from 1814 to 1942 (source: Camera dei Deputati, 1954)
Year Grain horticulture olives pasture vines
1 8 1 4  68 .7  0 .5  1.3  19 .5  9.1
1 94 2  68.1 2 .9  1.3  18 .5  9.1
The changes in landuse since the last world war reflect the changing requirements of a 
modernizing society. Most significant was the decline in importance of agriculture and 
agricultural employment. In 1951, 81.9% of the working population was employed in 
agriculture, in 1981 the figure had fallen to 22.7%. At the same time the proportion 
employed in industry rose from 10.0% to 40.8%, in commerce from 4.5% to 14.4%, 
and in other activities from 3.5% to 22.1% (Rota and Latronico, unpublished, 1986).
5.3.3 Construction
The town has expanded rapidly during the twentieth century to accommodate a growing 
population, higher standards of personal space, and smaller households. This has had a 
significant environmental impact. Housing had begun to spread to the east and south of 
the old town from the 1930s. This expansion has been officially encouraged since the 
first urban plan, the piano regolatore generale (PRG) and its later modifications. 
Building has caused many problems. The construction of engineering works (including 
those for consolidation against landslides) has often been penny-pinching. The problem 
is made worse still by the original poor construction of many engineering and building 
works (the evidently variable quality of which has been - it is claimed - the result of 
corrupt building practices and lax inspection).
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Some indication of the sort of problems that can arise through shoddy construction can 
be given from an incident recorded in 1942 when 16 metres of a retaining wall 
between Viale della Rimembrenza and Via Roma collapsed. A report noted: “The collapse 
happened because of stormwater pouring from the said rampart and infiltrating the 
shoulders of the wall, which lack supports and with a void behind it; contributory 
causes are the age of the wall, its insufficient thickness compared to its height, and the 
lack of its foundations.” (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 482, folder: Lavori di ricostruzione 
della parte crolata del muro al ramparte di via Roma nell abitato di Grassano, “Perizia 
dei lavori di costruzione della parte crollata del muro di sostegno al ramparte di via 
ROMA nel Rione Calvario dell’abitato di Grassano”, translated.) Similarly, a report in 
1947 described a large number of the roads as resting on banks “barely cemented and 
made of sands which are almost completely lacking in cohesion” (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 
482, folder: Grassano: consolidamento rione Purgatorio ecc, “Perizia dei lavori di 
consolidamento del rione Purgatorio della via S. Lucia, del largo Puntone e del fosso 
Fontana dello abitato di Grassano”, translated).
Housebuilding has added to the problem. According to the 1981 census (Istituto 
Centrale della Statistica, 1984b) there were 1,825 homes in Grassano, of which 
21.8% were built before 1919, 8.6% between 1919 and 1945, 21.4% between 
1946 and 1960, 20.7% between 1961 and 1971, 9.4% between 1972 and 1975, 
17.5% between 1976 and 1980, and 0.5% in 1980 and 1981. In 1988 the built-up 
area of the town occupied 16.57 ha (UEM).The rapid postwar increase in construction 
has led to many problems: in 1964, for instance, the mayor wrote to the Genio Civile 
to alert them to a threat from landslides uphill of Via Capitano Pirrone “in some areas 
building has led to heaps of debris over seven metres high. A lot of percolating water is 
noticeable and could threaten the stability of the new buildings and provoke the 
slipping of all the soil above.” (ASM, Proweditorato alle Opere Pubbliche, I, 177, 
letter from the sindaco to the Genio Civile, dated 15.4.1964, translated.)
Building, particularly the tarmacking of roads, tends to reduce infiltration and 
increase runoff (I Douglas, 1983). The modern increase in water consumption, 
drainage, and sewage have also acted to contribute to the increase in iandsliding. Piped 
water arrived in the town in the 1920s (Bolettieri, 1991) and a reservoir was built 
near the Chiesa Madre: though for many households it has only been available since the 
1950s (see Camera dei Deputati, 1954). With higher standards of living, water 
consumption has increased dramatically. This increase seems to have been directly 
linked to landslides caused by gulley excavation, promoted by sewage runoff.
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Since the 1970s, the reservoir’s 400 m3 capacity has regularly been exhausted each 
day. The water, most of which will drain from the town, represents a significant 
increase in runoff. Grassano’s precipitation of about 768 mm a year on the town’s 
16.57 ha will amount to 127,000 m3 over the year: assuming full daily consumption 
of the reservoir, reservoir water will increase runoff by up to 146,000 m3 a year - 
that is by a very substantial 115%. The town’s drainage, which includes some street 
drainage, originally ran into the Fosso dei Lupi, downslope of the Calvario landslide. 
After the Calvario landslide of 1956, fear that the drainage would reactivate the 
landslide led to the water being redirected to the Fosso Fontana, by the cemetery. After 
the cemetery landslide of 1976 fears that the drainage would reactivate the landslide 
there led to the water being canalized (interview with Giuseppe Vignola, 23.5.1991).
Drainage was generally slow from the unpaved and unguttered streets which were 
ubiquitous until the 1950s. The project to provide the first guttering for Corso 
Umberto Primo (then the main road of the town) was not begun until 1951, at which 
time it was noted that infiltration along the road was causing damage to surrounding 
buildings (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 14, file: Progetto dei lavori di consofidamento dei 
Rioni Meridiona/e S Innocenzo, Piazza e Purgatorio dello abitato di Grassano, 
“Relazione”). Likewise in 1962 it was proposed to pave the Corso Umberto Primo and 
Via Regina Margherita because they were allowing “infiltration of rainwater with 
serious danger for the stability of the adjacent buildings". (ASM, Proweditorato alle 
Opere Pubbliche, I, 177, letter from the sindaco to the Genio Civile, dated 4.6.1962, 
translated.)
Flooding is frequent at Grassano. In 1986 EAAP, the Ente Autonomo per I’Acquedotto 
Pugliese, produced proposals to spend L2 billion [L2.2 billion] to improve the water 
supply and drainage of the town. EAAP found the problems were the age of pipes (many 
of which had rusted), inadequate flowcapaities, and frequent rupture because of heavy 
traffic and geological problems (UTMG, file: Rete Idrica Abitato (Progetto per il 
Risanamento della Rete Idrica e Fognante nell’Abitato di Grassano), “Relazione"). 
According to a note attached to the folder, a total of thirty roads were susceptible to 
flooding by sewage (ibid, “Strade fognante sogette ad attuazione").
The localized increase in soilwater caused by faulty drainage and leakage has led to an 
increase in the likelihood of landslides. In at least one case it has actually caused a 
small landslide: in Piazza San Domenico on Via Meridionale. After heavy rains affecting 
Grassano in October 1957, burst drains under Piazza San Domenico caused a landslide 
and significant damage to the road under the square (Basilicata, 1957).
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5.3.4 Land management
Landslides in Grassano have worsened during the twentieth century. The various 
measures taken to counteract landslides in the municipality are described in detail in 
appendix C. Although there have been a number of projects to reclaim land throughout 
the municipality, there was little money to combat urban landslides until the 1970s. A 
lack of knowledge about the scale of the problem did little to encourage spending, and 
the lack of money available to be spent acted to stifle requests for more aid. It was only 
with the cemetery landslide of 1976, and later with the 1980 earthquake which 
affected much of Southern Italy, that significant funding allowed management of the 
newly-recognized problem - but the only approach feasible was grounded in the 
political and social realities of Grassano, rather than the requirements of the land.
This increase seems to have had only limited success in assuaging fears about 
landslides - a phenomenon which will be discussed in chapter seven.
5.4 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the complex nature of the physical and social factors that 
have interacted to produce the specific local pattern of landslides at Grassano. The town 
has been taken as an example of those towns described in chapter three where urban 
landsliding has increased during the twentieth century. It has shown that Grassano has 
an environment very susceptible to landslides (indeed, the town-centre paleoslide 
predates the occupation of the site by at least 100,000 years); but it has also shown 
that society has changed the landslides at Grassano by interfering in a vulnerable 
environment. The changes in the landuse around the town imply that this increase 
began before the twentieth century, but the major changes in the use of the land have 
been during the rapid social and economic change of the present century - notably the 
intensification of agriculture around the town, and particularly the major increases in 
housing, and the introduction of drainage and sewerage. These changes have made a 
significant contribution to the increase in the intensity of the landslides.
By discussing the specific nature of the factors accounting for landslides at Grassano 
(the combination of a vulnerable physical environment and an increasingly intense use
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of the land) this chapter has confirmed that Grassano typifies many of the regional 
trends discussed in chapter four. The example of Grassano implies that at least some of 
the increased reporting of landslides discussed in chapter three was because of a real 
increase in landsliding. But it does not show conclusively that this was the case, and 
such evidence can only be provided by the detailed history of landslides at Grassano in 
chapter six - which is put in context by the analysis of the social perception of 
landslides given in chapter seven.
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Chapter 6: The history of landslides at Grassano
This chapter outlines the history of the landslides affecting Grassano, in order to 
provide detailed information for an assessment of whether there has been a real 
increase in the intensity of landsliding in Basilicata over the past two centuries.
6.1 Introduction
Research has already been carried out to provide histories of the landslides reported at 
some of the towns in Basilicata (Guericchio and Melidoro, 1974; Del Prete and Petley, 
1982): it has provided evidence showing a reported increase of landslides similar to 
the regional pattern described in chapter three. But this dissertation is the first 
research to use detailed case-study material to show the relationship between regional 
factors of structuration and contingent local factors - from which it is possible to 
determine whether the increase in landslides has been a real one or only an apparent 
one.
6.2 Environmental change before the twentieth century
As chapters two and three showed, the general fertility of the land throughout Southern 
Italy has shown a decline over the past two thousand years. Grassano has a typically 
vulnerable environment, and as chapter five showed it has experienced pressures on 
that environment which are similar to those which have affected the whole of 
Basilicata discussed in chapter four.
Grassano proved no exception to the regional trend: what was once fertile is now 
sterile. The origin of its name gives some evidence on the environmental changes that 
the area has experienced. It probably came from the dialect term “grassili” (meaning 
a fertile place, according to Camera dei Deputati, 1954) vulgarized into Latin as 
“Grassus", “Crassia” or “Grascia”. The arms of the town depict two golden horns of
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plenty, filled with grapes, displayed above the three green hills on which the town 
developed which “attests to the fertility of the town” (Gattini, 1910, 30, translated).
Although Basilicata had been subjected to severe degradation since the sixteenth 
century, the historical sources examined for this dissertation described Grassano and 
the neighbouring municipalities as very fertile. Early evidence relating specifically to 
Grassano is difficult to find, principally because it only became an independent 
municipality in 1648 (previously it had been a district of Tricarico). Many historical 
sources consequently ignored Grassano, but inferences on the state of its land can be 
gained from descriptions of its neighbours.
According to Edirsi, writing in the twelfth century, Tricarico was “surrounded with 
woodlands, pastures, and fields” (translated into Italian and paraphrased by Pardi, 
1919, 127, translated), and this favourable description was characteristic of the 
municipalities around Grassano. Irsina was described as a “‘beautiful town’ with ‘land 
rich in vines and trees, and very productive’” (translated into Italian and quoted by 
Pardi, ibid, translated). And Grottole was “in the middle of land that produces every 
type of grain, and rich in pasturage” (translated into Italian and cited by Pardi, ibid, 
translated).
Mazzella (1601) made only passing references to Grassano, but like Edirsi, his 
descriptions claimed the land to be fertile and healthy. Similarly, Pachichelli (1702, 
276-278, translated) described Tricarico as being “flat and spacious and with 
abundant wine and wheat, in the foothills of the Apennines, and in very healthy air”. 
Ferdinando (1721, 145, translated) gave a similar description of Tricarico:
The town is in the foothills of the Apennines, between the two rivers Obliviosum 
[Biliosoj and Vasensum [Basento]... The air rejoices in being mild and healthy. On 
one side are most fertile mountains, close to the town; on the other are beautiful 
fields spread out over a broad plain. The surroundings are as much mountainous 
as flat, and irrigated by many streams. The soil gives the best produce and most 
highly praised wine, the luxuries of life as well as its necessities grow in 
abundance.
The first full description of the environment of Grassano was given in the platea 
inventory of 1763: “The air is healthy; the territory is fertile in every way and gives 
delicious abundance of precious grains, and generous wines..." (ASM, Cabreum, platea 
seu inventarium omnium buonorum venerandae commendae Grassani factum... in anno 
1763 et 1764, 12r, translated).
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The evidence on drainage problems and the state of the land demonstrate that in 
Grassano, too, there were problems of land degradation. There is some evidence to 
suggest that watercourses in and around Grassano seem to have been torrential and 
seasonal for at least several centuries - a characteristic diagnostic of degraded water 
basins which have experienced severe soil erosion (Tricart and Cailleux, 1972). 
Alberti (1550, 201, translated) wrote of the Basento that: “Like all the others in this 
region, this river becomes very full in rainy periods, and in the winter from the 
water coming down from the mountainside. Sometimes the force of the water is such 
that the wooden bridges the local people build are carried away in the flood...”
Confirmation of degradation comes from a manuscript written at the end of that 
century, the Inventario seu descrizione... de Ferrante Corsuto nell’anno 1585 (AAT) 
which described the boundaries of Grassano, which followed a number of dry valleys 
and a gulley - indicating significant land degradation. From the starting point of Pietra 
Colletta the boundary went south to Acquafredda following a gulley. From Acquafredda it 
followed a series of dry valleys then from the Basento up to La Scaricata, from La 
Scaricata to the Bilioso, and along the “dry valley at the foot of the Isca di Ripa” (ibid, 
16r, translated).
Although the early inhabitants of Grassano left few written documents, a fragment of 
their experiences survives in the name of the Bilioso torrent. Since at least the end of 
Byzantine dominance, the Bilioso has been renowned for its torrential, fluctuating 
discharge. The name, Racioppi (1876) suggested, comes from the Greek “OuAiog” , 
“pernicious”. This aspect of the Bilioso’s behaviour was noted again in 1839 when the 
Engineer of Water and Roads pointed out that the torrent formed a formidable obstacle 
to road-building. In flood, he noted, the Bilioso could rise up to 5.3 m (ASP, Intendenza 
di Basilicata (1806-1860), 50, 151 letter from L’lngeniere di Acqua e Strade to the 
intendente, dated 11.6.1839). The poor drainage of the watercourse was noted by Levi 
in the 1930s (1982, 145), who described the Bilioso as a “malaria-ridden stream".
There is evidence that landslides have affected Grassano for several centuries. The 
Calanconi district of the town is known by a number of local names, including 
Pontone/Puntone - in dialect “U Pndon”. The name means “the point” and implies that 
the present-day arrowhead shape to the land at Piazza della Repubblica (caused by the 
subsidence of the Calvario landslide) has been a longstanding feature. The name 
Calanconi (dialect: “U Calncon”) is restricted to the Bradano/Basento interfluve 
(Giacomo Lagamma, personal communication), although there is the tantalizing 
possibility that the name referred also to the Pontone area but this cannot be
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substantiated. No major landslides are recorded near the town in the Calanconi district 
(Cotecchia, Del Prete, Puglisi, unpublished, 1981).
The general state of the land was described in a letter sent in 1812 on behalf of the 
decusionati (councillors) of Grassano to the Commissario del R6 which gave the 
earliest explicit reference to landslides in the municipality. Aiming to expose the 
problem of environmental decay they claimed:
[The municipality] has a territory which is very restricted, sterile, and 
unrelated to the number of inhabitants...
The small reserve called La Machitella which is the only heritage of the 
municipality of Grassano is a piece of land of about two hundred and sixty tomoli 
[87.5 ha], kept closed throughout the year, which is let for growing grain, or 
meadowland, and the return, after the taxes are paid, goes to the town to pay for 
municipal expenditure. In this reserve there are small vineyards which fail to 
give a crop, and various places subject to landslips, and frequently subject to 
floods from the river Basento which are too damaging to allow anything to grow. 
These are the goods enjoyed by the citizens of Grassano. [ASP, Intendenza di 
Basilicata, 618,1, copy of letter from the decusionati to the commissario, dated 
10.4.1812, 2v-3v, translated].
More specific information is available on the Machitella district of the municipality, 
which had formerly been a feudal reserve. In 1813, the area was surveyed at 153.5 ha 
of which 46.8 ha (30.5%) was unusable because composed of riverbed, waterway and 
gulley, or trackway (ASP, Intendenza di Basilicata, 619, 15, Ordinance: “Coppia ec. - 
Estrato dal suo originale sintente nella Segretaria dell’lntendenza di Basilicata...").
The roads around the town were affected by landslides, and as the network of roads 
grew, so too did damage to the roads. The 1839 report by the Engineer of Water and 
Roads claimed that any roads connecting the proposed road to Grassano and Grottole 
would be too steep, too winding, and probably prone to disruption by landslides (ASP, 
Intendenza di Basilicata (1806-1860), 50, 151, letter from L’lngegnere di Acqua e 
Strade to the intendente, dated 11.6.1839). As in the rest of Basilicata repairs to the 
roads were often necessary after heavy rain. For instance, in February 1851 the 
Repullone road was being “daily devastated by the continuing rain" (ASP, Intendenza 
di Basilicata, 1006, 619, “Delibera dei Decusionati del Comune di Grassano” dated 
18.2.1851, translated). Some damage was caused by landslides. In 1843, for example, 
a proposal was made for spending a total of D78.41 [approximately L2.2 million at 
1988 prices] on repairing the Scalone road, of which D1.44 [approximately 
L 4 0 ,0 0 0 \ was for “excavation” (ASP, Intendenza di Basilicata, 1006, 619,
“Progetto, a stato definitivo, ad astimatorea de lavori occorenti per la riparazione 
della pubblica strada distinta [?] nell’abitato di Grassano denominata Scalone”).
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One possible indication of damage by landslides to Grassano is that it was reported in 
1808 that “Vigilance is used over the fallen houses” in the town which posed a threat 
to public health (ASN, Ministero Interno, I, 2183, 3, 19r, translated). The reason 
why the houses were damaged is unknown, but may have been the result of a landslide.
The railway along the Basento valley proved particularly vulnerable to landslides. On 
20 October 1888 a train which had just left Grassano station was derailed by a 
landslide in the municipality of Saiandra. Several were killed (Almagi&, 1910; Di 
Sanza, 1925; Puglisi, 1977).
By the beginning of the twentieth century, a number of areas in and around Grassano 
were evidently subject to land degradation and landslides This impression is confirmed 
by more recently documentary evidence on Grassano which shows that during the 
twentieth century urban landslides have become a serious problem.
6.3 Landslides in the twentieth century
In 1904 Grassano was scheduled for consolidation by the government (Regione 
Basilicata, 1987). Almagi& (1910) described Grassano’s landslides at that time and 
concluded that the problem from the landslides to the south and north of the town was 
worsening - but that the town itself was not seriously threatened. The implication that 
although there were landslides threatening the town the hazard was less severe than it 
is today, is corroborated by three main pieces of evidence:
First, in 1906 the mayor of Grassano wrote to the Prefect of Basilicata about the
danger to dwellings threatened by collapse. This letter’s measured tone was indicative 
of a problem that was serious but not perceived as urgent.
There are numerous inhabited houses built on top of cellars and caves and they 
are found on a section of about 400 m along the northern edge of the town. To 
forestall the danger coming from the collapse of the rock mass on which they are 
built, several engineers have come here, and they believed it necessary to 
undertake large-scale works under the provisions for Basilicata [the Zanardelli 
law of 1904]. Similarly, there are also another 50 homes which are on top of a 
dangerous rock mass in the south... In the centre of the town there are at points 
cellars [?] which could endanger the buildings above them, but there seems no 
urgency for now. [ASP, Prefettura di Potenza, Gabinetto, I, 280, letter from the
sindaco to the prefetto, dated 22.5.1906, translated.]
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Second, a similar picture of the town is given in the document (possibly, in fact, based 
on this letter) ASP, Prefettura di Potenza, Gabinetto, I, 280, “Condizioni di Stability 
degli Abitati - (Circ. 3/2 n 169)”, translated). Grassano’s stability was simply 
described as follows: “There is danger but there aren’t means [for its solution]”.
Third, and most significant, was a fairly detailed description apparently written in 
1902, by engineer Guercia of the Genio Civile. The earliest version appears at ASP, 
Prefettura, Atti Amministrativi (1896-1907), 213, 11, letter from the Genio 
Civile to the prefetto, dated 3.6.1902. It was subsequently expanded (ASM, Genio 
Civile, I, report dated 22.10.1906); and with an additional concluding paragraph at 
ASP, Prefettura di Potenza, Gabinetto, I, 280, letter dated 26.10.1906. The report 
described a number of landslides, and noted that the worst problem was caused by the 
collapse of the cellars (which still exist) excavated under the town. The meticulous 
care taken to list the effects of landslides in Grassano is evident, yet the opening line of 
the report revealed that the problem was not perceived as severe:
“In general, the town of Grassano is in a good condition of stability; with the 
exception of the northern edge and in particular places where, not because of the 
geological structure of the subsoil, but because of the work of the hand of man 
[sic] there is danger from landslides. The town is situated on top of a 
conglomerate mass with an average thickness of 7.00 m which rests on 
disassociated sandstones which are exposed on the northern side of the greater 
steepness of the slope. On this side, from time immemorial, the inhabitants of the 
place have excavated and continue to excavate caves for use as cellars. Towards 
the municipal road [Cinti] these caves have two floors and by the Chiesa Madre in 
some places are cut either partly into the conglomerate or entirely into the 
sandstone without any reinforcing support. Only near the entrances are there any 
props and stone supports. The action of the atmosphere slowly works on the weak 
cement and breaks it down, especially in the fronts cut into sand, in such a way 
that the overhanging rock comes to lack any base, and tumbles.
“This is made easier either by the action of the water percolating through the 
conglomerate... or by the lack of base for the soil in which the caves are 
excavated, and that is without any method, in any direction, in such a way that 
one penetrates into another. About thirty-five years ago a part of the 
conglomerate on which the Chiesa Madre sits, the highest part of the town, 
collapsed. Now a number of other caves are no longer being cut in that area, 
nevertheless it is necessary to forbid any excavation carried out in the caves in 
the sandstone.
“Eight years ago there was a landslide which buried and destroyed the cellars of 
two proprietors. In this same area in 1901, another piece of sandstone fell, 
burying another two cellars. Finally in 1902, a large piece of conglomerate fell 
from above, damaging other cellars and dropping down interrupted travel on the 
Cinti municipal road, where it damaged the vineyards and vegetable gardens; 
another rocky mass, through lack of underlying support and because it was 
detached along a natural fissure, threatened to fall. This rock was about 20.00 m 
long, 7.00 m high and 10.00 m deep and threatened to ruin various cellars and 
the livelihoods of the [illegible]. Following a visit from this office there were 
[illegible] for it to be pulled down.
167
“Besides the Tortorelli cellar, which lies underneath the Chiesa Madre oriented 
north-south and about 80 m long, there there is a segment of conglomerate which 
comes to the surface in the Piazza area, near the main road of the town, [CorsoJ 
Umberto Primo. The church is built on this segment, and at the top of its 
southern side there is Vincolo Primo Chiesa. This side is in complete disrepair 
and there are also some deep caves, dug there in such a way that the houses above 
them are in continuous danger.”
The report of our office shows that the main, if not the unique cause of the danger 
which threatens this town comes from the cellars dug in the past without rational 
criteria, badly maintained and winding which weaken the conglomerate in which 
one finds there. While waiting for works which can fully consolidate the built-up 
area, carrying out the law on Basilicata, it is necessary that you allow immediate 
and necessary ordinances in terms of Article 151 of [illegible abbreviation] such 
as the [illegible], the shoring-up or the demolition of the biggest cellars to avoid 
probable serious accidents.
The information in the document was not updated from the 1902 original. There was no 
mention, for instance, of the landslide of 1904 which affected the Rione San Sofia 
(ASM, Genio Civile, I, 826, “Elenco dei danni verificati ale opere comunali ed ai 
privati propriatari a causa di alluvioni e frane verificatosi dal 1° Gennaio 1904”). An 
interview with the former mayor Thomasso Celiberti gave supporting evidence that by 
1910 it was understood that Grassano was vulnerable. Celiberti recalled seeing a 
report on the town produced by the Genio Civile (possibly that quoted above). It 
described the western side of Grassano (the site of the Calvario landslide) as unstable. 
Celiberti claimed to have acted on this information in encouraging the eastward 
development of the town after the last world war - but this document has proved 
impossible to find, and has probably been lost.
6.3.1 Landslides from 1900 until the 1930s
6.3.1.1 The 1902 Cinti landslide
The first event this century for which there is corroborating evidence is the 1902 
landslide which affected the Via Cinti. It was apparently referred to in the 1906 Genio 
Civile report, and also probably referred to in passing by Almagici (1910, 158). The 
threat from the landslide was discussed by the Municipal Giunta of Grassano on 24 
April 1902 (AMG, Deliberazioni della Giunta Municipale, 1902, 66, translated):
The President [of the Giunta] Sig. Domenico Tortorelli... has invited a statement 
on how to prevent the severe danger to the citizens who cross the Cinti district, 
on one of the main roads close to the town. Everyone knows that in March a 
boulder of some tonnes fell though fortunately did not cause a serious accident. In
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the meantime, another larger portion of the rock is threatening [illegible] and it 
is impossible to forsee the precise consequences. Perhaps it could bring the 
houses above it tumbling down
6.3.1.2 The 1903 Via San Sofia landslide
The next recorded landslide occurred in Via San Sofia - probably in 1903. Two slightly 
different versions of events exist. The first is a report by the Commander of the 
Carabinieri, Potenza Division (ASP, Prefettura di Potenza, 213, 11, letter from the 
Legione Territoriale dei Carabinieri Reali di Bari, dated 5.1.1904, translated), 
described the events as follows:
Towards 10 a.m. on December 21 in the town of Grassano, in Via San Sofia a large 
mass of rock collapsed which had underlain part of an unoccupied house belonging 
to Concetta Pentasciglio.
The falling mass struck a building belonging to the heirs of Carlo Bonelli, as well 
as a cellar belonging to Maddalena Viroscutino.
There were no victims save a mule, valued at L350, belonging to Giuseppe 
Albanese, which was buried under the masonry. The loss produced by the relevant 
landslide is up to L2.000 [L8,210,000[  taking into account the damage to the 
buildings and farms.
The second (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 836, “Elenco dei danni verificati alle opere 
comunali ed ai propreatari a causa di alluvioni e frane manifestosi dal 1° Gennaio 
1904”) states that a heavy storm on new year’s day 1904 caused an estimated L.1,500 
of damage [L6,150,000 at 1988 prices]. Three houses in Rione San Sofia [now Via San 
Sofia] collapsed after a slippage in the underlying sandstone, which forms a part of the 
headscar of the paleoslide. The houses damaged belonged to Concetta Pentasciglio (L300 
damage), Giovanni Bonelli (L100 damage), and Gerendo Falcone (L300 damage). 
Flooding damaged two cellars in the town (a total of L400 damage) and seven plots of 
land were also damaged - probably by small landslips (a total of L700 damage). In all, 
eight households lost their accommodation.
6.3.1.3 The 1907 landslides
The impression that landslides had a relatively limited impact on the town itself is 
confirmed by the correspondence about the town from 1907. In February that year 
storms caused heavy damage throughout Basilicata. The Prefect of Potenza was in 
contact with thirty-two of the 125 mayors in the region, including the Mayor of 
Grassano (ibid, “Sindaci a cui si b telegrafato"). Eighteen of the municipalities in the 
hundred (<circondario) of Matera, which included Grassano, were damaged by landslides
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(ASP, Prefettura di Potenza, Gabinetto, I, 278, “Danni prodotti dalle alluvioni e dalle 
frane del febbraio 1907 - Circondario di Matera”).
The first reference to events at Grassano is a telegram from the mayor to the prefect 
indicates that landslides cut a number of roads - including the provincial road (now 
known as the SS7) which was probably as a result of landslides in the Petrino and/or 
Caracoia areas. “I understand that interruptions [on the road] cut the town off and 
nobody can get past them. Today I will find out if we can get some sort of postal 
service.” (Ibid, telegram number 5 of 13.2.1907, from the sindaco to the prefetto.)
By the following day the extent of the problem was clearer. “After an examination 
carried out yesterday along the bridleway leading to the [illegible] railway station, 
which was blocked by the first landslide, it appears that once past the landslides it is 
possible to get to the provincial road across the fields, which is unaffected by 
landslides. By this road one can get on horseback to the station. Today I sent labourers 
to get rid of the debris. I will carry out work under provincial direction. Send 
expenses.” (Ibid, letter from the sindaco to the prefetto, dated 14.2.1907.)
The damaged area did not include any part of the town (ibid, “Danni prodotti dalle 
alluvioni e dalle frane del febbraio 1907 - Circondario di Matera”), but it was more 
extensive than at first thought. The mayor later wrote to the prefect asking for 
government aid (ASP, Prefettura di Potenza, Gabinetto, I, 279, letter from the sindaco 
to the prefetto, dated 7.3.1907):
The roads outside of the built-up area of this municipality were not a little 
damaged by the recent storms.
In fact almost all the bridleways, particularly those leading to the railway 
station, to the Bilioso torrent, the Basento river, to the private holdings, were 
made inaccessible by landslides.
6.3.1.4 Later landslides, 1907 to 1930
Some evidence is available on the impact of landslides in Grassano between 1907 and 
the 1930s, from which time the Calvario landslide became increasingly active.
In 1913 a total of L400 [L 1 ,440,000]  was paid to the town to buy land for 
consolidation works. The exact location is not recorded, but the consolidation seems to 
have followed a landslide in the town. The Council Deliberation which authorized 
payment for the consolidation work noted that “there are other urgent consolidation
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works necessary in numerous other landslide-prone areas near to the town” (AMG, 
Deliberazione del Consiglio Communale, 1913, 24, translated).
Similar work became necessary in the area of the Chiesa Madre. Between 1922 and 
1925 consolidation work was carried out on a retaining wall near the church (ASM, 
Genio Civile, I, 395, folder: Opere di consolidamento delle frane minnacianti gli 
abitanti: iavoro di consolidamento dell'abitato di Grassano: Ricostruzione del muro di 
sostegno del piazzale del Chiesa Madre).
During December 1927, and with particular intensity on 3 January 1928, heavy 
storms again caused damage in the town. The stability of a block of conglomerate and 
sandstone overhanging Corso Umberto Primo caused sufficient concern that it was 
demolished (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 395, “Perizia urgente per abattimento di massa 
pericolante sotto il vico III Chiesa e di robustimento della balza rocciosa”, dated 
23.3.1928). Work was again necessary on the same site for the same reason after the 
storms of 1930 and 1931 - notably that of 29 November 1930 (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 
347, folder: Lavori urgenti per rabattimento di massi pericolanti sotto il Vico III 
Chiesa e di robustimento della balza rocciosa adiacente per il consolidamento 
dell’abitato di Grassano a seguito dell’inverno 1930-31) .
6.3.2 Other minor landslides
Landslides are evident throughout the area of the municipality - most notably on the 
clay hills studied by Rendell (unpublished, 1975) as can be seen from the geotechnical 
data reported in the previous chapter. A number of historical documents show that 
several problems were recognized in these areas by the 1950s - but were not 
recorded until the growth of government allowed reclamation to take place.
The areas of the municipality which were chosen for reclamation, from the 1950s 
onwards, were usually those subject to extensive land degradation and often to 
landslides. The precise frequency of landslides is hard to determine, though many of the 
areas were described as prone to calanchi, implying the continuous erosion and 
landslides associated with that landform. In 1961, for example, the gulleys of the 
Cugno di Noce area were threatened by instability. If they were not prevented from 
deepening, landslides would inevitably result, it was claimed (AMG, file: Cantiere 
Rimboschimento N. 19336/R, “Relazione tecnica illustrata").
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The hillsides around Grassano were reported in the 1960s as extensively degraded 
(ASM, Genio Civile, III, 115, 521). In 1961 the Consorzio di Bonifica della Media 
Valle del Bradano carried out a reclamation project in the municipalities of Grassano, 
Grottole, and Miglionico. At that time the situation on the Bilioso slope of the interfluve 
on which the towns stand was clearly poor and, as at Cugno di Noce, deteriorating 
rapidly:
In fact, though with the intervention already carried out, good resuits have been 
obtained on those slopes where work was done. At the moment, as well as new 
rills which previously were not there or were unimportant, there are also 
several areas which cannot be abandoned but are unstable or actually subject to 
landslides. This has happened either because of the weather, particularly 
disastrous in these last years, or because of the heedlessness of the cultivators 
who could have intervened with simple measures to stop the incipient erosion. 
{Ibid, “Relazione”, 2-3, translated.]
Many of the roads around Grassano have been affected by persistent landslides because 
they are poorly protected from erosion (see Gazzetta del Mezzogiomo, 1983). The SS7 
has been affected by continuous landslides in the Caracoia area (Gazzetta del 
Mezzogiomo, 1984b; 1984c). Building the Mulino road was hindered by landslides 
(Vignola, N [1943-], unpublished, 1981). Since its construction in the 1980s the 
road and its feeders have been subject to repeated damage (see Gazzetta del 
Mezzogiomo, 1983). The road was damaged as recently as 1991 (Gazzetta del 
Mezzogiomo, 1991).
Drought and fire have been significant contributors to land degradation. In 1976, the 
Cdnsorzio di Bonifica di Bradano e Metaponto reported the need to reforest 27.9072 ha 
of trees burnt during the drought of 1974 - about 60% of which was in Grassano 
(ASM, Genio Civile, III, 33, 160, “Relazione”). In 1981, Mayor Vignola [1943-] 
reported that all of the reforested land in Grassano had been lost to fire (Vignola, N 
[1943-], unpublished, 1981).
6.3.3 Urban landslides
6.3.3.1 The Cinti landslide
Minor landslides in and near the town have been a persistent problem throughout this 
century. One such example was the landslide in the Cinti district, which recurred in
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late 1959, or early 1960. The landslide was recorded in a letter from the mayor in 
1960, but no documents were found on what was done.
Immediately adjacent to the built-up area a landslide has occurred in the district 
called “Cinti”. It has caused a drop of about 3 metres over an area of about one 
hectare.
Since this landslide could extend and affect the built-up area, I request that your 
office [the Genio Civile] should carry out an inspection. (ASM, Proweditorato 
alle Opere Pubbliche, I, 177, letter from the sindaco to the Genio Civile, dated 
28.1.1960, translated.)
6.3.3.2 The Via Capolegrotte landslide
Via Capolegrotte is part of the conglomerate lip of the paleolandslide scar overhanging 
the Corso Umberto Primo and Via Vittorio Emanuele Secondo, and was already affected 
by a landslide in 1927 (section 6.3.1.4). From the 1970s, the deterioration of 
conditions there once again gave cause for concern. After a landslide affected the area in 
1971, the town council described it as a threat to the whole town centre (AMG, 
Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale, 1971, 68).
According to a letter of July 1980, a group of forty-four locals wrote on three 
occasions to the town hall (AMG, Anno 1978, X, 2, 13, letter from Antonio Lacertose 
and forty-three others to the Genio Civile, dated 26.7.1980 - it proved impossible to 
find a copy of the first letter, apparently dated 29.8.1976). The problem was, as set 
out in an earlier letter of July 1977, in Vico Primo Capolegrotte (AMG, Anno 1977,
X, 2, 13, letter from Domenico Villano and forty-two others to the prefetto, dated 
from internal evidence as July 1977, translated). “There is a wall to restrain an 
overhanging mass, the wall built in two parts, with the rock sticking out over the 
road, and recently several rocks have fallen, with extreme danger to passers-by.” 
(Although the letter was apparently drafted in July 1977, the 1980 letter mentions a 
letter written and “signed as always by a large number of citizens” dated 29.5.1977.)
6.3.3.3 The Petrino landslide
The Petrino landslide is a segment of the paleoslide to the immediate west of the town, 
on the SS7. The landslide is a longstanding problem (interviews; Gazzetta del 
Mezzogiomo, 1985b) and as already reported may well have been moving since at 
least 1907 (section 6.3.1.3). In 1961, when the plans for a new road connecting 
Grassano to Matera were made (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 223, 761) the existing roads
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in the area were described as “cut by numerous landslides” (ibid, “Relazione”, 
translated).
The landslide became more serious by the mid-1980s. In January 1985 there was a 
major slippage (Gazzetta del Mezzogiomo, 1986a). In March 1985 the Gazzetta del 
Mezzogiomo (1985b) reported that the road had been damaged by slippages at three 
places. Traffic along the SS7 was interrupted for five months (Gazzetta del 
Mezzogiomo, 1985c). Later that year it was reported that there were fears the whole 
road might be lost (Gazzetta dei Mezzogiomo, 1985e).
The problem had still not been solved the following year. Mayor Incampo was 
interviewed by the Gazzetta del Mezzogiomo (1986a, translated) and complained about 
the delays over repairs: “The delay is serious. This is a historic and important road.” 
There was a further, small movement in spring 1987. Funding has now arrived for 
major repairs to the road and reinforcement against future slope movements. L471 
million was allocated in 1987 and a project costing a further L1.8 billion was begun 
in 1990 (see appendix C).
6.3.3.4 Other landslides
Problems of instability have continued in the town centre to the 1980s, if less severe 
than those during the period at the start of the century. Engineer Dichio recorded 
(personal communication) that one home had been evacuated because of a landslide in 
the town in the period 1984 to 1988. Two houses also collapsed in the town centre in 
1988: earthquake damage had destroyed their neighbours in 1980 but neither had been 
buttressed.
6.3.4 The Calvario landslide
The landslide in the Calvario district (figure 6.1) is undercut by the erosion to the 
south of Grassano, and in 1906 was referred to by the mayor as subject to landslides 
(ASP, Prefettura di Potenza, Gabinetto, I, 280, letter from the sindaco to the prefetto, 
dated 22.5.1906, translated). Landslides became more serious later when erosion, 
accelerated by sewage drainage, meant that the area’s slopes were made progressively 
less stable.
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The first definite evidence of a landslide in the area was in 1934 when the SS7 was 
damaged. In that year Grassano was hit by intense storms and a large number of 
repairs had to be carried out: the cemetery, the Fontana, and Vecchio Trattura areas, 
the Fossa Tilea, Strada Fontana, the SS7, Via Chiesa, Fontana Piccola Tilea, Fontana 
Grande Tilea, and Via Madonna della Neve (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 347, file: Lavori di 
riparazione danni prodotti dalle alluvione del 1934 delle opere di consolidamento di 
Grassano). Damage to the Fontana, the SS7, and Via Madonna delle Neve, combined with 
the evidence from elsewhere (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 347, file: Via Puntone, letter from 
the podest& to the Genio Civile, dated 22.8.1934) suggests a movement of the Calvario 
landslide. A later letter shows that a visit was made by an official of the Genio Civile on 
23 June 1934 who confirmed there was a deep landslide (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 482, 
letter from the Genio Civile to the Prefettura, dated 17.12.1941).
The matter was treated seriously by the town’s administrators. On August 22 the 
mayor wrote to the Genio Civile at Matera to remind them that: “Some time ago, in the 
Puntone area [the area of the Calvario landslide] of this town, a landslide occurred... I 
believe that urgent consolidation work is necessary..." (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 347, 
letter from the podeste to the Genio Civile, dated 22.8.1934, translated.) It is known 
that on Saturday August 25 the Genio Civile arranged the inspection for the following 
Monday (ibid, letter from the Genio Civile to the podest&, dated 25.8.1934), but no 
record could be found of the inspection.
The problem recurred the following year. In March 1935 a Genio Civile report stated 
that:
in the Calvario area, lower part of the town of Grassano, a small landslide has 
occurred; it has caused a slight lowering of the road with lesions to the 
surrounding houses.
For the moment the landslide does not look serious, but with more torrential rain 
it could cause the sliding of the above mentioned area." [ASM, Genio Civile, I.
395, report by Michele Veneziani to the Genio Civile, dated 16.3.1935, 
translated.]
The first evidence of significant damage in the Calvario area came in June 1939 (AMG, 
Anni 1939-40-41, X, 6, 1, letter from the Genio Civile to the Prefettura, dated 
3.6.1939, translated). The visiting engineer reported that ‘ in Via Apullo Lucana part 
of the roof of number 24, a single-storey building, has collapsed... In the Calvario area 
there have been no more recent events, but as a matter of prudence it is advisable to 
evacuate numbers 21, 22, and 23 Via Garibaldi...” On June 8, The prefect wrote to the
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mayor requesting the damaged houses be evacuated (AMG, Anni 1939-40-41, X, 6, 1, 
letter from the prefetto to the podesta, dated 8.6.1939).
Similar problems occurred in January 1940 when heavy rains fell on Grassano and 
reactivated the landslide, causing the collapse of retaining walls (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 
482, document: “Perizia dei lavori di pronto soccorso da eseguire al rione Calvario 
dell’abitato di Grassano”, dated 14.3.1940).
The landslide came to the attention of the Secretary of the Federazione dei Fascisti di 
Combattimento, Matera - who, alarmed that it was a worsening problem, wrote:
“From Grassano, I have been made aware of the necessity of carrying out some 
consolidation works in the Piano Favale and Calvario area, evidently threatened, so I 
am told, by an ever-progressing landslide...” (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 482, letter from 
the Segretario Federale, Federazione dei Fascisti di Combattimento to the Ingegnere 
Capo del Genio Civile, dated 16.8. Fascist Year XVIII [1940J, translated.)
Following a report by Surveyor Lagonigro of Grassano the urgent evacuation of five 
houses in the Calvario area was deemed necessary (AMG, Anni 1939-40-41, X, 6, 1, 
letter from the podestct to the prefetto, dated 29.10.1940). The figure of five 
evacuated homes is confirmed by AMG, Anni 1939-40-41, X, 6, 1, letter from the 
podeste to the prefetto, dated 29.10.1940. In addition to the evacuation the mayor 
claimed that “urgent work is required to ensure that all of the huge Calvario district 
does not become uninhabitable.” (AMG, Anni, 1939-40-41, X, 6, 1, letter from the 
podesta to the prefetto, dated 29.10.1940, translated.)
The threat from the Calvario landslide continued to concern the authorities. As part of a 
series of projects during the 1940s a 15.4-m-long retaining wall was built on the 
edge of the district at the corner of Via Meridionale and Via Garibaldi, in order to 
protect the steep slope there against movement (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 482, folder: 
Grassano: consolidamento rione Purgatorio ecc., “Perizia dei lavori di consolidamento 
del rione Purgatorio, della via S. Lucia, de largo Puntone e del fosso Fontana dello 
abitato di Grassano”).
In both 1942 and 1950, the Calvario landslide disrupted traffic entering the town. On 
3 April 1942 the prefectoral commissioner (acting as mayor) reported: “Following 
the recent continuous rain, the Calvario district landslide in this municipality has 
become more alarming, and moreover a serious crack has opened underneath the small 
bridge of the Viale della Rimembrenza (close to Largo Pontone) as a result of which I
AFigure 6.1: Grassano: the Calvario district
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have arranged that the lorries and other vehicles should pass only on one side of the 
road” (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 482, letter from the commissario prefitizio to the Genio 
Civile, dated 3.4.1942, translated). In 1950 the problem recurred (AMG, Anno 
1950, X, 1, 4, letter from the sindaco to the Genio Civile, dated 4.8.1950, 
translated). “In the Puntone-Calvario area, where the cellars of the Stigliano family 
were, underneath the home of Antonio Rapanaro, a landslide threatens danger to the 
houses above it and to the road ‘Viale della Rimembrenza’ where all the coaches and 
motor vehicles etc. enter the town.”
The most dramatic movement of the landslide in the Calvario area was in 1956, which 
appears to have been by far the most serious landslide then to have affected Grassano. 
The Calvario landslide was the first landslide to receive major public attention. A 
number of older people interviewed in 1988 still remembered it. Michele reported in 
an interview that 90 families had been forced to abandon their homes. He had a friend 
who, after the event, built himself a new house on Via Meridionale. Some experiences 
were more dramatic. Beatrice: “Really nearly everything in Calv& [Calvario], 
everything tumbled down... Years ago.” (Her mother’s house had been in the Calvario 
area, on Via Appulo Lucano. It had partly collapsed, then been demolished.) Giacinto 
said the Calvario landslide was “a brutally ugly thing”: a stain on the town. Though his 
friend disagreed - Giacinto was exaggerating, he said. Antonia’s neighbour had lived at 
the bottom of Via Meridionale. His part of the road had been cracked. He had had to 
evacuate his house with his family. They rented a house nearby. He remembered that 
after the landslide many of the younger local people had left the town.
The Calvario landslide was preceded by a small earthquake of MS VII, with its epicentre 
just south of Grassano (Calcagnile and others, 1987; Regione Basilicata, 1987). In the 
twenty-four hours before the event there was about 1,000 mm of snow (Del Prete, 
1981). The fullest description is an untitled transcript in the municipal archives at 
Grassano (AMG, file: Frana del 1956, untitled description of the landslide dated 
14.3.1956 [apparently a slip of the pen for 14 February 1956], translated).
March 14 [sic] in Grassano, the subsequently-described executive engineer of 
the Genio Civile of Matera, together with the commander of the 50th Corps of the 
Fire Brigade of Matera, with Alderman Sig. Giuseppe Vignola and with the 
municipal secretary of Grassano Dr. Luigi Voltini, carried out an inspection of 
the area affected by the landslide which occurred between 4 and 6 a.m. of that 
day, to this effect:
The landslide caused a drop in the level of the SS7 road of about 70 cm, for a 
length of about 45 m. This drop was caused by the landslide occurring below the 
road and which affected about 15 ha.
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The landslide extends uphill of the state road at a depth of about 50 m, coming out 
by the nearest buildings of the Calvario area, the closest of which to the landslide 
shows signs of dissection...
Initial evacuation was carried out by the police, according to the report on February 
15 in the Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno (1956a, translated). “At Grassano the police have 
evacuated around thirty houses in danger of collapse. The cause was the weight of the 
fallen snow, and erosion from meltwater.” On the following day wholesale evacuation 
was ordered, based on the areas outlined in the report (AMG, Ordinanze del Sindaco, 
dated 15.2.1956). Initially, 77 households were evacuated - of which 34 were from 
Via Calvario, 13 from Via Garibaldi, 12 from Via Appulo Lucana, 12 from Via 
Sant’lnnocenzo, 4 from Via Gianvincenzo, and 2 from Via Santa Lucia (AMG, file: Frana 
del 1956, document: “Case sinistrate in seguito di scivolamento di terreno franoso”).
A telegram in the same file, sent by the mayor to the prefect, gives a slightly different 
picture: “Ninety-seven families and 150 rooms evacuated stop another ten rooms 
evacuated in town centre because dangerous stop seven infant schools with fourteen 
classes closed because they are dangerous stop...” (AMG, file: Frana del 1956, text of a 
telegram sent from the sindaco to the prefetto, dated 16.2.1956, translated).
According to the Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno (1956b, translated) 150 families were 
evacuated. “At Grassano a landslide has occurred above and below the SS7. It has 
affected 15 ha, with 150 families and as many dwellings evacuated. The families have 
been lodged in vacant buildings.”
Once reactivated, the debris of the Calvario landslide remained only marginally stable. 
After the drama of 1956 the landslide moved at least twice more in the following 
twenty-two months. In early 1957 further, slight movements took place, and a Genio 
Civile report gave the following description:
On February 2 this year, officials of this office carried out an examining visit to 
discover the latest results of the landslide which affected the Calvario area, on 
the edge of this town on 14 February 1956.
A more recent, continuous - if slight - movement of the landslide was observed 
which had caused the enlarging of old lesions, as well as brand new ones and the 
rupturing of some glass rods put in place by this office in order to monitor the 
changing situation. [AMG, file: Frana del 1956, letter from the Genio Civile to 
the Municipality of Grassano, dated 7.2.1957, translated.]
In December 1957 there was a further serious movement after heavy rain, affecting 
the SS7. The press, exaggerating the seriousness of the event, described it as follows:
ALARMING SITUATION IN THE PROVINCE OF MATERA 
GRASSANO IN DANGER FROM A HUGE LANDSLIDE
179
MATERA, 30th (G. M.) - Towards half-past eight this morning the area affected 
by a landslide in the built-up part of the municipality of Grassano - which about 
three years ago [in fact this refers to the events of 1956] was affected by 
landslides and an earthquake - was put into rapid motion.
At noon, for a length of almost 100 metres a large area of ground was lowered by 
almost one metre, sliding slowly downhill.
The slippage affected the the Via Appia, SS7, so traffic was diverted via the town 
itself. The landslide threatened the immediate collapse of a group of houses 
evacuated some time ago.
The event occurred following the recent rains which, innevitably, are continuing 
without intermission.
The mayor, together with other municipal officials, arrived at the scene 
immediately; meanwhile the arrival of the Genio Civile is awaited. [// Giornale 
d ’ltalia, 1957, translated. The report in the Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno was almost 
identical]
The report in II Tempo was slightly less clamorous:
HUGE LANDSLIDE 
in the town of Grassano
Matera, December 30
(E.P.) - the landslide area affecting the town of Grassano, which about three 
years ago [the same error] was affected by a landslide and an earthquake, is 
moving rapidly again. At noon, for a length of almost 100 metres, a huge quantity 
of earth, without any surface signs of movement, dropped by almost one metre, 
sliding slowly downhill.
...The event occurred following the recent rains which are continuing without 
intermission; it seems serious, to such an extent that from its very onset it 
provoked panic among the people living nearby. [// Tempo, 1957, translated.]
The Genio Civile report of the following day shows the landslide to have been serious, 
but smaller than both the alarming reports in the press implied. “A length of about 30 
m of the said road, at the edge of the town, has dropped by about one metre with 
subsequent interruptions to the traffic, which has been diverted across the town.” 
(AMG, 1958, 10, 1, 4, letter from the Ingegnere Dirigente of the Genio Civile to the 
Prefettura, dated 31.12.1957, translated.)
In 1959, triggered once again by heavy rain, the condition of several of the buildings 
worsened considerably and waterpipes were ruptured, further saturating the 
underlying subsoil. The mayor was forced to issue a demolition order (AMG, file: Frana 
del 1956, letter from the prefetto to the sindaco, dated 4.12.1959). The danger was 
described as being “landsliding and erosion of the road surface, severe damage to 
drinking water pipes”. (ASM, Provveditore alle Opere Pubbliche, I, 177, letter from
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Ing. Ancora to Impressa DONATONE Luigi, dated 28.11.1959, translated.) In the same 
letter, “about sixty-six” houses are described as having lesions, “about ten” as in 
need of demolition.
The damage from the storms of winter 1959 seems to have affected much of the town.
The mayor notified the Genio Civile of the damage in a letter dated November 26.
I write to say that as a result of the recent cloudbursts which occurred in the 
area, there has been the following damage:
Cracks in the walls of the houses on the edge of the landslide, beyond those 
already produced by the above movement, which has made their demolition 
necessary;
destruction of some water pipes running along the streets, to be specific: Via 
Sant’lnnocenzo, Via Santa Maria la Neve [sic], and Corso Umberto Primo;
subsidence and deep cracks on the highway along the following roads: Via Sotto 
Santo Domenico to the State Road 7, Via Sant’lnnocenzo, Via Santa Maria della 
Neve, Corso Umberto Primo, and the road in the new area of Via Capitano 
Pirrone;
a landslide on the Spineto road;
erosion and the washing away of huge areas of land on the banks of the 
“Basento" river;
a landslide on the Via Tilea which connects the built-up area with the Pianella, 
Processa, Calderaso and Manche districts. [AMG, 1959, X, 2, 1, letter from the 
sindaco to the Genio Civile, dated 26.11.1959, translated.]
The most recently recorded major landslide in the Calvario area was on 13 January 
1960. Deputy-Mayor Lopergolo sent a telegram to the Genio Civile informing them 
that: “A new landslide has affected the Calvario area and the SS7 road causing damage to 
buildings and making the road impassable stop please send a technician from the Genio 
Civile”. (AMG, Anno 1959, X, 2, 8, telegram from the vice-sindaco to the Genio 
Civile, dated 13.1.1960, translated.) The Genio Civile inspected the problem and 
reported:
There has been a new movement of the old landslide which has caused a serious 
lowering of a 60-metre length of the SS7 road by about 1.70 m.
The landslide, which is about 90 m from top to bottom and extends up and 
downslope of the road, has caused new damage to homes in the Calvario district of 
the town. [ASM, Prefettura di Potenza, Gabinetto, III, 110, 1808, letter from 
the Genio Civile to the Proweditorato Regionale alle Opere Pubbliche, dated 
15.1.1960, translated.]
After the events of 1960, the affected parts of the Calvario area were evacuated. Over 
thirty dwellings eventually collapsed as a result of the landslide, it was reported in 
1963 (ASM, Proweditorato delle Opere Pubbliche, I, 177, letter from the sindaco to 
the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, dated 10.10.1963). A few residents stayed on, though in 
1969 the planning officer Lapacciana described the Calvario area being abandoned and
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uninhabited (AMG, file: Frana del 1956, statement by the Tecnico Communale, dated 
12.11.1969). Some damage has continued in the area and a number of buildings 
collapsed. Lapacciana quoted the collapse of Giuseppe Tortorelli’s house in his 
statement (ibid), and a letter from Felice Rapanaro to the mayor in 1964 indicated 
that movement was continuing close to the scar of the landslide (AMG, Anno 1964, X,
2, 8, letter from Rapanaro Felice to the sindaco, dated 20.7.1964). Minor movements 
still occur (Cotecchia and Del Prete, 1992) but no significant damage has since been 
done to the buildings.
6.3.5 The Cemetery landslide
The cemetery is of great importance to the communal life of Grassano. In 1948 the 
mayor had referred to it as the focal point for the “cult of the dead” (ASM, Genio 
Civile, I, 208, letter from the sindaco to the Proweditorato Regionale alle Opere 
Pubbliche, dated 28.7.1948, translated); and Camera dei Deputati (1954, 129, photo 
caption, translated) described it as “perhaps the most important part of the town”. 
Consequently, the effect of the landslides there (figure 6.2) has had a deeply shocking 
effect on the local people.
The area around the cemetery, incized by the Fosso Fontana and the Fosso Marruggio 
Secondo, has been recognized as vulnerable to landslides for many years. The first 
damage recorded was in 1934: following storms which affected the access road and the 
cemetery itself (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 347, file: Lavori per riparazione danni prodotti 
dalle alluvioni del 1934 delle opere di consolidamento di Grassano). It was probably in 
the following year that the check dams referred to in the document were placed in the 
Fosso Fontana (ibid).
In 1947 it had been noted that, because of storms, damage continued and the check dams 
“had suffered undermining and cracking” (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 482, folder:
Grassano: consolidamento rione Purgatorio ecc., “Perizia dei lavori di consolidamento 
del rione Purgatorio, della via S. Lucia, de largo Puntone e del fosso Fontana dello 
abitato di Grassano”, translated).
In 1948 the whole area was described as prone to landslides, and it was noted that the 
area had recently been affected by minor landslips. At that time, the cemetery was 
becoming too small for the requirements of the town. The mayor wrote to the
1 8 2
Figure 6.2: Grassano: the cemetery
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Proweditorato Regionale alle Opere Pubbliche on the possibility of expanding the 
cemetery.
Just downhill of the municipal cemetery being extremely prone to landslides, 
some time ago eleven check dams were constructed which, up until now, have 
given the area a certain stability and security.
With the passing of time, in these parts as much as in the rest of Lucania, the 
storms are very violent and have led to damage which, as it stands, presents a 
severe threat to the cemetery’s existence.
...This situation has been made worse by the most recent storm and there has been 
a small landslip at the bottom of the cemetery area... [ASM, Genio Civile, I, 208, 
letter from the sindaco to the Proweditorato alle Opere Pubbliche, dated 
28.7.1948, translated.]
Infact the area was to be affected by frequent landslides. In January 1959, there was a 
landslide at the cemetery after heavy rain. An event which Ex-Mayor Ambrico recalled 
in an interview (17 May 1988). Ambrico sent a telegram to the Proweditorato delle 
Opere Pubbliche: “Landslide produced water infiltration has affected the cemetery area 
[stop] I request to arrange an inspection to assess [stop]” (ASM, Proweditorato 
Regionale alle Opere Pubbliche, I, 177, telegram number 6 of 29.1.1959, from 
Sindaco Ambrico to the Genio Civile, translated). No further documents were found 
concerning the event.
Minor damage to the cemetery and its infrastructure was frequent, as a petition dated 
1971 shows. “The here underwritten request you to take precautionary measures at 
the cemetery, where the rainwater from other places damages the private tombs 
starting with that of Gregorio Bolettieri and all the path in front so I [sic] request you 
to intervene as soon as possible.” (AMG, Anno 1971, X, 2, petition dated (by the local 
authority) 17.3.1971, translated.)
The problem recurred in the winter of 1972 to 1973. Between December 1972 and 
February 1973, almost all the public works were damaged, according to a statement 
by the planning officer Lapacciana. This included extensive damage to the cemetery. 
(UTMG, file: Nuovo Cimitero, “Perizia dei lavori di sistemazione della recinzione, 
muri di sostegno, casa del custode, viali e gradinate interne nel civico cimitero”.) 
According to documents held in the town hall’s technical office, this included the 
cemetery, where “damage was reported to the plots in the avenues and internal steps, 
to the area used for the caretaker’s shelter” (UTMG, file: Nuovo Cimitero, document: 
“Perizia dei lavori di sistemazione della ricinzione, muri di sostegno, casa del custode, 
viale e gradinate cimitero nel civico cimitero”, “Relazione”, dated 6.5.1974, 
translated).
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It is evident that the municipality was aware that the longterm stability of the 
cemetery was compromised by undercutting gulley erosion. In 1973 it was reported 
that erosion in the gulleys beneath the cemetery, caused by rainwater and sewage 
runoff, was continuously undercutting the land on which the cemetery was built (AMG, 
file: Cantiere N° 2 6 7 5 1  /R , “Relazione tecnica illustrativa”.)
In 1974, two years before the main landslide, a twenty-five-name petition was signed 
complaining about the effects of landslides in the Fosso Marruggio. "The underwritten 
citizens, all riparians of the Fosso ‘Marruggio’ request that the planning officer 
should be invited to survey the damage caused by a landslide. The said landslide has cut 
a piece of road, impeding the access of the riparians to their own plots. To be more 
exact, in order to be able to get over this part of the road it is necessary to cross the 
vineyards of the riparians...” (AMG, Anno 1974, X, 2, 13, petition dated 21.1.1974, 
translated.)
About 300 mm of rain fell in the twenty-four hours before the landslide of 21 
November 1976 (Del Prete, 1981) and there were landslides throughout Basilicata - 
most notably at Pisticci (Regione Basilicata, 1987). Significant damage was done to 
the cemetery at Grassano. "At Grassano", reported the Corriere della Sera of 
November 22 (translated), “another landslide has destroyed a large part of the 
cemetery, near the Fosso Fontana”. The local press provided more extensive coverage, 
although the first report in the Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno, on November 22 (1976a, 
translated), only made page sixteen.
Grassano (Matera) 21 Nov.
A huge landslide has affected the cemetery of the municipality of Grassano. Half of 
the area has dropped about ten metres, upsetting municipal sepulchres and 
private chapels. The mayor, with council staff, went to the site immediately to 
see the damage, which could be about a billion [lire]. He has asked for an 
immediate meeting with the regional government, the Prefectorate and the 
province in order to establish the repairs necessary and has contacted the Genio 
Civile of Matera.
Senator Salerno, after he had visited the devastated graveyard, suggested that the 
Prime Minister, the Minister of Public Works and the Basilicata region should 
intervene.
The following day the event made page seven ( Gazzetta del Mezzogiorno, 1976b, 
translated), with a photograph of the scene.
A DROP OF TWENTY-FIVE METRES CAUSED BY THE LANDSLIDE...
Grassano, November 22
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As already reported, a large landslide has affected over half of the area of the old 
and new cemetery, which dropped by over twenty-five metres, the council 
sepulchres and chapels have been disturbed in a terrifying fashion, and - if the 
rain continues to fall - the ground will slip from under the very feet of the local 
people.
Already by the end of yesterday, a number of meetings took place at the town hall, 
presided over by Mayor Daraio, where all the (political] groups took part in 
order to decide the first course of action. Ordinances of evacuation were sent out 
to six families living on the edge of the landslide (from Via Tarranto - see UTMG, 
file: Nuovo Cimitero, letter from the Commandante Provinciate dei Vigili del 
Fuoco to the Sindaco di Grassano, dated 21.11,1976]. Today, with the agreement 
of the health authority, spray disinfection was carried out by the firemen 
supervised by Dr. Mastroroberto and by Dr. DAIessandra in place of the 
provincial doctor.
Furthermore a precautionary measure is in operation by qualified staff, to get 
the corpses out of the gulleys and rebury them in the part of the cemetery not 
affected by the landslide. The burning and urgent problem remains that of 
burying the corpses; it is genuinely to be hoped that in the near future there will 
not be any new deaths. To discuss this, a meeting - ending shortly before this 
piece was finished - was held with the most important provincial, regional, and 
technical authorities, including among others the president of the Regional 
Council, Senator Bardi, the regional assessore for health, Schettini, Assessore 
Viti, Regional Councillor Grieco and Senator Ziccardi - who has studied events 
from close at hand since yesterday. Representing the Genio Civile of Matera was 
Engineer Stragapede.
The landslide of 1976 was a very significant one for Grassano. The events proved 
unnerving for almost everyone, and by 1980 the unease helped force political changes 
which have led to the creation of a machinery for managing landslides. The landslide 
has not been repeated, though has experienced small movements as a result of the 
November 1980 earthquake and also major storms (UTMG; file: unnamed; document: 
“Concorso per i lavori di consolidamento diretto ad eliminate le situazioni di rischio 
connesse alle condizioni del suolo nei comuni di Aliano, Gorgoglione, Grassano,
Grottole, Montalbano Jonico, Pomarico, Stigliano" (June 1990]). Small cracks are 
visible in the cemetery walls at 90° to the slope, also giving evidence of downslope 
movement.
6.4 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the information from Grassano on the reported level of 
landslides during the twentieth century. Chapter three showed that the reported level 
of landslides has increased across much of the region - chapter four showed there are
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well-documented physical and social factors which explain this trend, and chapter five 
confirmed that these factors have affected Grassano.
The evidence from this chapter shows that there has been a real increase in the 
intensity of landsliding at Grassano. During the twentieth century landslides have 
affected parts of Grassano which were either marginally affected or completely 
unaffected before. Twentieth-century landslides are consequently on an unprecedented 
scale, which confirms the circumstantial evidence given in previous chapters that 
there has been a real increase in the intensity of landslides.
However, the records on landslides show that the present century has also seen a much 
greater level of information recorded on even the smallest landslides. Whether this 
reflects merely an increase in interest in the landslides which occur, or whether it 
may be a symptom of modern society’s greater intolerance to landslides is an 
important question. Any assessment of the most effective way to treat landslides must 
be aware of social perceptions of the hazard they pose, but must also be prepared to 
question the validity of that perception and the action that follows from it. This 
increase is dealt with in chapter seven.
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Chapter 7: Managing landslides at Grassano
This chapter examines the scale of the response to the landslides at Grassano - why it 
has increased so significantly during the twentieth century, and what has been the 
impact of this changing response to the landslides.
7.1 Introduction
Chapters three and six of this dissertation showed that there has been a real increase 
in the intensity of landslides in Basilicata during the twentieth century: this is despite 
the increase in the effort and money spent on tackling landslides which was described 
in detail in chapters four and five. The reasons for the changed response to landslides 
lay partly in the increased incidents of landslides and partly in an increased 
sensitivity to those landslides which occurred.
Factors accounting for the increased sensitivity were outlined in chapter four: but it is 
only in the context of an intensive analysis of a case study that the causative 
mechanisms leading to this change can be examined. Increasingly important in the 
contingent factors affecting landslides at Grassano has been the cultural interpretation 
of the landslide hazard and the attempts to manage the land which follow from it. This is 
because these attempts express what Kirby (1990c, 284) called a “local discourse” 
on risks and hazards, negotiated between interests in the community, which 
determines how they are perceived and how they are treated (for other examples see 
Guidoboni, 1987; Mitchell, Devine, and Jagger, 1989).
7.2 The response to landslides
The modern management of hazards throughout Basilicata has been characterized by 
inertia and a slow response to change - as Bergeron (1991) demonstrated in his 
analysis of the 1980 earthquake. “In Basilicata”, Nicola Vignola J1948-J commented 
“everything’s done after the horse has bolted” (personal communication). According
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to Gaetano Ambrico (interview) “Intervention is only carried out when something’s 
happened... Today they continue to carry out an episodic intervention, rather than an 
organic one." The need for an “organic" intervention, to respond in advance to 
landslides using both active and passive measures, and treat them as predictable and an 
everyday problem, has been missing until very recently from the projects for 
environmental protection.
The response to hazards, once it has finally taken place, has ensured that although the 
level of damage has increased with the greater intensity of landslides, the total effect 
has often been financially beneficial. Grassano has benefitted greatly from the money 
spent on it after disasters - most notably over recent years in the funds for rebuilding 
after the 1980 earthquake (see Bergeron, 1991). At Grassano, funds following the 
earthquake have now reached around L40 billion (interview with Giuseppe Vignola,
22.5.1991). But most significantly with respect to landslides was that total spending 
on urban landslides (at 1988 prices) increased from L2 billion by 1978 to L15 
billion by 1991.
This spending has benefitted a number of powerful interest groups in society - but its 
adoption has only come about as the result of the struggle behind the creation of a local 
discourse on landslides. In addition to 31 land-reclamation projects affecting the 
municipality of Grassano, appendix C details 49 projects undertaken to consolidate 
urban landslides. There was some spending before the current landslide crisis - in the 
1930s, 1940s, and 1950s - but funding accelerated greatly after the landslides of the 
1970s and 1980s. Of the total L15,258,420,000 spent at 1988 prices on landslides 
since the 1843, 88.1% was spent in the 1980s (figure 7.1, table 7.1, appendix C ) * .
The figure of L13.4 billion spent on landslides in the 1980s is more than the total 
spent on general land reclamation programs in the municipality, also given in detail in 
appendix C (the exact amount spent in Grassano is difficult to judge from many of the 
relevant documents). What has been most important about this spending on urban 
landslides is that it is “extraordinary" in financial terms. It has to be competed for: 
this competition has a direct impact on the everyday life of the municipality, and has 
come to be of great political significance for the town’s administrators.
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Figure 7.1 Grassano: consolidation (1988 Lire)
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Table 7.1: Grassano: spending at 1988 prices on urban landslides from the 1840s to 
the 1980s (sources: appendix C)
Decade Projects Spending (at 1988 prices)
1840s 1 L 2 , 2 0 0 ,0 0 0
1850s 2 L 2 , 5 9 0 ,0 0 0
1860s 1 L 8 8 ,9 0 0 ,0 0 0
1870s 0 -
1880s 1 L 3 , 0 1 0 ,0 0 0
1890s 0 -
1900s 1 L 1 ,9 0 0 ,0 0 0
1910s 1 L 2 7 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0
1920s 1 L 2 0 ,7 0 0 ,0 0 0
1930s 9 L 2 9 5 , 1 00 ,000
1940s 6 L1 4 5 ,2 2 0 ,0 0 0
1950s 1 0 L51 5 ,7 6 0 ,0 0 0
1960s 1 L1 8 ,8 0 0 ,0 0 0
1970s 6 L 6 9 4 ,8 6 0 ,0 0 0
1980s 8 L 1 3 ,4 4 1 ,6 9 0 ,0 0 0
7.3 The management of hazards
7.3.1 The political response
The environment is managed at Grassano, as elsewhere in Italy, on the basis of a 
compromise made between the components of the state. The right to use the power of 
local government in Grassano is competed for by the political parties, the main ones of 
which are, from left to right, the Democratic Left Party (PDS) - formerly called the 
Communist Party (PCI), the Socialist Party (PSI), the Social Democratic Party 
(PSDI), the Christian Democratic Party (DC), and the Social Movement (MSI).
The early post-war administrations were dominated by the DC, as appendix F shows. 
The left first achieved a majority of votes in the 1975 election. Combined, the PCI, 
PSI, and PSDI gained 50.1% of the vote, and ten of the twenty seats. A minority 
administration was set up under Luigi Daraio of the PCI. According to an interview 
with Nicola Vignola [1948-] the administration suffered not only from its lack of 
majority, but from a simple lack of preparedness to take on power. A prefectoral 
commissioner was brought in to run the administration between September 1975 and
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August 1976, and again between February and June 1979. At the 1979 election the 
PCI’s vote collapsed, and the DC gained an absolute majority of votes and seats.
The earthquake/landslide of 1980/1981 caused major disruption to the community, 
and seems to have contributed to dissatisfaction with the DC majority. The 1983 
elections gave the left an absolute majority of seats once again, but no unified 
programme. A prefectoral commissioner was again brought in, and the elections were 
reheld in 1984. They produced a return to the left-right parity of 1975. Under 
Salvatore Incampo’s leadership, the DC opened to the left, and took the PSI and PSDI 
into a stable coalition. The PCI and the non-party Lista Civica candidates (including 
Giancursio Salvatore, formerly of the MSI) were excluded from power. The Christian 
Democrats benefitted greatly from the political stability after 1984. They and their 
PSDI partners increased their seats at the expense of the PCI and the Lista Civica. After 
the 1989 elections, the DC-PSDI-PSI coalition continued, but the PSI’s authority was 
reduced, and they left the coalition in 1990 to join the PCI (now renamed the PDS) in 
opposition.
Until the 1970s, local politicians paid relatively little attention to the problem of 
landslides. Tomasso Celiberti (mayor from 1952 to 1953, and 1970 to 1975) 
described landslides as having been “a serious problem... there were always 
landslides”. At the Provincial level “we were considered [to have] a serious 
problem”, but at that time other problems such as unemployment were perceived as 
much more important. He noted that consolidation of some sort or another was 
regularly carried out. There were also some minor administrative initiatives carried 
out: such as a ban on mining of cobbles, for building, from the gulleys around the town.
Gaetano Ambrico (mayor from 1958 to 1960) agreed that landslides had caused 
problems. There were some during the period of his administration, such as that at the 
cemetery in 1959, but he described these as minor affairs. He believed the perceived 
importance of landslides in the 1980s to be a result not of events acting to goad the 
administrators into action but of academic research.
It was only after the drama of the cemetery landslide in 1976 that there was a major 
change. The mayor at that time, Luigi Daraio (mayor in 1975, and from 1976 to 
1979), described as ”a surprise” even though he considered the cemetery area to be 
“prone to landslides by nature”. The implications of this change are examined in 
section 7.3.
192
The councillors interviewed (Domenico Beatrice of the DC, Giuseppe Vignola of the PSI, 
Nicola Vignola [1948-1 of the PCI, and Salvatore Giancursio of the Lista Civica) agreed 
that that the realization there is a landslide hazard has only recently been forced by 
events. Domenico Beatrice believed the landslides have always been a problem at 
Grassano, but that people have only responded to dramatic events - particularly the 
earthquake/landslide of 1980/1981. Giuseppe Vignola (then deputy-mayor) had a 
similar viewpoint. He believed landslides have always been a problem at Grassano but 
“awareness was only really aroused after the landslide of ’76...” Particularly 
significant in this respect was, he felt, the presence of two geologists: himself, and his 
cousin Nicola [1948-1 on the town council. Salvatore Giancursio similarly dated the 
realization of a crisis as coming after the 1976 landslide: “when there was this little 
movement at the cemetery, because before they thought nothing of it”. Giuseppe’s 
cousin Nicola Vignola [1948-] claimed that the politicians became aware of the 
problem only after 1980. It was principally the result of the catalyst provided by the 
research findings of Cotecchia, Del Prete, and Puglisi.
Since the realization that Grassano was beset by severe landslides, and devoid of 
adequate funds to pay for what was perceived as necessary intervention, the 
municipality has been forced to rely on state funds. The role of the municipality as a 
client for state funds has caused a great deal of resentment, and a number of speakers 
at Grassano’s 1981 conference on soil conservation complained of the perceived lack of 
consultation of the local people in decision making. According to Mayor Nicola Vignola 
[1943-J, for example, the vital decisions on the future of Grassano were taken by 
people outside of the community, and taken on the basis of money. “All the arguments 
relate to money” he said “I think the people of Grassano have the right to be allowed to 
understand this problem, then to choose...” (Vignola [1943-1, 1981b, 114, 
translated).
The central government money spent on landslides has evidently been supported by 
much of the local electorate. Some influential locals now claim that the amount spent 
may be enough to ensure that future landslides do not exceed a tolerable threshold. 
Giuseppe Vignola of the PSI (interviewed 22.5.1991) said he believed that the money 
so far spent, or in the process of being spent, would ensure Grassano stability in the 
medium-term (decades). But stability is by no means guaranteed and calls for more 
money are still being made. Mayor Incampo was not quite as sure as Vignola that the 
situation is safe. “Perhaps more money will arrive” he suggested (interview,
23.5.1991), adding that he hoped the 1983 law on soil conservation might produce 
some more.
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7.3.2 Local people
The participation of ordinary people in local politics is only recent. Even after the 
first world war, politics only involved a very small proportion of the population (with 
the restrictions on the franchise only about 3% of the adults voted) and was a factional 
context among the gentry (Camera dei Deputati, 1954; Levi, 1982; Bolettieri,
1991). It was only with the decline of the peasant society and the end of Fascism that 
class-based politics was established in Grassano. Local people have helped shape the 
development of the “local discourse" on risks and hazards through clientalism, 
political protest, and mass protest. For the administrators to use spending on 
landslides as an effective electoral ploy, the local residents would have to be convinced 
it is effective. Many believe it is - though agreement is far from universal as the 
semi-structured interviews carried out for this dissertation show (appendix G).
Question seven of the interviews showed that almost everyone at Grassano is familiar 
with landslides. Of the 41 who gave a reply, 20 recalled the Calvario landslide, 31 
recalled the cemetery landslide, 8 recalled the Petrino landslide, and six mentioned 
some other local landslides. The majority believed the problem to have a physical 
origin, as question eight shows: 20 blamed it wholly or partially on geology, 26 on 
precipitation or drainage, and 3 on relief; but 4 blamed it on deforestation, 5 on lack 
of defences against landslides, and 1 on another cause (the supernatural).
Question nine showed that many local people were still concerned by landslides. Of the 
40 who gave a reply, only 2 believed that landslides represent no hazard to the town,
12 that they represent a moderate hazard, and 26 that they represent a severe hazard. 
Of those who felt that there was a limited risk many believed it was limited to certain 
areas: Innocenzo, for example, put a figure to it: “about 20%’ of the town. By 
contrast, to the majority the hazard was very much more serious. Domenico said 
“There is no stable ground." “Terrible”, said Paolo, “something which never ends, 
and comes to the fore periodically." Giacomo described it as “terrible". Porzia 
claimed: “It’s stupid to say there’s no danger! We old ones say the world’s finished.’"
Nevertheless, for the majority, the management programme put into effect at Grassano 
has had some tangible success, as question ten showed. Of the 38 who gave valid 
responses, 24 believed the problem was less than in the past, 6 believed it was about
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the same, but 8 believed it was worse. Of the majority, Pietro considered the problem 
had been reduced because of the surfacing work carried out on roads, and Nicolina 
believed the danger had abated because now it was understood (and engineering 
measures could be undertaken to improve it). Of those who said the problem was about 
the same, most believed it to be temporary, the result of a lack of rain.
Question eleven showed that of the 44 interviewed to find out their feelings about 
landslides, most expressed disapproval of the local authority’s action. One can be 
characterized as believing the authority’s approach to the hazard to be very good, 9 
believed it to be good, 4 believed it to be adequate, but 14 considered it poor, and 8 
believed it bad. Eight gave no reply or a reply of some other sort.
Question thirteen showed that many believe the government has very little interest in 
Grassano’s problems. None can be characterized as believing the government’s 
approach to the hazard as very good, 9 believed it to be good, 5 believed it to be 
adequate, but 12 believed it to be poor, and 9 believed it to be bad. Six gave no reply or 
a reply of some other sort. Filomena said that a road near her house, disrupted by a 
landslide, had remained unrepaired for five or six years (this was in 1988). “There 
are some shits working at the town hall... [who promise:] Today, tomorrow, the day 
after tomorrow...’ There are some real shits! Will you take this to the mayor? I hope 
so!” What does the government do? “The government sends money, it arrives at the 
town hall and they enjoy themselves!” “But what do they do?” one of Antonio’s friends 
added rhetorically. “Almost nothing”, said another. Antonio: “We’re abandoned”, just 
like in Levi’s Christ Stopped at Eboli, he said. Donato was more dismissive. They 
don’t interest themselves in anyone... they don’t interest themselves in nothing”, he 
said. What about central government? “Like the municipality! Worse!”
Question fourteen showed that the majority disapproved of the amount of work that was 
being done to prevent landslides. Eleven can be characterized as believing the work 
done to be adequate, 2 as believing it probably adequate, but 25 as inadequate. Six gave 
no reply or a reply of some other sort. Typical of those approving of the work of 
politicians was Innocenzo, who welcomed funds for consolidation - and for 
reconstruction afterwards. To eliminate the problem he considered that reforestation 
is necessary but “really you have to continue” with the present policies. However, 
Francesco said that some work’s been carried out, “but not much”. Central 
government only gives aid if it is asked. What’s been done for consolidation is not 
enough - “Never enough!” More consolidation needs to be carried out - in the Calvario 
area in particular.
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Question fifteen confirmed the findings of question eight that the majority at Grassano 
perceive the landslide hazard to have a physical origin and a technological solution. It 
showed that of those interviewed the majority were in favour of a technological 
solution to landslides - with the “active" methods usually used by the Genio Civile 
mentioned with greater frequency. Of the 32 interviewees who gave a reply, 9 were in 
favour of the use of retaining structures, and 5 of draining works; though 7 were in 
favour of reforestation, 2 of effective planning regulation, 5 of abandoning the town, 
and 8 of some other approach.
The role of grasping and advocating the complex range of demands for attention to the 
landslide hazard is that of the local politicians - who can be influenced by formal 
electoral pressure, informal clientalistic pressure, or mass protest. Clientalism has a 
long history at Grassano, with competition for power ensured by the factional basis of 
politics. Levi (1982, 34) described the situation at Grassano in the 1930s as being 
typical of Basilicata:
The upper classes have not the means to live with decorum and self-respect... 
Small parcels of farm land do not assure them a living and, in order to survive, 
these misfits must dominate the peasants and secure for themselves the well-paid 
posts of druggist, priest, marshal of the carabinieri, and so on. It is, therefore, a 
matter of life and death to have the rule in their own hands, to hoist themselves 
or their relatives and friends into top jobs. This is the root of the endless 
struggle to obtain power and to keep it from others, a struggle which the 
narrowness of their surroundings, enforced idleness, and a mixture of personal 
and political motives render continuous and savage.
Since the last world war the limited benefits of welfarism have ensured that the 
struggle is less necessary -and less frantic, but clientalism continues. Most people in 
Grassano - especially those with power - are unwilling to talk about these matters 
with an outsider. All the former-mayors spoke to for this dissertation denied there is 
corruption - save Ambrico: “of course it happens!”
Local people show a variety of responses to perceived clientalism. For Giacomo and his 
wife, the action of the authorities is not really relevant. Their Christian Democratic 
politics is dictated by religion. They acknowledged that there are dishonest people in 
politics, but believe they must fight for their own beliefs. Carmella was similarly 
disenchanted about politics at Grassano. “Worthless. Worthless because they’re too 
indecisive to act.” She had been a member of the PCI youth league, but left because of 
their inactivity. One of her friends said that as far as the municipal administration is 
concerned “the problem [of landslidingj doesn’t exist". A number of people evidently 
were frightened about expressing their beliefs. When Angela was asked about the
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administration, she refused to comment because, she said, she has a son who she wants 
to be able to get a job in the future.
For many of the people interviewed, the programme to combat landslides was just part 
of a wider problem in government: that of corruption. For these people, the interests 
of the community are not genuinely served by the elected representatives. The 
representatives are principally there to serve personal interest, they claim. What do 
the local authorities do? “Nothing! Nothing really” Anna said. What works are carried 
out are often done shoddily and have to be redone. “In effect, the administrators here 
promoted the landslides.” When they act “first it is for their own interests, then for 
the interests of others. In everything there are private interests.” But what can be 
done to solve the problem of landslides? Marco said that more investment is needed, as 
for all the southern problems yet current investment is influenced by clientalistic 
influence rather than by need. “There’s always the need to ask for something, and to 
give something in return."
Caterina claimed that clientalism is a very powerful force in Grassano politics and 
suggested the town’s problems are “more political than geological”. The report from 
the University of Bari (the work of Cotecchia, Dei Prete, and Puglisi) gave “a pretty 
bad picture... most people were convinced that this proposal was made because some 
administators have land down there (the proposed sites for new developments!. It was 
the same story for the cemetery... it wasn’t possible to find an area free from private 
interests.” Do most people think like this? Caterina’s friend added: “most... almost 
everyone”.
Evidence for the existence of problems arising from clientalism in the town is largely 
anecdotal. Bolettieri (1991, 138, translated) recorded that “Every programme 
approved by the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno was announced in advance in a telegram by 
national politicians to the mayor: especially when an election was near.” When this 
passage was read to Mayor Incampo (23.5.1991) he responded: “It’s changed... above 
all with this recent work [begun after the Senise disaster of 1986].” Real local needs 
are now being satisfied, he maintained, not just the needs of politicians.
Some archival documents bear testimony to corruption, or the suspicion of it. In 
October 1954, a complainant wrote to the Communist newspaper RinascitS Lucana 
(letter from Salvatore Calciano, “I lettori ci scrivono”, 17.10.1954, translated) 
claiming corruption in the building trade.
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I’m asking you to give me the opportunity of denouncing one of many abuses of 
power that occur in this town, which is known to all as a bed of corruption.
We’ve got an example, one of many, which merits the telling.
...The builder X* * has blocked off two public roads, one with a dry wall the other 
with stakes and boards, using no-one knows what property rights. It would need a 
loud outcry and denunciation by the citizens to spur the clerico-liberal 
authorities of the municipality to intervene against X.
At the moment there has been a protest note given to the mayor and to the Genio 
Civile... In this protest note there are a number of clear admissions by the 
entrepreneur, which relate to the Genio Civile and should be investigated. The 
entrepreneur, in the presence of witnesses who have readily attested to the 
event, said that the works carried out there would be done how and when he 
pleased since the surveyor dined at his [X’s] house...
The mayor hasn’t moved, while the Genio Civile has sent a surveyor... perhaps 
the same who dines at X’s.
Links between the building industry and the ruling Christian Democratic party are 
still close. For the 1988 DC festival, the Festa dell’Amicizia, ten of the twenty 
sponsoring firms were in the construction industry. Construction, needless to say, 
does not account for a half of the firms in Grassano.
Other examples show a more subtle sense of influence. In 1958 one Grassano resident 
wrote to congratulate the new mayor and - just in passing - to put forward his case for 
favourable treatment.
It was with pleasure that I heard you had come to manage the administration at 
Grassano, and in truth it was about time that the reins were taken over by 
someone with authority, who could interest himself in our town.
Among all the other problems there is that of the landslide [in the Calvario area] 
which affects a number of families, and me as well because my family house of 
about 20 rooms and some premises for [illegible] is in that area, and has 
remained abandoned, exposed to harm from the weather and human vandalism: 
because, for sure, I wouldn’t disobey an evacuation ordinance.
...I have had many requests to let out the premises, but I can’t accept them until I 
have been given permission by the relevant authorities who you could authorize 
to write to me again concerning my house. [AMG, Anno 1958, X, 1, 4, letter to 
the sindaco, dated 24.9.1958, translated.]
The request was turned down by the mayor. On the bottom of the letter he wrote in 
pencil (translated): "Give clarification, and news, and eventual satisfaction as 
merited". On September 27 the mayor replied to the letter concluding that although no 
immediate satisfaction was possible "I assure you, however, of my support in the
* Name removed
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matter in proceeding to the relevant organization for eventual revision". (AMG, Anno 
1958, X, 1, 4, letter from the sindaco, dated 27.9.1958, translated.)
As the interviews with former-mayors indicate, interest among local politicians in the 
landslides at Grassano has been developing since the 1970s. Less than three years after 
the cemetery landslide the 1979 Christian Democrat manifesto (Democrazia Cristiana, 
Sezione di Grassano, unpublished, 1979, translated) indicated a readiness to tackle 
landslides and produced a programme to counter the hazard. Without giving further 
details it proposed:
A GEOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE TOWN AND THE ENTIRE AREA, to supply the 
municipal administration with a way of co-ordinating the consolidation of the 
town and soil conservation carried out by various government organizations...
THE RESOLUTION OF THE COMPLEX PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE CONSTRUCTION 
OF THE NEW CEMETERY AND THE CONSERVATION OF THE OLD.
After the earthquake/landslide of 1980/1981, the urgency of action and the 
availability of funds prompted action by local politicians. Political differences over the 
approach to landslides was small, mainly restricted to the stridency with which calls 
were made for funds and intervention.
One example was the doubts first expressed in November 1981, principally by 
opposition councillors, over the progress of research into the landslides (AMG, 
Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale, 1981, 307). It was not until 18 January 1982 
that the research was discussed once again (AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio 
Comunale, 1982, 2, translated). Giovanni Lerose of the PCI claimed the results of the 
new study would be “more or less” identical to the results presented to the conference 
of 1981, and the only tangible difference would be the lost time. Giuseppe Vignola of 
the PCI said it would be the “researching in greater depth work already carried out”. 
Lucio Manna of the MSI wanted to know why the regional government and the Genio 
Civile had not carried out the work earlier.
The project was not in fact approved until November 6 of that year. Once again there 
were complaints concerning the delays which gave members of the opposition the 
opportunity to criticize the majority. In a claim hotly denied by the majority,
Giuseppe Vignola of the PCI alleged that delays were intentional and the administration 
was not competent to manage the search for a new site.
By the next election, in June 1983, there was a general awareness among politicians 
of the slope instability threatening Grassano. In their election manifesto, the Christian
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Democrats claimed the town to be the victim of an uncontrollable “natural” disaster 
over which the administrators had no control - and for which they were consequently 
absolved of any responsibility. Yet it has a defensive tone: the party was well aware 
that it could (and did) suffer at the polls as a result of its handling of the crisis. “The 
balance of these four years of administration [by the DC] is undoubtedly positive 
despite the tremendous problems there have been and the extraordinary difficulties 
caused by the earthquake and the drainage situation.” (Democrazia Cristiana, Sezione 
di Grassano, unpublished, 1983, translated.)
The PSI, unencumbered by the problems of administrations was able to put its case 
more positively. It identified landslides as one of the major problems for the new 
administration. “At the centre of the administration’s attention must be the three 
emergencies which for years have blocked development: EMPLOYMENT, SOIL 
CONSERVATION, and RECONSTRUCTION.” (Partito Socialista Italiano, Sezione di 
Grassano, unpublished, 1983, translated.) The Socialists perceived the involvement of 
outside organizations was necessary, but warned against surrendering of local 
autonomy. ‘The municipality must... be a partner in the works carried out by the 
various agencies for soil conservation...” (Ibid, translated.)
In the rerun election of 1984, the perceived threat from landslides has receded 
further and the emphasis in political debate began to shift from consolidation against 
landslides to rebuilding after the damage in 1980/1981. Local autonomy in 
redevelopment was greater but there was a temptation for politicians to opt out of 
making decisions and rely on technocrats. The PSDI preferred a non-political 
technological “fix” to the problem, and considered it soluble through the 
“objectivity” of planning professionals (Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano, 
Sezione di Grassano, unpublished, 1984, translated).
However, the debate as a consequence concentrated less on the details of technocratic 
management, and more on the political issues of making strategic decisions. The 
Christian Democrats suggested a new version of the town plan. They recognized the 
locals’ wish for Grassano to remain on its site, but warned that “in order to do so with 
adequate peace of mind it is necessary to carry out reforestation and repair works on 
the gulleys which surround the town" (Democrazia Cristiana, Sezione di Grassano, 
1984, translated). Meanwhile, building was necessary in the expansion zones to the 
east of the town where there was, they claimed, “tranquility, from the geological point 
of view”. They also proposed extending street guttering, and that new public facilities 
should be built including a sports centre and cemetery. The PCI, however, argued that
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there were more important strategic issues, over the philosophy behind preserving 
the town. They argued that what was needed was a programme of “organic 
intervention" using not just “active” methods of intervention but also “passive” 
methods like reforestation and planning control (Partito Communista Italiano, Sezione 
di Grassano, unpublished, 1984, translated).
After the Christian Democrats’ victory in the election, the new variant to the town 
plan was authorized in October 1985. It was based on the claim that the old 
information was proven to be no-longer adequate:
THE TOWN COUNCIL, given that the municipality of Grassano was classified as 
having had second-degree earthquake damage;
realizes that it is therefore necessary to allow for the improvement of the town 
plan...
[and] that it is indispensible to prepare a [new] geological report on the 
territory... [AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale, 1985, 400, 
translated.]
In March 1985, the geological report for the new plan was discussed. Nicola Vignola 
[1943-] of the DC reassured the council that “Engineer Viggiani, a qualified 
professional, could make a valid contribution to the town plan." Vignola’s argument, 
backed by the majority, won: the council recommended unanimously to adopt Viggiani 
and his colleague Picarelli from the University of Naples to carry out the work. The 
research came up with the results required to give the approval for construction.
It is evident there was a suspicion that the process of making strategic decisions was 
being taken away from public debate and the council’s control. Salvatore Giancursio of 
the Lista Civica “regretted the lack of consultation between the political groups and the 
technicians who were to produce the variant to the town plan”. Likewise Nicola Vignola 
[1948-] of the PCI stressed that Viggiani held his confidence, but added that some 
aspects of the study “must be discussed in council”.
The variant was finally passed on 5 October 1987, with twelve votes in favour and 
seven against (from the PCI and Lista Civica) (AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio 
Comunale, 1987, 270). The essence was explained by Bronzino in his introductory 
speech (ibid, “allegato ’A’”, translated). “Attention has been paid to soil erosion; it is 
noted that Serra Martella is the only zone for further building in Grassano, that 
despite the needs of the citizens, it has not proved possible to use the Quarto Gradino 
area for geological reasons...” The opposition was extremely unhappy. Councillor 
Calciano denounced the plan alleging “it was not formed by the council but by the
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majority [DC and PSI] without any prior discussion. In addition, some of the protection 
against landslides present in the old plan had been eliminated in some areas.” (A claim 
strongly rejected by Lorusso of the PSI, on behalf of the majority.) After innuendos 
about corruption being behind the delay, the meeting ended acrimoniously. The PCI 
abstained, recommending that the variant should also include planning for 
development. And Salvatore Giancursio dictated to the minutes: “The majority does not 
really have a dialogue with the opposition allowing them [the opposition] to help...” 
(Ibid, translated.)
The evidence on the parties’ approach to consolidation and planning shows that the 
general strategic priorities of management are fixed on a perceived need for 
preventing landslides by the technological control of the land, although there may be 
some debate over tactical responses to it. The widespread acceptance of the need for 
environmental management from the far left to the far right shows the difficulty of 
questioning the hegemonic management ethos. This ethos has come to predominate not 
only because it expresses the widespread acceptance of the behaviouralist perception of 
hazards, but also because the dominance of these ideas became self-reinforcing. These 
ideas came to form the reason behind the aid-giving policies of the government, and the 
vote-buying business of local politics.
The archival evidence at Grassano shows that since the last world war there have been 
a number of occasions in Grassano when the local state, and the party machines, have 
been unable or unwilling to represent the wishes of all the local people over landslides. 
The tactical inflexibility generally exhibited by the opposition parties has meant that 
these eruptions of popular discontent have mainly had nothing but an ephemeral impact 
on the local political society - through the discontent aroused over the leftwing 
administrators’ plan to build a new cemetery in the 1970s contributed to the 
significant political instability in the town.
In 1960, for example, a number of residents wrote direct to the prefect complaining 
about the difficulty of using Via Santo Rocco. The prefect wrote to the Genio Civile and 
the town hall with the request to “examine the possibility of including the requested 
project in the consolidation works for the town.” (ASM, Proweditorato alia Opere 
Pubbliche, I, 177, letter from the prefetto to the Genio Civile, dated 1.6.1960, 
translated.)
The progress at repairing the damage from the Calvario landslide was the cause of a 
petition in January 1961, when 164 citizens signed the following petition: “We
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signatories ask when the landslide... will be cleared up, because there should be no 
difference between us and those who live in Piazza Santo Domenico, Via Meridionale, 
Piazza Arcangelo llvento, and in Via Capitano Pirrone and Via Serra Martella..." (AMG, 
file: Frana del 1956, petition dated 15.1.1961, translated.)
In 1974, two years before the main landslide at the cemetery, the previously-quoted 
twenty-five-name petition was signed complaining about damage from a landslide in 
the Fosso Marruggio. (AMG, Anno 1974, X, 2, 13, petition dated 21.1.1974, 
translated.) And in 1977, a petition from forty-three residents complained about a 
landslide in Vico Primo Capolegrotte (AMG, Anno 1977, X, 2, 13, letter from 
Domenico Villano and forty-two others to the prefetto, dated from internal evidence as 
July 1977, translated).
The claims of individual citizens have also been noticed - though perhaps not with the 
same degree of urgency. One such example was the damage from a part of the Calvario 
landslide which affected the property of the Rapanaro family. The damage was first 
notified to the Genio Civile by the mayor in 1950 (AMG, Anno 1950, X, 1, 4, letter 
from the sindaco to the Genio Civile, dated 4.8.1950). In 1964 Felice Rapanaro 
complained to the mayor about the collapse of a retaining wall.
As you are aware, through the weakness of its foundations, the retaining wall at 
Largo Pontone, next to two rooms belonging to me, threatens a collapse from one 
moment to the next.
The movement of the wall has already caused the collapse of a ground floor room 
and if it were destroyed the vault of that room would be as well - causing me 
serious financial loss. [AMG, Anno 1964, X, 2, 8, letter from Rapanaro Felice to 
the sindaco, dated 20.7.1964, translated.]
A letter was sent from the town hall to the Genio Civile on June 16 alerting them to the 
state of the wall. On July 8 the Genio Civile replied that the municipality itself had the 
responsibility for such emergency repairs (AMG, Anno 1964, X, 2, 8, letter from the 
Genio Civile to the Comune di Grassano, dated 12.11.1964).
The matter, still unresolved, was taken up again by Rapanaro at the beginning of the 
winter. He seems to have contacted both the Genio Civile and the town hall at about the 
same time. In a letter dated November 12 the Genio Civile reiterated that the local 
authority should carry out immediate repair works, paid for retrospectively by the 
government (AMG, Anno 1964, X, 2, 8, letter from the Genio Civile to the Comune di 
Grassano, dated 12.11.1964). Apparently crossing in the post was a letter from the 
mayor, dated November 14 requesting the repair of the wall to be carried out by the
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Genio Civile, along with other outstanding consolidation works (AMG, Anno 1964, X, 2, 
8, letter from the sindaco to the Genio Civile, dated 14.11.1960). The Prefectorate 
wrote to the mayor on November 24, referring to the Genio Civile’s earlier letter, and 
asked that he “adopt with all urgency the best steps to safeguard public safety." (AMG, 
Anno 1964, X, 2, 8, letter from the Prefettura to the sindaco, dated 24.11.1964, 
translated.) The mayor capitulated and ordered minor repairs. He replied in December: 
“in order to prevent damage to people and to property, a fence has been erected to 
isolate the Largo Pontone area of this town..." (AMG, Anno 1964, X, 2, 8, letter from 
the sindaco to the Prefettura, dated 3.12.1964, translated.)
7.3.3 Politics and research
At Grassano, the ideological constraints of the “dominant" view of landslides as 
abnormal events has restricted the intellectual freedom of the town administrators 
just as the realities of politics have restricted their freedom of action. The various 
reports on the town’s geology have exposed the severity of the threat to the town from 
landslides only slowly, as the town council was forced to concede in 1981 (AMG, 
Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale, 1981, 137). This was because a wholesale 
analysis of the municipality was believed unnecessary and research was carried out 
only when required: however, as more research has been carried out, more problems 
have been verified or discovered which in turn has unleashed a repressed demand for 
managing the land, and the allocation of more resources for even more research.
The landslides affecting the Calvario area in the 1950s led to the first postwar report 
on the town’s geology in 1960. The municipal giunta originally asked the geologist 
Vincenzo Cotecehia of Bari to carry out a study of landslides (AMG, Deliberazioni della 
Giunta Municipale, 1960, 26) but it was eventually undertaken by the municipal 
surveyor, Michele de Cuzzi (ASM, Proweditorato alle Opere Pubbliche, I, 177, 
“Relazione tecnica dell’abitato di Grassano"). The report noted the steep slopes of the 
town, the nature of the geology, the problem of floodwater and gave opinions on 
necessary works to consolidate against landslides. The problem was considered 
relatively minor and the report suggested that the landslide hazard could effectively be 
overcome by reducing the infiltration of water into the subsoil - particularly the 
repair of water and sewage pipes, and the surfacing of roads. De Cuzzi’s estimate of the 
money required to eliminate (in entirety) the problem: only L160 million [L1.9 
billion], was very much lower than the later estimates.
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The writing of a town plan made the next report necessary. Town plans, which have by 
law to include a geological report, were first made compulsory for small towns like 
Grassano in 1967 (Mengoli, 1982; King, 1987). It is forbidden by law to allow the 
development of land that is or may be subject to landsiiding, or to put others at risk 
from landslides or avalanches (Alexander, 1987).
In his report for the first town plan Boenzi (unpublished, 1973) recorded a number 
of deep slump landslides quoted in section 5.1.1.1. But he was well aware of the 
necessary limitations of the study, and suggested more detailed research if and when 
the areas were to be developed. The full plan recognized that landslides were 
potentially of great danger to the town, limiting as they did the town’s expansion. II 
Politecnico (unpublished, 1973, 125-126, translated) urged that “the citizens must 
in a very real way come to regard consolidation as a collective good...” It suggested 
expansion of the town, assuming a stable population of 8,000 by 1983 (it was in fact 
6,157) and a demand for higher standards of accommodation. Most of the new 
accommodation (63%) was to be built in the expansion zone east of the town, deemed to 
be less vulnerable to landslides.
The relative lack of information on landslides at Grassano is not unusual, because the 
threat posed by landslides to towns in Italy was not well documented until the 1970s 
(Alexander, 1987). Although 25% of municipalities replying to a National Order of 
Geologists’ survey in the 1970s had been affected by landslides, only 5% had instigated 
research into local geology. In 1975, following new funds from the government, the 
Basilicata region ordered research to be carried out in Grassano - though at some 
future, unspecified date. It was only after the cemetery landslide of 1976 that serious 
attention began to be paid to the problem of the slope instability affecting the town.
The cemetery was not relocated as Boenzi (unpublished, 1973) had recommended it 
should be - and the 1976 landslide caused significant damage. The immediate result 
was a panicked attempt to find a site for the proposed new cemetery. It was planned to 
have a minimum area of 1.7 ha, plus 0.9 ha of gardens. As a result of its size, a 
geological study into its location was a legal obligation (Bonelli, Bianchi, and Brandi, 
unpublished, 1977). Rapisaldi and the Vignola cousins (Rapisaldi, Vignola, and 
Vignola, unpublished, 1977) suggested that the site should be close to the east of the 
town, relatively even, relatively stable, and well drained. As section 7.3.4 shows, a 
site to satisfy these criteria has not yet been found, principally for political reasons.
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By 1980 the DC administration was already planning further research into soil 
conservation throughout the municipality, according to its earlier election promises. 
Mayor Vignola wrote to the President of the Regional Giunta of Basilicata requesting 
L50 million \L111 million] funding for a research project (UTMG, letter from the 
sindaco to Vincenzo Verrastro, dated 3.3.1980). The situation, as it was then 
understood, was made plain at a special sitting of the town council in August 1980 
which noted that the extreme impact of the Calvario and Cemetery landslides on the 
town and condemned past inaction. The deliberation which was produced amounts to a 
damning criticism of past policies (perhaps a criticism that owes a little to neophytic 
zeal) and called for research into the town’s geology (to inform intervention by 
government agencies and co-ordinate their consolidation works) as well as funding 
“commensurate to the dramatic nature of the situation" (AMG, Deliberazioni del 
Consiglio Comunale, 1980, 305, translated).
THE town council of Grassano, urged by explicit requests from groups of 
councillors, political parties, mass organizations and unions, and becoming 
aware of the urgent necessity of soil conservation and the consolidation of the 
town, approves unanimously the following order of the day...
BECAUSE the municipality of Grassano, and more precisely the urban area, is 
composed of easibly-erodible fragile rocks it is affected by continuous landslides. 
Relevant to this can be cited two examples which sufficiently clarify the 
degradation of the physical environment of Grassano: the landslide of winter 
1956 which caused the destruction of two districts of the town, and that of 
autumn 1976 which affected the cemetery and condemned it to complete 
destruction;
DISCOVERING that in both cases almost nothing was done to contain the mass 
movements and nothing to prevent them. Neither can the timid attempts at 
reforestation and the sporadic public works carried out be said to be satisfactory 
because of the lack of money and short-lived nature of the projects involved... 
[Ibid, translated.]
The earthquake/landslide of 1980/1981 and the research which followed it confirmed 
the fears that a large part of Grassano could be vulnerable to landslides. As early as 15 
December 1981 the council decided “to consolidate stability is paramount in any 
discussion of reconstruction", and to carry out “a full intervention for... the 
consolidation of the town" (AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale, 1980, 314, 
translated). It became evident that the problems which landslides posed for Grassano 
were enormous. They were spelt out by the then-mayor Nicola Vignola [1943-] in his 
address which opened the conference on soil conservation in 1981.
Drainage problems have stopped and are hindering the completion of important 
public works, programmes, projects and finance for this municipality. For 
example: the construction of the new cemetery, development in the artizan area, 
construction of new reservoirs for increasing the water supplies, the 
construction of the new sports complex, construction of the new water
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purification plant, the construction of the Muiino provincial road, and the 
“Petrullo”, “Acquasalsa", and “Tilea” local roads. (Vignola [1943-J, 1981, 1, 
translated.]
It was immediately recognized that even with heavy expenditure there was always the 
chance that the damage would be repeated. Del Prete (unpublished, 1981) considered 
that the cost of intervening at Grassano would be in the order of L10 billion [L18.8  
billion ] after which there would be a 25 to 30% risk of the project failing to be 
adequate. Asked his opinion on whether the town’s reconstruction would worsen the 
effects of the landslide, Del Prete replied that consolidation of the landslide would be 
possible. He proposed: either the demolition of the town, which would be “inadvisable” 
for social reasons (ibid, 20, translated), or the control of sub-surface water for 
which “conditions are not easy” (ibid, translated), or to improve surface drainage.
According to Gaetano Ambrico (interview) the case for transference of the town had 
first been made by Zanotti-Bianco before the War; and subsequently by Cotecchia and 
others. At the conference Grieco argued: “...even these problems of transference should 
be looked in a new way because it is not true that there are habits and traditions which 
tie people to their ‘own’ area. Today what counts is a new quality of life, which drives 
man [sic] to migrate... it is a new and different type of civilization which the 
individual wishes to enjoy." (Grieco, 1981, 101, translated.) But when the people of 
Grassano were offered the opportunity to support the relocation of their town, at an 
exhibition organized by Giuseppe Vignola and Nicola Vignola [1948-] their reaction 
was an almost-unanimous rejection (interviews). It is evident that any planned 
transference of the town would be very unpopular with voters - and consequently 
almost certainly impossible for any party to carry out.
In March 1981 the council reiterated its call for a co-ordinated programme of 
consolidation (AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale, 1981, 136, translated). It 
decided to call for L10 billion for consolidation against landslides, and to leave the 
decision of whether to relocate the town to the comfortable future, after further 
research. Its deliberation read as follows:
HAVING NOTED that up until now nothing has been done, neither to forsee 
problems nor to control landslides when they are occurring...
[The council] DENOUNCES Once more the awful situation of the municipality 
which has been severely hit by the above-mentioned natural events...
AND ASKS [the national and regional authorities]:
to assign ten billion lire in the way suggested by Professors Cotecchia, Del 
Prete, and Puglisi of the University of Bari who described to the conference the 
urgent works necessary for the consolidation of the town - to give back a 
minimum level of security to the worried population
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for further successive finances to ensure:
a valid and secure consolidation which excludes the possibility of any risk in 
the future;
research for the choice of alternative areas suitable for the development of 
Grassano outside the present town, for use if necessary in the future; 
revision of the town plan.
AND HOPES that in the law on the reconstruction of the earthquake-hit area, huge 
finances will be made available for the problems of soil conservation and soil 
erosion. [AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale, 1981, 137, translated.]
Three reports were produced on the geomorphology of Grassano by the research team of 
Cotecchia, Del Prete, and Puglisi. In the first of their reports (Cotecchia, Del Prete, 
and Puglisi, unpublished, 1981) they came to the conclusion that the problem at 
Grassano was going to cost between L15 billion and L16 billion [L28.3 billion to L30 
billion ] of consolidation was needed. Even given this spending, they warned that the 
risk to the town would still be between 25 and 30% - though the estimate was based on 
the theory that the paleoslide is sufficiently vulnerable to slip given a seismic shock, 
an assumption questioned by Radina and Vignola (1981). Cotecchia, Del Prete and 
Puglisi pointed out that the alternative to consolidation was full or partial 
transference of the town south to the Basento valley, or northwest to Bivio Calle 
(Cotecchia, Del Prete, and Puglisi, unpublished, 1981).
The final research report by the same team (Cotecchia and Del Prete, unpublished, 
1983) looked at the potential for development for the variant on the town plan. To the 
east of the town they found reasonable stability, but recommended that the new 
reservoir should be kept away from landslide scars. In the town centre, drainage, 
reforestation, and forestation was proposed.
After the election of 1984 the research by Cotecchia, Del Prete, and Puglisi - with its 
unpopular emphasis on transfering the town - did not form the basis of the new 
variant of the town plan. They had looked, Engineer Dichio said (personal 
communication), at too long a timescale, “a geologist’s timescale" - rather than the 
civil engineer’s timescale of 200 years or so. Why should the people [or, more to the 
point, the administrators] of Grassano be worried about what happened after that, 
given the enormous changes over the past two centuries? he asked.
New research was carried out by a team from the University of Naples: Picarelli and 
Viggiani. And it came up with the results required to give the go-ahead for 
construction. Picarelli and Viggiani did not share the views of Cotecchia, Del Prete, and 
Puglisi on the paleoslide, describing it as *a hypothesis only, which is a long way from 
being proved." (Picarelli and Viggiani, unpublished, 1986b, 44, translated.) For the
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town centre they proposed the channelling of drainage water, the repair of the water 
and sewage network, control of the gulleys to the south of the town, and the 
improvement of foundations in the town centre (unpublished, 1986d).
Money is now available to make, at the very least, a significant contribution to 
reducing the landslide hazard at Grassano. It is evident from the preceding discussion 
that the reaction to landslides has reflected a local discourse on hazards, with the 
research undertaken influenced by the need the administrators perceive to provide a 
solution to landslides from within the current political system. Nowhere is the 
influence of the practical considerations of the local discourse on hazards more evident 
than in the case of the cemetery.
7.3.4 The cemetery problem
The landslide at the cemetery in 1976 provoked a crisis of government at Grassano. 
The solution to the problem shows the workings of the management of landslides: 
limited as it was by the weakness of local government, and influenced by clientalism, 
political conflict, popular protest, and the subsequent discovery of highly-unpalatable 
information on the landslide.
The damage was so severe that it was originally assumed a new cemetery would be 
necessary - as had been envisaged in the town plan. The plots of land to be used for the 
new cemetery were those on the catasto map 13, numbers 601, 606, 607, 623-629, 
727, 728, 813, 914, and 915 (figure 7.2). Initial hopes were not, however, based 
on the real nature of political life at Grassano. The Communist administration had 
severe difficulties in coming to terms with the power that it held for the first time. In 
the ensuing crisis the hoped-for became the impossible.
It was claimed that the proposed new site for the cemetery would be “more stable and 
more suitable from the geological point of view than the old one”, according to the
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obligatory report produced by the Provincial Commission for Cemeteries (AMG, file: 
Nuovo Cimitero, “Verbale di sopralluogo della Commissione Provinciale per i 
Cimiteri”, dated 1.12.1976, translated). Yet when the commission eventually made 
its obligatory inspection of what was claimed to be the new site, it was apparently 
taken to other plots. According to a later claim by Francesco Carbone on behalf of the 
Grassano branch of the Associazione Italiana Coltivatori (AMG, file: Nuovo Cimitero, 
“Osservazioni alia Variante di P.R.G. del Comune di Grassano”, dated 2.11,1977) the 
commission was taken to plots 601, 576, 652, and 649 - of which only 601 had been 
in the original plan for the new cemetery area. Unaware of the difference the 
Committee gave the necessary permission for the cemetery to be built - given that 
there would be further exploratory research because of reservations over the water 
table underneath the site.
The reasons for this surprising change appears to have been to accommodate the 
political realities at Grassano. On December 9 Mayor Daraio had written to the owners 
of a number of plots inviting them to meet to discuss the appropriation of their land, as 
recommended by the Cemetery Commission. At their meeting on December 14 it proved 
impossible to gain complete assent from the gathering, and it became evident that a new 
site would be politically necessary. The sensitive nature of local politics at the time 
meant that bad feeling over dispossessed owners would have been a very serious threat 
to the administration.
In an interview (16.8.1988), Daraio claimed that the site he had proposed was “more 
or less” that in the town plan but claimed that “interested people” suggested that the 
area was not precisely that proposed in the plan. He said the site had in fact been 
chosen by the municipal surveyors, who indicated one particular area which had a 
slope about the same as the original site. The majority of proprietors were amenable 
but others (all Christian Democrat supporters, he claimed) caused trouble. In the file 
on the new cemetery in the archives at Grassano there is a map of the new site. The old 
proposed site is marked in in red biro. Around it is a series of appears to be new sites 
pencilled in, the prospective new sites were rotations of the old, indicating that they 
were devised by whoever drew them to avoid the land of selected landholders (AMG,
File: Nuovo Cimitero, rough sketch apparently of possible new sites for the cemetery). 
Twenty-four plots were tentatively suggested: 538, 549, 569-571, 583-585, 587- 
591, 593, 599-601, 622, 725, 726, 783, 811, 812, and 1494 (ibid).
By December 18 when the council met to debate the cemetery, matters were still in a 
state of flux. The council deliberation on the site (AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio
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Comunale, 1976, 204, translated) explained: “THE Provincial Cemetery Commission 
expressed a favourable decision on the said area, located 200 m from the zone of 
[urban] expansion specified in the town plan. A good proportion of the affected 
proprietors have agreed with the decision, while others are opposed to it... the area 
chosen is that [also] chosen for geological reasons in the town plan." The site was not 
greeted with overwhelming enthusiasm by councillors. Councillors Giancursio, 
Carbone, and Nicola Vignola [1943-] all complained that the site was too close to the 
town, and could restrict the area available for new housing. When the meeting was 
reconvened the following day, Daraio stated that the area eventually to be chosen “had 
to be specified with respect to the town plan” (ibid, translated) which the council 
agreed unanimously.
On 24 February 1977 research was commissioned into the site of the proposed new 
cemetery, following the insistence of the Provincial Cemetery Commission. The work 
was undertaken by Professor Rapisardi, with the aid of the two Vignola cousins, Nicola 
[1948-] and Giuseppe. They rejected the old site (Rapisardi, Vignola, and Vignola, 
unpublished, 1977), noting that the water table would be at a locally variable depth, 
which without piezometric analysis it would be impossible to determine), and 
considered the site part of an area with only “precarious stability” (translated). The 
new area chosen, again on sheet 13 of the catasto map, was plots 425-435, 437-448, 
450, 496, 536, 538, 539, 711, 712, 822, 1397, and 1398. Bonelli, Bianchi, and 
Bandi (1977, 6, translated) later commented on this proposal that: “The area within 
the perimeter has an irregular form, it is most unusual compared to the traditional 
cemeteries in our area, characterized almost always by square or rectangular plans.” 
This unusual compromise was in the interest of the proprietor of the land on which it 
was planned to build the cemetery. Rapisardi’s report on the new location for the 
cemetery was adopted by the council (AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale,
1978, 9). The proposals received the necessary ratification from the Genio Civile in 
December 1977, and were formally accepted by the council on 14 March 1988.
The original site was rejected for practical political reasons - and a compromise site 
had to be found. The explanation given for the changes in the site had been agreed upon 
was that there had been no specified original site. It was now claimed that Boenzi 
(1973) had merely suggested a “general site to the EAST of the town and north of the 
SS7” (AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale, 1978, 9). Almost as if the debates 
over the site had never taken place.
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When the Communist administration fell a prefectoral commissioner was appointed to 
run the town. Among the documents that came to the attention of the commissioner were 
those relating to the new cemetery's site - including complaints that alleged 
irregularities in the procedure for choosing the site which had been lodged by three 
locals. These documents had previously been rejected by the council as irrelevancies 
(AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale, 1978, 9). The commissioner passed the 
matter over to the prefect, realizing the site proposed by Rapisardi had in fact never * 
been given the necessary consent of the Cemeteries Commission. The prefect 
reconvened the Cemeteries Commission in March 1979: and on the 29th the 
Commission carried out an inspection of Rapisardi’s recommended site. Its findings 
were that the new area identified for the cemetery was not suitable for geological 
reasons. They found:
that the said new area is nearby that previously proposed;
that the area proposed can, geologically, be subdivided into two zones;
the first identified in yellow on the plan attached to the geological report, which 
is suitable;
the remainder does not have the right requirements being in an area affected by 
landslides.
...the area proposed [as a whole] therefore does not satisfy legal requirements... 
[AMG, file: Nuovo Cimitero, “Verbale di sopralluogo della Commissione Prov.le 
per i cimiteri per parere preventativo localizzazione area per costruzione nuovo 
cimitero in Grassano”, dated 6.4.1979, translated]
In May the commissioner revoked Council Deliberation 127 of 1977, which had 
accepted the Rapisardi report (AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale, 1979,
84). It did not prove possible to break the ensuing deadlock until after the 
earthquake/landslide of 1980/1981 which threw matters at Grassano into a new state 
of confusion. In 1982 Mayor Nicola Vignola [1943-] claimed the town and its 
territory was “stricken by serious geological problems...” and requested a 
prolongation of the deadline for a project “in order to allow the detailed geological 
study” (AMG, file: Nuovo Cimitero, letter from the sindaco to the Proweditorato alle 
Opere Pubbliche, dated 8.2.1982, translated).
The requested project was at that time being undertaken by Cotecchia, Del Prete, and 
Puglisi who eventually concluded that the proposed new location of the cemetery was 
too close to the urban area, and that a nearby new site would be difficult to find - for 
geological reasons (Cotecchia, Del Prete, and Puglisi, unpublished, 1983). They 
proposed that the site should be on the north side of the Serra Martella, rather than on
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the south side which had previously been attempted. The new area they proposed was on 
an old landslide deposit 13 metres thick and “appearing to have been stable for a long 
time" (ibid, 26, translated). But they warned that the erosion evident along the length 
of the Strettolone road north of the site could lead to deteriorating stability in the
future. A second alternative was proposed at Masseria Franceshiello: a site of around
40 ha, some 3 km to the south of the town.
The findings were rejected by the municipal administration as the basis for a new plan.
When Picarelli and Viggiani (unpublished, 1986c) examined Rapisardi’s proposed site 
they concluded that the area is part of a paleoslide - but the morphology is devoid of 
“elements which would indicate a moving landslide” (ibid, 11, translated). The 
stability of the area would be compromised by the presence of a water table, or by 
seismic shock; although drainage would increase it.
The need originally perceived for the new cemetery was stifled for several years, and 
the crisis generated by the landslide of 21 November 1976 consequently remains 
unresolved. In part, perhaps, this can be seen as a failure - a failure of the scientists 
to argue their case and a failure of the bureaucrats to act. In May 1991 the council 
agreed to a new site to the east of the Serra Martella - though members of opposition 
parties have suggested that the plan will prove too expensive ever to be realized 
(in terv iew s).
The example of the cemetery landslide shows the extremely complex processes 
determining the local discourse on hazards. The outcome of this discourse has been to 
preserve the existing approach to hazards: for the very practical reasons outlined, the 
response to the damage caused to the cemetery in 1976 was subordinated to factional- 
political and party-political issues. The result enshrined these considerations as 
politically legitimate practical considerations to be taken into account in managing the 
landslides hazard. This happened because the options for radical change - even with the 
leadership of the PCI/PDS - were so limited, and the hegemony of the technocratic 
approach to landslides so complete.
7.4 Conclusions
This chapter examined why the scale of the response to landslides at Grassano has 
increased so significantly during the twentieth century - and what the impact has been
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of this changing response on the reaction to the landslides. It showed that the real 
increase in landslides, combined with a greater modern sensitivity to hazards in 
general, has generated a concern which has had a profound effect on political life at 
Grassano.
For the reasons already discussed, there has been a real increase in landslides in 
Basilicata during the twentieth century - also experienced at Grassano. In combination 
with the greater sensitivity of modern society to hazards and the associated 
determination of government to control it this has led to a significant increase in the 
bureaucratic effort spent on landslides. More effort and more funds has meant an 
increase in the reporting of problems, and combined with the greater dissemination 
and survival of these reports this has led to a greatly increased volume of information 
on landslides.
The concern over landslides has stimulated research projects and public debate over 
the management of the land. Although evidence has begun to appear that suggests that 
the current approach to the land is highly inappropriate, it has continued. This is 
because the local discourse on landslides from which that approach follows has, until 
now, acted to reinforce existing power relationships. Landslides have proved helpful 
for the political and bureaucratic elite because landslides mean money. The very 
exercising of political power which these funds allow reinforces the legitimacy of the 
power of the spenders, and the faith which stems from this legitimacy is such that 
revolutionary change in the approach to the environment is still stifled. The small 
likelihood of this process being slowed or reversed is of fundamental importance to the 
future of Grassano, and the many settlements like it in Basilicata. It will be discussed 
in the next chapter.
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Chapter 8: Summary and conclusions
This chapter summarizes the dissertation’s findings, relates them to the dissertation's 
thesis, and examines the extent to which the thesis has been examined. The chapter 
then draws conclusions on the general nature of environmental hazards and their 
specific operation in the dissertation’s case study. It then concludes with an evaluation 
of the dissertation, the directions it implies for future research, and the general 
significance of its findings.
8.1 Introduction
This dissertation has examined humankind’s impact on the intensity of environmental 
hazards, exemplified by landslides in Basilicata. The research has shown that in 
Basilicata the intensity of landsliding has been significantly increased as a result of a 
longstanding inability by humankind to control the undesired effects that arise from a 
destructive approach to the land. This inability is the product of exploitative social and 
political structures which have been manifested in an inappropriate treatment of the 
physical environment (notably through farming and associated deforestation, but 
increasingly by urbanization). The approach to the land which has arisen under 
capitalism makes it a more destructive type of socioeconomic system than any that 
have gone before.
8.2 Summary of work done
The aims of the dissertation were introduced in the preface to chapter one, section 1.1, 
and its objectives in the introduction, section 1.2. Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2 showed 
how environmental hazards are an important and very expensive indicator of 
humankind’s vulnerability to environmental fluctuation. Landslides cause a 
significant, though underestimated damage worldwide, but are especially threatening 
in the Mediterranean region - and particularly well documented in Italy, as section
1.3.3 explained. Basilicata, and the municipality of Grassano, were chosen for study
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because of contacts available there, and the wealth of the background literature and 
documents available on the region’s environment. The section shows that the landslide 
hazard in the region is sufficiently intense that its analysis is both of academic worth 
and significant practical importance.
The choice of case study is also justified for firm methodological reasons: as was 
explained in section 1.4 this dissertation combined a structuralist ontology and a 
realist epistemology, which indicated the need for a methodology that would combine 
regional (extensive) research with local (intensive) analysis. Section 1.5 showed in 
outline how this was to be done in the context of Basilicata, and the information the 
dissertation needed to establish in order to make a significant contribution to 
knowledge. Extensive research showed the intensity of the past and present regional 
patterns of landslides (chapter three), and the dynamic interaction of the physical and 
social factors which have accounted for them (chapter four). Intensive analysis showed 
the physical and social factors which have accounted for past and present patterns of 
landslides at Grassano (chapter five), the pattern of landslides which they have caused 
(chapter six), and the factors which have increased modern sensitivity and determined 
the modern reaction to landslides (chapter seven).
The literature on environmental hazards, of which landslides are an example, was 
discussed in chapter two. Section 2.1 showed the concept of “nature” to be an 
ideological construction based on humankind’s alienation from the land. The 
significance and the complexity of this relationship is acknowledged in the 
dissertation’s rejection of the term “natural hazards”, and its adoption of 
“environmental hazards” to describe the threats posed to humankind by the 
environment. Section 2.2 discussed the different approaches to the environment, that 
explain contrasting approaches to hazards research.
Section 2.3 showed that to the environmental determinists hazards were an 
unavoidable constraint on humankind, though recent research is more sanguine on the 
point of avoidability. Behaviouralist hazards research, based on the human ecology 
perspective, suggests that human involvement in the modification of the environment 
may worsen hazards but it can also mitigate their worst effects. The structuralist 
critique of hazards has suggested, however, that social organization is an important 
contributor to hazards, and that a more rational social organization could consequently 
help reduce them.
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The implications of these approaches to hazards for the analysis of landslides was 
analyzed in section 2.4. Landslides are physical processes, but the environments and 
the contingent circumstances in which they occur are frequently influenced by 
humankind. In the Mediterranean the influence of humankind is a particularly 
important consideration because it has been so intense and so prolonged. The ability of 
hazards theory to account for these complex causes was the subject of the remainder of 
the section. Behaviouralist research has tended to concentrate on the geophysical 
triggers of landslides in order to help their prediction and suppression through the 
application of technology; but structuralist research has looked for deeper causes and 
has indicated that landslides are inextricably linked with the societies that they affect, 
that technology can only be a (partial) remedy, and that a real cure can only come 
through fundamental social change.
The dissertation’s research question was discussed in section 2.5. It was designed to 
examine the critical difference between the behaviouralist and structuralist 
approaches on the extent of the influence of humankind and physical factors on 
environmental hazards with reference to the evidence in Basilicata. The research 
question, designed to allow this examination and to produce an argued analysis of 
landslides in the region that would be informed by the theoretical background, was: 
how has humankind increased the intensity of the hazard from landslides in Basilicata, 
and why has that increase been caused?
Chapter three examined the intensity and distribution of landslides in Basilicata. Based 
on a number of sources, section 3.1 showed landslides are very common, affecting 
almost all parts of the region, and 81% of its towns (including Grassano). Section 3.2 
examined the historical evidence on urban landslides in the region which indicates that 
the reported damage from landslides has increased over recent centuries - and have 
noticeably worsened since 1900.
Chapter four assessed the importance of the physical and environmental factors behind 
the increase in reported landslides in Basilicata. Section 4.1 emphasized the 
complexity of attributing the causes of landslides there. Section 4.2 showed why the 
region is, by nature of its physical environment, highly susceptible to slope 
instability and has a high “normal” level of landslides - notably in the uplands of the 
Bradano Trough. Basilicata has a predominantly steep relief; a geology which exhibits 
fragile lithological types, degraded soils, and many weaknesses of geological structure; 
intense tectonic and neotectonic activity with an associated seismicity; and a 
mediterranean climate characterized by summer drought and winter rain. This
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generally vulnerable environment has been extensively modified by human activity 
over several thousand years. The section concluded that the influence of humankind on 
the physical environment of the region is so important that physical factors cannot be 
discussed adequately in isolation from the societies with which they have evolved.
Section 4.3 showed the ways in which the region’s physical environment has been 
subjected to an significant indirect and direct modification by humankind. Most of these 
modifications have tended to decrease slope stability: deforestation has been extensive, 
and was particularly rapid during the nineteenth century; agriculture has been 
required to support a population which has increased significantly in size; and the 
marginalization of the peasantry - which began before the introduction of capitalist 
agriculture but was greatly accelerated by it - caused increased farming pressures, 
particularly on the most vulnerable land; recent urban development associated with 
industrialization has accentuated land degradation. Set against these generally 
destructive changes the section explained the attempts over the past century and more 
to reclaim land and prevent landslides, but showed why it has been limited in its 
effectiveness by poor, often-corrupt administration, and the application of technology 
that has often been inappropriate.
The town of Grassano was introduced in chapter five. It provides an example with 
which to examine the material presented in chapter three on the causal relationships 
behind the regional pattern of landslides - which indicated an increase in reported 
landslides during the twentieth century. Section 5.1 gives an introduction to the town 
and its surroundings. It is one of those many reported in chapter three in which 
reported landsliding has worsened during the twentieth century, and is affected by a 
number of urban landslides that are a serious hazard. Most notable in this respect is 
the paleoslide that underlies the town centre and which appears to have moved after 
severe seismic shocks: individual units have moved repeatedly during the twentieth 
century.
Section 5.2 showed that, like much of Basilicata, Grassano is highly susceptible to 
landslides because of the nature of its physical environment, and has a high “normal” 
level of landslides. The town is particularly vulnerable because it is located on a 
steeply-sloping hillside; has a vulnerable lithology formed of conglomerate, clay, 
sandstone, and chaotic landslide deposits; has been subjected to a number of severe 
earthquakes this century - notably in 1930 and 1980; its climate is semiarid; and 
only vestiges of the climax vegetation remain.
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The feudal farming regime that was relatively benign in environmental terms was 
followed by an increasingly intense use of the land after the introduction of 
agricultural capitalism. According to the evidence presented in section 5.3, the site of 
Grassano has probably not been occupied for more than a thousand years, but during 
that time its inhabitants have caused significant change in the surrounding land. By the 
end of the nineteenth century there had already been extensive deforestation, and a 
continuing pressure on the land through agricultural development has followed. The 
rapid expansion of the town’s built-up area during the late twentieth century has been 
on to land which has a moderate susceptibility to landslides; but a combination of 
construction work with growing water consumption and associated drainage, has caused 
a significant increase in erosion and gulleying. The chapter concluded, in section 5.4, 
that social and physical factors operate together to modify the land and that the 
landslides affecting the town are contingent on short-term combinations of triggering 
factors.
Chapter six showed that the factors discussed in chapter five, which have caused such 
significant environmental change in the municipality of Grassano, have led to a real 
increase in the level of landsliding. The historical evidence presented in section 6.2 
showed that Grassano experienced extensive environmental degradation before the 
twentieth century, which caused widespread drainage problems and a number of 
landslides. Section 6.3 described the history of landslides at Grassano. It described 
early landslides in Via Cinti, Via San Sofia, and in a number of other locations - though 
none were particularly significant. The evidence in sections 6.3.4 and 6.3.5 showed 
how, particularly since the 1950s, Grassano has been affected by two severe 
landslides: in the Calvario district and at the Cemetery. There was earlier evidence that 
these areas were unstable, but the Calvario landslide of 1956 and the Cemetery 
landslide of 1976 were unprecedented in the damage that they caused. Even though the 
fear these events aroused was greatly enhanced by the contemporary discourse on 
landslides, and by the twentieth century there was already a problem of urban 
landslides at Grassano, but the hazard was relatively less intense than it was to become 
later in the century.
Chapter seven analyzed the factors behind the increased fear of landsliding during the 
twentieth century and the increased attention that has been paid to them. In section 7.1 
it analyzed the concept that within society there is a discourse on landslides that has 
determined the perception and treatment of them. Section 7.2 acknowledged that 
although landslides have increased in intensity in Grassano, the greater attention paid 
to them is in part because of greater modern sensitivity to environmental hazards. The
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section showed how the central government responded from the late 1970s onwards to 
the reported increase in the hazard from landslides with a very rapid increase in the 
funds available for consolidation throughout Basilicata.
Section 7.3 showed that the combination of an intensifying hazard and a greater 
sensitivity to it have combined to produce a concern over landslides that has its origin 
in the local discourse on hazards. The state has been forced to respond to this concern 
and has attempted to control it - but without success. State intervention has actually 
worsened the perceived problem because more money has encouraged more research... 
which has uncovered more problems. Support for the policies subsequently pursued 
has been ensured by the machine nature of local and national politics.
Before the 1970s landslides were generally ignored as a serious threat to the town 
because they were perceived as essentially insoluble and unpredictably irregular in 
occurrence: but from the 1970s the experience of serious landslides, combined with 
the detailed research on the town’s geology which began in 1981, greatly increased 
awareness of the town’s vulnerability to the hazard: and at the same time the money 
which began to become available for consolidation gave the potential for at least 
reducing that vulnerability. The section explained how the political system, directed to 
the satisfaction of clients, was galvanized by the new money available. Accepting the 
central government funds meant accepting political indebtedness to central 
government, but it allowed dramatic political gestures which, though of doubtful 
effectiveness in terms of insuring against slope instability, were undoubtedly 
successful in maintaining credibility for the ruling parties and the bureaucracy they 
employ. The difficulties which arise from the political manipulation of landsliding is 
demonstrated by the example of the inability to solve the problems which have arisen 
from the partial destruction of the town’s cemetery in 1976.
Section 7.4 gave the chapter’s conclusions on the current approach to landslides - that 
despite rapid environmental changes, the conservative nature of the discourse on 
hazards has ensured that the current response to landslides should continue. So strong 
is the hegemony of this discourse that the political opposition is unable to question the 
ruling parties’ approach to the town’s environmental problems, and merely works to 
suggest more efficient ways of pursuing present policies. This is despite the fact that 
the policies carried out to ameliorate landslides act to benefit the political status quo 
and reinforce it.
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8.3 Evaluation of work done and statement of limitations
8.3.1 The work done and its limitations
The dissertation showed through its analysis of landslides in Basilicata why 
environmental hazards are of real academic and practical concern. The case-study 
approach taken to do this is inevitably a compromise between workability and 
explanatory validity, but compromise need not be harmful provided it is acknowledged, 
and forms part of a coherent strategy to a desired end. The coherence of the chosen 
approach was ensured by a strict adherence to the guiding principles of an internally- 
consistent methodology (based on realism). The use of any methodology both restricts 
and empowers the research, but realism was chosen because it provided the significant 
advantage of a robust methodological framework within which to explore the physical 
and social factors involved in environmental change, their contingent local operation, 
and the hazards they produce.
The critique presented in chapter two shows that none of the approaches to 
environmental hazards is entirely satisfactory, but the dissertation took a broadly 
structuralist methodology for its analysis. This approach was vindicated because the 
material from Basilicata shows the importance of considering the nature of society as 
an important structural factor determining the intensity of landslides - but only in the 
context of the physical environment which society can modify considerably. However, 
until now, most structuralist research on hazards has avoided taking environmental 
constraints into account as a significant factor in the contingent nature of hazards.
The complexity of empirical material in Basilicata showed the importance of an 
approach which acknowledges the dynamic relationship between the physical 
environment and society. The changes in the regional pattern of landslides implicitly 
support the contention that humankind has had considerable influence over the 
increase in their intensity. Although the environment of Basilicata is by nature 
vulnerable to landslides, it is because there had been no significant endogenous change 
in the environment of the region that the dynamic social changes (which have 
consistently been associated with rapid environmental change) can be inferred with 
reasonable security to be responsible for the increase in landsliding.
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The evidence on Grassano is limited by being from one locality only: but, as the 
discussion in chapter two shows, this need not hinder research. Grassano was chosen, 
very much in the geographical tradition, as an example with which to examine 
contingent conditions - though this could only be done because the regional context was 
already understood. It confirms the regional pattern of social change inseperably 
linked to environmental change. It shows that these links were geographically specific 
because they depended on local circumstances, and were specific to the locality. At 
Grassano the landslides have worsened this century: and any analysis why must take 
into account the very complex interaction between the physical and social structuring 
factors identified at the regional level.
The history was explained but a number of important questions remained to be 
answered, through the detailed study of the town, on what lay behind it:
• What combination of factors accounted for the increase in reported landslides 
there?
• Was the pattern of landslides reported a real one or just a perceived one?
• If it was at least in part a real increase did concern over landslides grow, and 
has this affected the approach to the hazard?
Evidence on the landslides at Grassano was mainly limited to the urban area. However, 
this was not necessarily a drawback - because it allowed a detailed examination of the 
locally specific factors in the area where the physical environment has been most 
intensively influenced by society. Whether society is essentially passive or potentially 
active in its relationships to hazards is a fundamental difference between the 
behaviouralist and the structuralist approaches: and the urban landslides at Grassano 
give the clearest possible evidence of the active influence of humankind on the land.
8.3.2 Further research
There is good deal of the further research which could be carried out on the subject 
matter for this dissertation, as is made implicit by the questions generated by the 
preceding discussion. Indeed, the fragmentary nature of much of the evidence 
uncovered demands more research to fill the gaps in knowledge. The research required 
can be divided into the analysis of the general approach to hazards which informs this
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dissertation, and the specific subject matter - though these two categories are not 
mutually exclusive.
Basilicata has been taken as emblematic of the landslide hazard which exists elsewhere 
in the Mediterranean. More empirical data would obviously help to increase the 
understanding of the processes which occurred, and consequently the relevance to other 
areas of those patterns which have affected Basilicata. More material would also help to 
test the relevance of the specific case material dealt with in this dissertation and to 
expand the confidence with which its results could be applied elsewhere. Particularly 
helpful in this respect would be more research on places with similar problems to 
Grassano, and a number of those towns discussed in chapter three would be suitable 
(perhaps, given importance of formal politics in determining the local discourse on 
hazards, those with a different political history such as Irsina and Calciano). Although, 
as the dissertation has shown, a great deal of research has been carried out into the 
geomorphology of the landslides in and around Grassano, this dissertation has generated 
more topics for geomorphological research - particularly the application of dating 
techniques to give detail to the historical events described.
Much more work could be carried out into the general question of the links between 
social change and environmental hazards. This dissertation has explored the 
importance of the environment in structuralist research: it has demonstrated the 
importance of considering environmental constraints alongside politics and economics. 
It has introduced those constraints explicitly into political-ecology research on 
environmental hazards - but has explored only one example of its occurrence. A 
number of questions on the structure/agency nature of this relationship could be 
answered by a more detailed analysis of specific topics in the dissertation. This is 
particularly important if the results discovered are to inform work carried out on 
other places and on other times. Most notably: how independent of society do 
environmental processes remain? and which structuring factors are important in 
influencing the contingent nature of hazards in other places?
Additional research could help to put the evolution of a humanized environment in a 
general context of social history. More relevant in direct terms to this dissertation is 
that it could help to put the research in a more comprehensive and readily-relevant 
context: and by doing so, allow the empirical data and analysis to be more understood, 
used, and useful. In particular, it could help to indicate more clearly the social 
structures which prevent the effective reduction of hazards such as landsliding, and by 
showing them provide the theoretical basis for practical action to change them.
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8.4 Contribution to knowledge
This dissertation unavoidably has imperfections in its design, material, and findings: 
but has provided a number of very useful insights into the material studied and the 
broader questions which that material illustrates. It has made a number of theoretical 
and empirical contributions to knowledge - though these two categories should not be 
understood by the recognition of that conventional divide to be mutually exclusive. The 
contributions have been: providing a critique of existing theory, uncovering new 
information, and providing a synthesis of the existing information with the new 
information necessary to answer the dissertation’s research question.
Any complete analysis of landslides must draw on both the behaviouralist approach to 
hazards and the structuralist approach. Like any set of coherent ideas, these two 
approaches both empower research (by making the world coherent through their 
contribution to knowledge and understanding) but also restrict it (by the inevitable, 
partial misrepresentations of reality which they include). As chapter two shows, 
representatives of both schools have acknowledged the incomplete explanations which 
they give. The material presented in this dissertation demonstrates the need for a 
different approach.
The material discussed in this dissertation has shown that both approaches to hazards 
come close to explaining what occurs - but neither comes quite close enough. The 
behaviouralist approach denies the qualitative difference between humankind and other 
species in its acceptance of “human ecology” - and with it denies the ability to 
“cause” processes that contribute to hazards. The structuralist approach accepts that 
humankind has a role in causing hazards, but fails to recognize explicitly that this is 
mainly an indirect cause which modifies the physical factors that structure the 
contingent nature of hazards.
The contribution of this dissertation to the theory of hazards is consequently one of 
tone... It asserts that importance must be given to both the social and environmental 
causes of hazards, but stresses that these forces can no longer be discussed in isolation 
from each other. In this respect it allows an updating of the political-ecology approach 
to hazards based on the methodological changes in geography in the 1980s. In specific 
terms it has shown the importance of political and economic factors in structuring the
2 2 5
behaviour of society to the environment, and the significance of the environment in 
structuring the form and nature of the hazards which affect societies.
The empirical part of this dissertation has provided significant new information on the 
historical increase in the intensity of landslides across Basilicata, which it has put in 
the context of the available secondary sources. The comparison between published 
sources on landslides with new archival evidence demonstrated for the first time the 
changes affecting landslides this century. This pattern in turn conforms to the 
available evidence on erosion rates, and shows high erosion rates to have been a 
reasonable proxy for the levels of land degradation and landslides. Its establishment of 
the links in Basilicata between humankind and landslides substantiates the secondary 
texts indicating an increase in degradation over the past several millenia. Much of the 
information it contains is made available for the first time in English.
Of particular importance is the specific information on Grassano, put in context by the 
broader patterns of regional change. The material on Grassano explained the contingent 
operation of the causal mechanisms behind the broader patterns, and the availability of 
a wider context in which to place the case study ensured a fuller understanding of the 
processes behind the regional pattern. This work provided a detailed environmental 
history of Grassano, taken from a variety of sources - almost none of which had been 
previously available, and demonstrated the validity of the modified political-ecology 
approach used for explaining environmental degradation.
The dissertation has shown that in Basilicata the intensity of landslides has been 
significantly increased as a result of humankind’s inability to control the unforseen 
consequences of its destructive approach to the land, and that this destruction has been 
particularly intense since the introduction of capitalism. Capitalism, and the social 
structures which support it, has been the most important factor in the current 
increase in urban landslides, but it has not been the only factor - which calls into 
question the validity of the political ecologists’ assumption of a “natural economy” in 
which the peasantry is in equilibrium with the environment. The dissertation has 
shown humankind’s relationship with the environment to be a dynamic one: all 
societies have caused environmental change, though the damage in the past was less 
because the rate of exploitation of individuals (and consequently of the land) was 
lower.
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8.5 Discussion of the significance of the results and their application
Contemporary society has shown itself to be increasingly sensitive to hazards and 
increasingly intolerant of them. This general trend away from riskiness causes a 
desperate desire for a solution to landsliding, that continues unsatisfied because 
humankind can never be liberated from the environment. Indeed, humankind is 
irrevocably a part of the environment, and cannot stand outside it.
The very large amounts of money spent on consolidation against landsliding in 
Basilicata are treating the problem, but they cannot cure it. This is because the 
projects used are guided by the same social interests which helped to produce the 
current problem. Since they reinforce the legitimacy of the powerful, these factors 
reproduce and strengthen those interests when they are put into effect. The restriction 
of the intervention measures against landslides to mainly tactical measures ensures 
that landsliding will continue to be a serious hazard in Basilicata until current social 
and economic relationships are changed, and that the failure of opposition to these 
measures means the approach to landslides will reproduce the power relationships 
which created them.
If the desire of freedom from landslides cannot be satisfied it can at least be assuaged. 
This dissertation has aimed to be descriptive rather than prescriptive. It has not 
attempted to dictate solutions, but to indicate how successful different approaches to 
providing solutions could be. This is a deliberate choice because change can only come 
about through a fusion of theory and practice - which can only occur in Basilicata 
itself through the practise of participants in the political process, rather than by 
outsiders.
The options available for change are limited by the region’s physical and social 
structure. This dissertation has shown that real change in the relationship between 
humankind and the environment will be very difficult to achieve because it would 
entail a fundamental disruption of the exploitative political and economic structures 
which in the past have promoted both the action that has intensified environmental 
changes, and the social inertia that prevents those practices from being stopped, it is 
evident that, given the strength of existing vested interests in society, the genuine
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social change which is necessary for a real solution will probably be a long time 
coming even given the current political changes in Italy.
How a real solution could be created is not easy to forsee. An interesting perspective 
was given by Sandbach’s (1984) identification of three discrete approaches to 
environmental change, based on the ideologies of conservatism, liberalism, and 
socialism. Each approach could provide a “solution” which is not optimal, but 
satisfactory to its own ideological imperatives. The conservative approach is based on 
the assumption that environmental crisis is unavoidable, and the only effective 
response to the social tensions which crisis will bring is their suppression by 
authoritarianism. The liberal approach is for the continued improvement of technology 
to allow society to evade the worst consequences of environmental crisis. And the 
socialist approach is for the reduction of perceived social inefficiency to prevent it at 
source.
In the Italian context, the conservative solution is not impossible. Indeed, twentieth- 
century political history has repeatedly demonstrated the vulnerability of the Italian 
political system to authoritarianism at times of crisis. A totalitarian solution would 
not necessarily preclude a rigourous technological response to landslides (it did not 
preclude it during the Fascist period) but political repression would delay, perhaps 
indefinitely, the fundamental social changes which this dissertation has shown to be 
necessary for a lasting solution to landsliding.
The liberal, technocratic solution has been the approach to landslides adopted since the 
last war. It seems likely to continue for the forseeable future as the hegemonic 
approach to landslides. Yet as this dissertation has shown, technology is not a full 
solution to the problem of landsliding - although it can reduce the harm suffered it 
will not entirely prevent landslides, and cannot prevent the fear which they cause.
The only solution to a society based either on fear of authority (as is conservatism) or 
fear of the environment (as is liberalism) is a socialist society, which might 
eliminate, or at least reduce, the conflict between humankind and the environment. The 
establishment of such a society would involve the immensely difficult problem of a 
radical change to the contemporary theory and practice of environmental relations. 
Overthrown would have to be the cultural prejudice for the division between 
humankind and external nature: if ever completed this would allow the end to the 
attempt to conquer external nature, because external nature would become an 
anachronistic concept. Also overthrown would have to be the cultural prejudice for the
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supremacy of internal nature: society would be fully humanized, fully responsible for 
its own actions and able to take responsibility for its impact on the environment.
The implementation of a such a society would require not just an economists solution, 
but also an environmentalist solution. Economists socialism has been shown by 
experience to be capable of reducing class antagonisms - but not environmental 
antagonisms (it may begin the abolition of the concept of internal nature, but cannot 
begin the abolition of the concept of external nature); while western 
environmentalism may begin the abolition of the concept of external nature, but it 
cannot begin the abolition of the concept of internal nature.
Even if an environmental-socialist solution to landslides in Basilicata would be the 
optimal one, it would not be without its problems. It would be forced to recognize that 
because of the physical constraints which will continue, a new “balance of tolerance" 
would have to be established in which landslides would once again come to be recognized 
as “normal”, “everyday" events. This would possibly make it necessary for society to 
recognize that the problem arising from many landslides (perhaps including those at 
Grassano) may only be soluble by the acceptance that some landslides will always be 
unavoidable, and that in a number of cases this may even make necessary the 
abandonment of towns.
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Appendix A: The landslide-inventory maps
The gridcells used in the landslide-inventory maps are numbered as in figure A.1. They 
run from west to east and south to north. The percentage of each gridcell covered by 
erosion is followed with the percentage covered by landslides; the location of the 131 
municipalities is given in brackets after the data for the gridcells in which they lay.
Gridcells 001-006: 18/1, 10/2, 10/0, 0/0, 17/1, 1/10.
Gridcells 007-018: 0/1, 20/3, 21/0 (Rotonda), 6/0, 11/0, 5/0, 13/0, 7/6, 20/4, 
15/7, 30/0, 18/0.
Gridcells 019-031: 0/2 (Maratea), 0/1, 0/11, 14/0, 40/2 (Vigianello), 37/3,
8/0, 24/2, 8/6, 54/0, 18/7, 11/0 (Terranova di Pollino), 42/0.
Gridcells 032-053: 0/0, 0/3, 0/10, 0/31 (Trecchina), 2/15, 3/14, 0/0, 8/0,
14/0, 5/0 (Casteluccio Inferiore, Casteluccio Superiore), 3/0, 0/0, 4/0, 22/0,
16/0, 46/0, 22/0, 16/0 (San Severino Lucano), 46/0, 29/0, 92/0, 60/3, 36/2, 
68/0, 58/1.
Gridcells 054-075: 0/4, 0/0, 0/6, 0/35, 2/33 (Nemoli), 1/26 (Lauria), 3/10,
12/16, 20/5, 0/0, 1/0, 5/0, 10/0, 15/0, 3/0, 23/0, 52/5, 57/1, 12/0, 35/2
(San Constantino Albanese), 64/0 (Cersosimo, San Paulo Albanese), 33/10.
Gridcells 076-097: 0/1, 0/0, 1/33 (Rivello), 3/27, 0/7, 1/4, 0/24, 4/38, 6/21,
8/0, 6/0 (Latronico), 19/0, 28/0 (Episcopia), 38/0, 43/0, 10/2, 30/0 
(Francavilla in Sinni), 31/0, 15/0, 50/1 (Noepoli), 48/0, 70/0.
Gridcells 098-119: 2/0, 2/6 (Lagonegro), 9/4, 0/0, 1/0, 26/4, 9/26, 14/33,
12/0, 9/0, 7/0, 16/0, 13/0, 28/0 (Teana), 30/1 (Fardella), 20/0 (Chiaromonte),
11/0, 15/0, 33/0, 74/0, 24/0, 36/0 (San Giorgio Lucano).
Gridcells 120-149: 0/0, 4/34, 1/2, 22/1, 15/0, 15/0, 20/7, 17/5, 15/3 
(Castelsaraceno), 20/0, 5/0, 16/0 (Carbone), 10/0, 19/1 (Calvera), 11/0, 15/0,
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Figure A.1 Basilicata: outline of landslide-inventory  maps
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Gridcell numbers
9 5 2 -9 5 3  
940 -9 5 1  
9 2 7 -9 3 9  
9 1 3 -9 2 6  
8 9 9 -9 1 2  
8 8 7 -8 9 8  
8 6 7 -8 8 6  
8 4 4 -8 6 6  
8 1 8 -8 4 3  
7 9 1 -8 1 7  
7 6 4 -7 9 0  
7 3 3 -7 6 3  
6 9 6 -7 3 2  
6 5 7 -6 9 5  
6 2 0 -6 5 6  
5 8 2 -6 1 9  
545 -5 8 1  
5 1 0 -5 4 4  
4 7 4 -5 0 9  
4 3 8 -4 7 3  
4 0 2 -4 3 7  
366 -4 0 1  
3 3 1 -3 6 5  
2 9 7 -3 3 0  
2 6 5 -2 9 6  
2 3 6 -2 6 4  
2 0 8 -2 3 5  
1 7 9 -2 0 7  
1 5 0 -1 7 8  
1 2 0 -1 4 9  
0 9 8 -1 1 9  
0 7 6 -0 9 7  
0 5 4 -0 7 5  
0 3 2 -0 5 3  
019 -0 3 1  
0 0 7 -0 1 8  
0 0 1 -0 0 6
g = Grassano H I coastal pixel
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13/1, 22/1 (Senise). 48/0, 70/0, 59/0, 32/1, 38/0 (Valsinni), 3/0, 9/4, 8/0
(Nova Siri), 24/0, 4/0, 1/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 150-178: 0/3, 2/16, 4/2, 4/1, 3/5, 3/0, 0/0, 3/1, 2/2, 28/2, 6/1 (San
Chirico Raparo), 5/0, 34/0, 50/3 (Castronuovo di Sant’Andrea), 65/0, 84/0, 98/0, 
94/0, 23/0, 28/2, 10/0 (Colobraro), 9/5, 7/5, 13/10 (Rotondella), 10/0, 4/0, 
2/0, 0/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 197-207: 5/19, 9/1, 0/0, 6/0, 3/0, 1/0, 6/0, 12/2, 26/6, 15/0, 35/0,
40/0, 34/0, 25/1 (Roccanova), 40/0, 87/0, 90/0, 12/0, 8/0, 14/2, 18/0, 9/1, 
3/0, 8/0, 2/0, 2/0, 1/0, 0/0 (Policoro), 0/0.
Gridcells 208-235: 4/0, 3/0, 0/0 (Moliterno, Sarconi), 2/0, 0/0, 8/1, 9/0, 11/0 
(San Martino d’Agri), 17/0, 12/0, 16/0, 5/0, 17/0, 18/0, 50/0 (Sant’Arcangelo),
85/0, 20/2, 8/0, 25/0, 34/2, 7/1 (Tursi), 30/0, 17/0, 4/0, 0/0, 1/0, 0/0
(Scanzano Jonico), 0/0.
Gridcells 236-264: 0/0, 0/0, 3/0 (Grumento Nova), 3/0, 0/0, 19/0 (Montemurro,
Spinoso), 6/0, 14/0, 17/0, 16/0, 37/7 (Galicchio), 34/0 (Missanello), 33/0,
50/0, 83/0, 20/0, 27/0, 21/0, 22/1, 13/2, 3/0, 8/0, 19/1 (Montalbano Jonico), 
10/0, 2/0, 3/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 265-296: 1/1, 0/0 (Tramutola), 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/1, 3/13, 6/0, 2/0,
14/1 (Armento), 8/0, 19/1, 17/0, 14/3, 18/1 (Aliano), 81/0, 97/0, 73/0, 40/3,
43/2, 32/0, 20/0, 24/0, 11/0, 13/0, 8/0, 6/0, 1/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 297-330:0/0, 2/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 2/3, 3/16 (Viggiano), 1/21, 2/0,
8/4, 7/3, 19/0 (Guardia Perticara), 20/0, 37/0, 10/2, 29/0, 19/0, 2/0, 18/0, 
23/0, 24/0, 19/0, 39/2, 54/0, 32/0, 11/0, 18/0, 20/0, 15/0, 17/0, 0/0, 0/0,
1/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 331-365: 1/0 (Paterno), 0/0, 2/1, 0/7 (Marsico Novo), 9/10, 2/32,
1/32, 3/25, 2/1, 11/0, 6/1 (Corleto Perticara), 20/0, 34/0, 5/1 (Gorgoglione), 
9/2 (Cirigliano), 33/1, 22/2, 13/0, 10/0, 20/0, 15/0, 4/1, 13/2 (Craco), 35/0, 
18/0, 48/0 (Pisticci), 18/0, 32/0, 17/0, 18/0, 0/0, 3/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 366-401: 8/16, 1/1, 0/0, 1/3 (Marsicovetere), 0/0, 0/0, 10/33, 4/50,
0/44, 9/25, 11/2, 9/0, 8/2, 13/0, 5/2, 4/6, 16/2, 17/5 (Stigliano), 18/2, 8/6,
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27/0, 27/1, 36/0, 29/0, 48/0, 56/0, 44/0, 9/0, 10/0, 38/0, 41/0, 24/0 
(Bernalda), 0/0, 3/0, 0/0, 2/0.
Gridcells 402-437: 7/0, 15/0, 4/0, 3/33, 3/21, 1/1, 6/2, 8/20, 6/37, 1/67, 
8/62, 28/0 (Laurenzana), 21/0, 7/5, 13/2, 4/1, 15/7, 16/7, 10/3, 13/1,
17/12, 22/3, 26/1, 26/0, 56/0, 40/0, 69/0, 24/0, 55/0, 54/0, 61/0, 45/0, 
17/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 438-473: 2/0, 0/0, 0/5 (Brienza), 2/1, 2/10 (Sasso di Castalda), 9/5,
0/0, 2/11, 11/30, 3/12 (Calvello), 8/0, 9/11, 1/3, 24/0, 10/0, 16/1, 2/7,
14/2, 42/2 (Accettura), 17/2, 23/17, 13/2 (San Mauro Forte), 10/24, 34/0,
65/3, 53/0, 56/0, 46/2 (Ferrandina), 28/0, 33/0, 49/0, 67/0, 38/0, 42/0,
33/0, 3/0.
Gridcells 474-509: 19/3, 17/0, 4/11, 3/2, 7/0, 9/0, 5/0, 25/0, 5/0 (Abriola),
4/4, 16/2, 15/1 (Anzi), 9/2, 3/8, 3/0, 4/2 (Castelmezzano, Pietrapertosa), 13/3,
5/0, 3/4, 3/2 (Oliveto Lucano), 0/10, 1/3, 2/7, 49/0 (Salandra), 40/0, 23/2,
19/7, 15/18, 29/0, 29/3, 26/4 (Pomarico), 33/0, 0/0, 2/0, 0/0, 3/0.
Gridcells 510-544: 26/3 (Sant’Angelo le Fratte), 10/1, 2/8, 3/1 (Satriano di
Lucania), 0/0, 0/5, 2/0, 0/1, 1/0, 2/0, 0/0, 8/1, 56/0, 17/5, 10/0, 5/0, 11/1 
(Campomaggiore), 0/7, 0/1, 1/8, 6/9 (Garaguso), 4/8, 10/0, 17/5, 0/4, 11/8, 
16/2, 38/0, 16/1, 2/8, 21/3, 9/0, 0/0, 16/0, 20/0 (Montescaglioso).
Gridcells 545-581: 34/1 (Vietri di Potenza), 13/2 (Savoia di Lucania), 19/0, 5/5,
0/3, 0/2 (Tito), 8/0, 4/10 (Pignola), 20/5, 0/6, 3/0, 24/12, 27/2, 12/1
(Trivigno), 4/1, 13/5 (Albano di Lucania), 17/10, 2/3, 2/6, 5/9 (Calciano),
48/18, 12/2, 11/0, 7/2, 31/1, 25/3 (Grottole), 32/7, 20/4, 18/2, 15/1 
(Grottole), 5/0, 2/0, 1/0, 13/0 (Miglionico), 4/0, 2/0.
Gridcells 582-619: 10/3, 1/4, 12/0, 29/0, 3/2, 3/3, 0/14, 31/8, 2/5, 0/6, 5/6, 
13/5, 7/10, 8/16, 21/7 (Brindisi di Montagna), 44/4, 15/4, 8/1, 6/0, 2/0, 9/5
(Tricarico), 12/9, 7/0, 15/1, 13/2 (Grassano), 11/0, 4/0, 12/0, 10/0, 16/0,
12/0, 12/0, 7/0, 2/0, 5/0, 14/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 620-656: 12/0 (Balvano), 18/0, 25/0, 1/6, 17/32 (Picerno), 1/40, 
11/6, 14/5, 0/8, 7/0 (Potenza), 7/2, 17/1, 13/2 (Vaglio Basilicata), 38/0, 14/3,
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19/3, 6/0, 4/5, 7/4, 13/6, 6/1, 3/0, 4/0, 2/2, 2/0, 11/0, 8/0, 11/0, 3/0, 1/0, 
2/0, 0/0, 5/0, 0/0 (Matera), 0/0, 0/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 657-695: 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 3/3, 2/0 (Baragiano), 2/0, 3/0, 4/0, 6/0,
10/2, 8/0, 3/1, 12/4, 21/11, 11/8, 11/30, 19/25, 9/12 (Tolve), 4/33, 4/59 
(San Chirico Nuovo), 9/14, 0/3, 11/0, 0/0, 2/0, 6/0, 10/1, 13/1, 7/3, 0/0, 0/0, 
4/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 696-732: 1/0, 1/0, 6/0, 0/0, 10/0, 15/2, 6/0, 4/0, 21/3 (Ruoti),
25/1 (Avigliano), 13/11, 9/0, 7/3, 9/2, 10/6, 44/6 (Cancellara), 19/15, 10/19,
5/20, 20/19, 9/18, 1/1, 9/0, 0/1, 10/0, 20/0, 1/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/1, 2/1,
1/ 1, 0/0, 0/0, 0/ 0, 0/0.
Gridcells 733-763: 0/0, 2/0, 0/0 (Muro Lucano), 14/0, 31/1 (Bella), 9/0, 22/6,
16/0, 34/2, 25/8, 4/3, 3/0, 2/0, 5/2, 4/2 (Pietragalla), 0/1, 10/17, 7/47
(Oppido Lucano), 22/12, 4/0, 8/0, 10/0, 11/0, 28/0, 4/0, 0/1 (Irsina), 5/1,
3/0, 10/0, 0/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 764-790: 0/0 (Castelgrande), 6/1, 11/2, 13/2, 17/3, 16/3, 5/1, 22/2,
2/12, 8/6, 15/0, 1/0, 1/1, 12/4, 7/2, 1/0, 9/20 (Accerenza), 5/47, 21/5, 2/0, 
3/0, 3/0, 7/0, 4/0, 0/0, 0/0, 6/0.
Gridcells 791-817: 11/6, 1/11, 21/1, 37/1, 13/0, 22/0 (San Fele), 18/0, 6/3,
13/2, 3/4, 2/0 (Filiano), 3/1, 5/6, 0/0, 0/1, 1/0, 11/3, 27/7, 20/4, 9/12,
4/12, 2/0, 1/0, 0/0, 8/3, 1/2, 0/1.
Pixel 818-843: 5/0 (Pescopagano), 10/0, 11/6, 16/0, 11/0 (Rapone), 21/0 (Ruvo
del Monte), 11/2, 0/0, 8/1, 0/0, 1/0, 5/5, 1/0, 5/1, 1/0, 5/5, 7/3 (Forenza),
5/1, 15/0, 9/0, 1/5, 0/1 (Banzi), 0/5 (Genzano di Lucania), 36/0, 22/0, 4/0,
1/0, 0/4.
Gridcells 844-866: 3/1, 12/0, 0/1, 0/0, 1/0, 0/0 (Atella), 3/0, 8/2, 0/1, 0/0,
4/4, 17/2, 0/0, 6/0, 8/0, 0/0, 0/0, 4/0, 15/2, 15/0, 0/3, 0/0, 0/4.
Gridcells 867-885: 8/0, 11/0, 3/0, 0/0, 7/0 (Rionero in Vulture), 1/0 
(Ripacandida), 0/1, 6/2 (Ginestra), 3/0 (Maschito), 8/0, 1/0, 0/0, 1/0, 0/0 
(Palazzo San Gervasio), 0/0, 1/0, 0/0, 2/4, 0/0.
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Gridcells 886-898: 5/0, 2/0, 0/0, 2/0 (Barile), 9/3, 22/1, 3/0, 0/1 (Venosa),
0/0, 14/0, 10/0, 3/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 899-912: 12/1, 0/0, 1/0 (Melfi), 5/1 (Rapolla), 4/1, 2/0, 9/0, 0/0,
5/0, 11/0, 13/0, 0/0, 1/0, 0/0.
Gridcells 913-926: 7/12, 6/4, 12/6, 23/1, 1/7, 1/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0,
4/0, 2/0 (Montemilone), 1/1.
Gridcells 927-939: 43/0, 9/0, 6/0, 2/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0 (Lavello), 0/0, 0/0, 0/0,
0/0, 2/0 , 2/ 1.
Gridcells 940-951: 8/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 2/0. 
Gridcells 952-953: 0/0, 0/0.
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Appendix B: The regional landslide data 
B.1 The historical data
This appendix gives the data for the regional historical comparison of landslides made 
in chapter three. Although there are problems with their selectivity and (often) their 
reliability, historical sources can be very important for research into environmental 
change, as Hooke and Kain (1982), Hansen (1984b), and Fanthou and Kayser (1990) 
noted. They may be the only sources of information, they allow the absolute dating of 
events, and they can allow comparisons of change to be made.
Published sources dealing with the historical development of landslides in Basilicata 
are limited, though information on the area can be gleaned from a number of 
statistical, written, and graphical sources dealt with in this dissertation. The most 
helpful archives were the state archives of Matera, Potenza, and Naples. The Archivio 
del Municipio (municipal archives) of Grassano provided a very large amount of 
information from 1938 onwards (earlier documents had mostly been damaged or 
destroyed). A number of offices gave relevant up-to-date information: the Ufficio 
Tecnico del Municipio at Grassano, the Ufficio Erediale of Matera, and the Ufficio 
Tecnico of ANAS (Potenza). A number of other sources provided supplementary 
information: the Archivio della Chiesa Madre di Grassano, the Archivio del Prefettorato 
di Matera, the Archivio Vescovile di Tricarico, and the Biblioteca Comunale di 
Grassano.
B.2 Chi-square tests
The following is a chi-square analysis of the historical data given in table 3.3 of the 
text.
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B.2.1 Contingency comparison of 1906 to 1910
Summary statistics: degrees of freedom = 2, total chi-square = 13.237, probability of 
null hypothesis = 0.0013
Observed frequency table:
1906 code 1 2 Totals
1910 code 
1 2 9 1 7 46
2 8 1 4 2 2
3 1 1 3 2 4 3
Totals 4 8 6 3 1 1 1
Expected frequency table:
1906 code 1 2 Totals
1910 code
1 19 .89 26.11 4 6
2 9.51 1 2 .4 9 2 2
3 18 .59 24.41 4 3
Totals 48 6 3 1 1 1
B.2.2 Contingency comparison of 1906 to 1986
Summary statistics: degrees of freedom = 4, total chi-square = 10.746, probability of 
null hypothesis = 0.0296
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Observed frequency table:
1906 code 1 2 Totals
1986 code 
1 1 3 7 2 0
2 1 0 6 1 6
3 1 7 2 4 41
4 8 2 4 3 2
5 1 2 3
Totals 4 9 6 3 1 1 2
Expected frequency table:
1906 code 1 2 Totals
1986 code
1 8 .75 1 1 .2 5 2 0
2 7 9 1 6
3 1 7 .9 4 2 3 .0 6 41
4 1 4 1 8 3 2
5 1.31 1 .69 3
Totals 4 9 6 3 1 1 2
B.2.3 Contingency comparison of 1910 to 1986
Summary statistics: degrees of freedom = 8, total chi-square = 16.199, probability of 
null hypothesis = 0.0396
Observed frequency table:
1910 code 
1986 code
1 2 3 Totals
1 1 5 6 3 2 4
2 1 0 1 6 1 7
3 21 9 1 8 4 8
4 1 0 7 2 0 3 7
5 0 1 2 3
Totals 6 6 2 4 4 9 1 2 9
Expected frequency table:
1910 code 1 2 3 Totals
1986 code
1 1 0 .4 2 4 .47 9 .1 2 2 4
2 7 .3 8 3 .16 6 .46 1 7
3 2 0 .8 4  8 .93 18 .23 4 8
4 16 .06  6 .8 8 1 4 .0 5 3 7
5 1.3 0 .56 1 .14 3
Totals 5 6 24 4 9 1 29
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Appendix C: Spending on landslides
C.1 Introduction
The historical data on extraordinary-spending projects designed to consolidate against 
the urban landslides of Grassano is discussed in chapter seven. Spending on landslides 
is difficult to determine, and the figures given can only be considered an approximate 
guide to what has been done, for several reasons:
First, only extraordinary expenditure is considered, and much of that is hidden. The 
cost, for instance of the emergency work at the Rapanaro family’s property (section 
7.3.2) was probably never even costed. Likewise the regular clearing up of minor 
landslide debris in and around the town by council employees.
Second, details of many of the operations carried out - many sketchy in the first place 
- seem to have been lost. Frequent reference has been made in the dissertation to gaps 
in the found documents.
Third, a variety of works of various kinds have been carried out, but pinning down how 
much was actually done in Grassano, or even the extent to which work was done to 
prevent landslides, is often not possible. This is a particular problem for many of the 
large-scale land-reclamation programmes which have affected the municipality.
Fourth, Italy has experienced considerable price inflation since the beginning of the 
twentieth century. To give some comparability between the cost of the landslide works 
costs were converted to 1988 values (to three significant figures) using the retail 
price index shown in figure C.1 (calculated from Mitchell, 1981; and OECD, 1990). 
1988 values are given to three significant figures in italics in square brackets. The 
few projects from before 1861 were assumed to be at 1861 prices (prices were 
generally stable in the mid-nineteenth century) but with the 1988 equivalents given 
to two significant figures only.
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Figure C.1 Italy: price inflation
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C.2 Urban landslides
1843: a total of D78.41 [approximately L2,200,000] was paid by Grassano for 
repair work on the Scalone road. The main work was: excavation, building a retaining 
wall, steps (ASP, Intendenza di Basilicata, 1006, 620, “Progetto, a stato definitivo, 
ad astimaterea de lavori occorente per la riparazione della pubblica strada distinta [?] 
nell’abitato di Grassano denominata Scalone”).
1 850: D25.2 1/2 [approximately 1690,000] was proposed to be spent by Grassano 
on two retaining walls on Via Pontone (ASP, Intendenza di Basilicata, 1006, 619, 
“Perizia per la strada denominata Pontone del comune di Grassano”).
1 853: D70.00 [approximately L1,900,000\ was proposed to be spent by Grassano for 
strengthening the retaining wall of Via Puntone (ibid, “Perizia suppletoria della 
strada Pontone”).
1866: a total of D3,045.73 [L88 ,900 ,000 ] was spent by Grassano on reinforcements 
along Via Puntone mainly on retaining walls and embankments (ASP, Intendenza di 
Basilicata, 1006, 620, “Perizia per la continuazione dei lavori a [illegible] alia 
strada Pontone per portare al completamento”).
1883:  A total of L733.25 [L3 ,0 1 0 ,000 \ was paid by Grassano for repairs to Via 
Carmine and Via Capolegrotte (including two retaining walls) (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 
836, folder: Affari comunali Grassano, “Lavori di sistemazione della Strada interna 
della via CapoleGrotte [sic] ed ora Carmine”).
1902:  L462.90 [L1, 9 0 0 ,000\ spent on the demolition of a rock mass in the Cinti area 
(ASP, Prefettura di Potenza, 213, 11, letter from the Genio Civile to the Prefetto, 
dated 19.6.1907). Grassano received a government grant of L107.95 [L443,000] 
towards the cost.
1911 to 1922: A total of L15,030.69 [approximately L27,700,000 assuming the 
money to have been spent at 1917 costs] spent on repair projects. Works included a 
retaining wall at Via Piazza [Corso Umberto Primo], guttering for Strada sotto la 
Chiesa [Via sotto la Chiesa] and Via Cinti, a retaining wall for Vico Primo Capolegrotte
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(ASM, Genio Civile, I, 620, folder: Opere di consolidamento delle frane minacciente gli 
abitanti (Legge 31 marzo 1904 N° 140) “Perizia dei lavori complementari di 
consolidamento I’abitato di Grassano”, “Relazione").
1 924: L19,785.92 [L16,300 ,000]  was paid for the reconstruction of a retaining 
wall near the Chiesa Madre. In 1925.  a further L6.000 [L4,400 ,000 ]  was spent on 
repairs there (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 395, folder: Opere di consolidamento delle frane 
minnaciente gli abitanti: Lavoro di consolidamento dell’abitato di Grassano: 
Ricostruzione del muro di sostegno del piazzale del Chiesa Madre) .
1932 to 1933: L120,000 [L11 9 ,000 ,000]  spent on repairs following the storms of 
1930 and 1931. Main works were: the demolition of an overhanging rock face under 
Vico Terzo Chiesa (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 347).
1 934: L13,707.63 [L 14 ,300 ,000]  was authorized to be spent on further repairs 
( ibid).
1934: L29,565.30 [L30 ,900,000]  was paid by the Genio Civile for repairs to the 
damage caused by the 1934 storms. The main works were: around the cemetery and the 
springs, and Via Tilea (ibid, file: lavori di riparazione danni prodotti dalle alluvioni 
del 1934 delle opere di consolidamento di Grassano) .
1934:  L40.000 [L41,700 ,00 0 ]  authorized for consolidation in Grassano. The main 
works were: channelling the Fosso Santo Domenico and the Fosso Monteoliveto (ASM, 
Genio Civile, I, 471).
1 935: A total of L33.075 [L34,000 ,000]  paid for general works of consolidation 
around the town. This included the insertion of check dams in the Fosso Fontana (ASM, 
Genio Civile, I, 836, file: Lavori di picolla bonifica ed interventi relativi all’abitato di 
Grassano) .
1 936: L4,947.25 [4 ,720 ,000]  spent by Grassano for the repair of retaining walls on 
municipal roads (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 836, folder: Grassano: affari varii,
Deliberazioni del Podest& 1936, 88).
1937: L3,503.83 [L3 ,050 ,000]  was paid for the extension of a retaining wall (ASM, 
Genio Civile, I, 347, file: Lavori di consolidamento dell'abitato di Grassano nell [sic] 
Fosso Monte Oliveto) .
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1937:  L2,440.98 [L2 ,130 ,000 \  was paid for consolidation works in the Fosso 
Monteoliveto. Damage by the storms of 1932 and 1933 had threatened the town (ibid, 
file: Lavori di riparazione danni alfuvionali negli anni 1932 e 1933. Consolidamento 
dell’abitato di Grassano) .
1937 to 1939: L56.000 [approximately L45,300,000 assuming the money spent at
1938 costsI was spent on the repair of Fosso Monteoliveto (ASM, Genio Civile, I,
4 7 1 ) .
1940:  L50.000 [L33 ,300,000]  was allocated for the construction of retaining walls 
in the Scalone, Puntone, and Calvario areas (the project was not completed) (ASM, 
Genio Civile, I, 482, folder: Perizia dei lavori di pronto soccorso da eseguire in alcune 
zone dell’abitato di Grassano, “Perizia dei lavori di pronto soccorso da eseguire in 
alcune zone dell’abitato di Grassano”; and folder: Rione Calvario Grassano, letter from 
Catarina and Giuseppina Vignola to the Genio Civile, dated 1.8.1942).
1942:  L5.300 [L2,640 ,000]  was spent on repairs to a retaining wall in Via Madonna 
delle Neve (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 395, loose papers).
1942:  L19,759.83 [L9 ,850,000]  was paid for the construction of a retaining wall in 
the Calvario area, and for the demolition near it of a wall and a dwelling following the 
storms of autumn 1940 (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 482, un-named folder, letter from the 
Ministero dei Lavori Pubblici to the Genio Civile, dated 23.6.1942).
1942:  L15,720 [L7,8 30 ,000]  was paid for the reconstruction of the collapsed 
retaining wall at Via Roma (ibid, folder: Lavori di ricostruzione delta parte crollata 
del muro al ramparte di via Roma netI /sic/ abitato di Grassano) .
1947: L3,697,216 [L65 ,400,000]  was paid for a number of consolidation works. 
The main works were: a retaining wall by the Chiesa Purgatorio, drainage works in 
Rione Pontone (Calvario], repairs to the check dams in the Fosso Fontana (ASM, Genio 
Civile, I, 395, folder: Grassano: consolidamento rione Purgatorio ecc. “Perizia dei 
lavori di consolidamento del Rione Purgatorio della via S. Lucia, del largo Puntone e del 
Fosso Fontana dello abitato di Grassano”).
1948:  L1,566,360 [L26 ,200,000]  was authorized to be paid for the consolidation of 
the Fosso Fontana. The work was to be completed by 13 August 1950. (ASM, Genio
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Civile, I, 799, folder: Consolidamento Fosso Fontana. Contabilife, “Relazione su conto 
f ina le”.)
1950:  L3,357,760 [L56 ,000 ,000 ]  was spent on three new check dams in the Fosso 
Fontana and drainage works for Rione Calvario (ibid, folder: Lavori di consolidamento 
del Rione Calvario, e Fosso Fontana, “Relazione”; and ibid, “Decretto di Svincolo di 
Canzione").
1950 to 1951: L3,416,880 [approximately L52,300,000 assuming the money spent 
at 1951 costs] was paid for the repair of a retaining wall in Rione Calvario, drainage 
works in Rione San Sofia and Rione Calvario, a new retaining wall (extending the 
existing one) in Via Roma (ibid, folder: Perizia dei lavori di consolidamento del Rione 
Pontone, S. Sofia e Calvario in abitato di Grassano. Liquidazione finale, “Stato finale dei 
lavori eseguiti a tutto il 28-12 1951”).
1 951: a total of L7,968,960 [L122,000 ,000]  was paid for a number of works 
including the repair of the perimeter of the Chiesa Purgatorio and the construction of a 
retaining wall in Rione Meridionale (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 14, folder: Progetto dei 
lavori di consolidamento dei Rioni Meridionale S. Innocenzo, Piazza e Purgatorio dello 
abitato di Grassano).
1 951: L5.000.000 [Z. 76,000 ,000]  was allocated for the consolidation of the built- 
up area south of the Via Meridionale (ibid, folder: Lavori di consolidamento del nuove 
rione fra la via meridionale e la strada apullo lucana in GRASSANO) .
1 952: L4,366,690 [L64 ,000 ,000]  was spent on the consolidation of the newly 
built-up area south of the Via Meridionale (ibid, folder: Perizia di lavori di 
consolidamento del Rione Meridionale in abitato di Grassano, “Relazione”; and ibid, 
affidavit of execution of work, dated 28.11.1952).
1 953: a total of L4,000,000 [L57 ,6 00 ,0 00 ]  was authorized for expenditure in the 
Rione Italia, Rione San Rocco, and Rione Monteoliveto which included the repair and 
improvement of old retaining walls (ibid, file: Perizia dei lavori di consolidamento del 
Rione Italia - S. Rocco e Monteoliveto dell’abitato di Grassano).
1 954: a total of L3,800,000 [L53,000,000[  was allocated for works including a 
retaining wall near the town hall (ibid, folder: Perizia dei lavori di consolidamento
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del Rione Processionale, Capo Le Grotte, S. Domenico e Piazza dell’abitato di Grassano, 
“Relazione”).
1 9 5  5: L400.000 [L5 ,45 0 ,00 0 ]  was authorized to be spent on consolidation of the 
banks of the Fosso Fontana. One half was to be paid by the municipality, one half by the 
Ministero dell’Agricoltura e delle Foreste. A total of 500 working days were allocated, 
with twenty-four workers each paid L800 a day (AMG, 1954, X, folder: Sistemazione 
Fosso della Fontana, “Ministero dell’Agricoltura e delle Foreste, Decreto Ispetorale di 
autorizzazione e concessione del contributo, N 1/98B”; and the anonymous list of 
workers.)
1958:  1.7,000,000 [L8 5 , 4 0 0 , 000] was allocated for the consolidation of Rione 
Calvario (ASM, Prefettura di Matera, III, 110, 1808, contract dated 26.11.1958).
1959:  L447,654.99 [L5,460 ,000]  was paid for drainage works in the Rione Calvario 
and other areas (ASM, Proweditorato regionale alle Opere Pubbliche, I, 207, folder: 
COMUNE DI GRASSANO: PERIZIA dei lavori di somma urgenza occorenti per tutela della 
pubblica incolumitct ed a salvagardia dell’ingiene pubblica nell’abitato, decree by the 
Provveditore, numero di protocollo IV/11487).
1 969: L2,212,000 [L18 ,800 ,000]  was allocated for the demolition of houses in 
Rione Calvario (AMG, Deliberazioni della Giunta Municipale, 1969, 256).
1973:  L.2,527,980 [L1 6 ,800 ,000 \  was allocated for cantiere 26751 /R, the 
consolidation of the Fosso Fontana and Fosso Maruggio Secondo. This followed cantiere 
26563/R in the same place. Fifteen workers were paid for 51 days’ work, which 
included reforestation, resurfacing of tracks, and the repair of walls. (AMG, file: 
CANTIERE N° 26751/R SISTEMAZIONE FOSSI FONTANA, “Relazione tecnica 
illustrativa”, and “Preventivo di spesa”).
1974:  L21,000,000 [L117,000 ,000]  was allocated for repair works to the 
cemetery, including the demolition of dangerous walls, drainage works, the 
construction of new walls, the repair of steps and paths (UTMG, file: Nuovo Cimitero, 
“Perizia dei lavori di sistemazione della ricinzione, muri di sostegno, casa del custode, 
viali e gradinate interne nel civico cimitero", “Perizia").
1974:  L3,476,400 [L19 ,30 0 ,00 0 ]  was allocated for cantiere 26563/R, for the 
consolidation of the Fosso Fontana and the Fosso Marruggio Secondo. Fifteen workers
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were paid for 51 days (AMG, file: CANTIERE DI RIMBOSCHIMENTO N° 26563 FOSSI 
DELLA FONTANA, “Relazione finale”).
1975:  L3,772,000 [L17 ,800,000]  was spent on cantiere 27199/R the consolidation 
of the Fosso Fontana and the Fosso Marruggio Secondo. Fifteen workers were employed 
for 51 days (AMG, file: CANTIERE RIMBOSCHIMENTO N° 27199, letters from the 
Ministero del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale to the Comune di Grassano, dated 
25.8.1975 and 15.12.1975).
1 9 7  8: L1,050,000 [L3,250,000]  was paid for the repair of the cemetery (AMG, 
Deliberazioni della Giunta Municipale, 1978, 366).
In 1979.  after the devolution of the workfare programmes, the region became 
responsible for their administration. L300,000,000 [L808,000,000]  was allocated 
for reforestation and consolidation work in Grassano and Grottole. At Grassano, nine 
check dams were built in the Fosso Fontana in order to slow erosion in the channel. The 
cost of the work in Grassano was probably at least L200.000.000 [L540,000,000]  
(UTMG file: Progetto speciale aree interne - programma 1979 - lavori di 
sistemazione idraulico-forestale interesanti i comuni di Grassano e Grottole in 
Provincia di Matera, “Relazione”).
1 981: L800,000,000 [L1,5 1 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ]  was allocated for the construction of a 
check dam, drainage works, a retaining basin, the repair of gulley walls and the 
canalization of drainage water in the Fosso Spinetto (UTMG, PERIZIA dei lavori di 
consolidamento dell’abitato di Grassano, mediante imbrigliamento e sistemazione del 
fosso “Spineto” (1° tratto a valle), “Relazione”).
1982: L845,000,000 [L 1 ,3 60 ,00 0 ,000 ]  was allocated for the following work: In 
the Fosso Fontana - construction of three check dams, drainage works, repair of gulley 
sides. Fosso Marruggio Secondo - construction of a check dam, a retaining basin, 
drainage works. (UTMG, PERIZIA dei lavori di consolidamento delTabitato di Grassano, 
mediante Timbrigliamento e la sistemazione di un tratto del fosso “Fontana” e del fosso 
“Marruggio I I ”, “Perizia”.) This project was extended in 1984, absorbing the 
unspent surplus (UTMG, folder: Lavori di consolidamento dell’abitato di Grassano, 
mediante imbrigliamento e sistemazione di un tratto del fosso Fontana e del fosso 
Marruggio II, “Relazione”).
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1 983: 1.26,000.000 [L36 ,700,000]  was allocated for the construction of a retaining 
wall at Pozzo delle Vigne near the SS7 (AMG, Deliberazioni del Consiglio Comunale,
1983, 82).
1984:  L42.833.332 [L54 ,500 ,000]  was paid for the repair of Via Tilea (AMG, 
Deliberazioni del Commisario Straordinario con i Poteri del Consiglio Comunale,
1984, 103).
1 98  5: L980,000,000 [L 1 ,1 40 ,000 ,000 ]  was authorized to increase the capacity of 
the canalized channel in the Fosso Marruggio Secondo, down to its confluence with the 
Fosso Fontana (UTMG, Lavori di consolidamento deli’abitato di Grassano, mediante 
imbrigliamento e sistemazione di un tratto del fosso Fontana e del fosso Marruggio II, 
“Perizia di variante e suppletiva").
1986:  L510,000,000 [L561,00 0 ,00 0 ]  was allocated by the regione Basilicata for 
consolidation of the Fosso Fontana. The work involved the construction of a check dam, 
calming of flow in the gulley, drainage canalization, and drainage works along the 
channel. (UTMG, file: Perizia dei lavori di consolidamento dell’abitato di Grassano 
mediante la sistemazione in tratto del Fosso Fontana, “Relazione".)
1 987: ANAS allocated L471,000,000 IL 4 9 5 , 000 ,000]  for the consolidation of 300 
m of the SS7 (from Kilometre 525.500 to Kilometre 525.800) (UTANAS, file: Strada 
Statale: nr. 7 “Via Appia* Tronco: S.S. Nr. 277 - Grassano. Lavori: Urgenti di 
consolidamento, sostegno e protezione del corpo stradale in frana tra i Km. 520+000 e 
536+000. (Cap. 505.) Perizia: di Variante Tecnica e Suppletiva senza aumento di 
spesa, “Relazione".) This area had been subject to landslides for at least thirty years, 
but the amount spent on repairs over that period is unknown (conversation with a 
senior ANAS official). The work included the construction of a retaining wall and the 
use of anchoring piles.
In the period 1988 to 1991 three major projects were begun, at a total cost of 
approximately L8,300,000,000 (interviews with Giuseppe Vignola, 22.5.91; and 
Michele Lacertosa, 24.5.91).
• In 1989 a L5,500,000,000-project was begun by the Basilicata region for 
consolidation under the provisions following the Senise disaster of 1986 (see Regione 
Basilicata, 1987). This work involved consolidation on the south slope of the Fosso 
Spinetto, the Fosso dei Lupi, and on the north slope of the Fosso Tilea.
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• In 1989 the Corpo Forestale began a project to reforest and consolidate the 
Fosso Fontana and the cemetery, at a cost of approximately L1,000,000,000.
• In 1990 ANAS began a L1,784,490,000-project to consolidate the site of the 
Petrino landslide on the SS7.
C.3 Land-reclam ation projects
The evidence on the extraordinary-spending on urban landslides does not, and cannot, 
show the full impact of landslides on Grassano. Ironically, given the refusal to 
acknowledge landslides as “usual”, there has been widespread ordinary spending on 
preventing them.
In an interview with Engineer Rocco Dichio (24 May 1988) covered some of the 
reasons why. Dichio had been at Grassano since 1 January 1984, and in addition to his 
first-hand knowledge of projects since that date, had second-hand awareness of 
preceding years. Since 1980, he estimated, there had been about 15 retaining walls 
built in the town; at a total cost of about L1.5 billion. In 1988 they were built no more 
frequently than before the earthquake of 1980. Similarly with road guttering, which 
is standard for all new projects, such as the resurfacing of Via Capitano Pirone.
Since 1980 there had been perhaps six or seven ordinances of evacuation issued which 
had been unconnected with the earthquake/paleoslide: of which only one (the villa on 
the SS7 in the Petrino district) was the result of landslides.
In addition to the costs incurred in the response to urban landslides, there have been 
wider-based reclamation programmes undertaken often, as the examples quoted in this 
appendix show, including quite explicitly the reduction in intensity of landsliding 
outside the town.
Bv August 1932: A total of L50.000 [1.46,600,000]  had been spent (about L40.000 
[L 3 7 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ]  from the Ministero dell’Agricoltura e Foreste, and about L10,000 
[ L 9 , 320 ,000 ]  from the Prefectorate) on anti-malarial works in Grassano, Tricarico, 
Stigliano, and Venusio (ASM, Genio Civile, I, 557, letter from the Proweditorato alle 
Opere Pubbliche to the Genio Civile, dated 6.8.1932).
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1952 to 1966: six projects were undertaken, with a total of L74,862,446 spent in 
the municipality [between L678,000,000 (spent at 1966 prices) and 
L1,130,000,000 (spent at 1952 prices) - an average of L113,000,000 to 
L188,000,000 each). Sixty-five check dams were built, twenty-one kilometres of 
watercourses were repaired, and twenty hectares of land was reforested in addition to 
upgrading the woodlands elsewhere (CBMVB, 1988 iavori di Forestaz [sic] Tricarico, 
“Lavori in Amministrazione Diretta”).
After 1966, other sources of finance were turned to, notably the Basilicata region’s 
Piano Forestaie, and an average of about L50,000,000 was spent each year until 1976 
(the figure then dropped) [between a maximum of L543,000,000 (spent at 1966 
prices) and minimum of L203,000,000 (spent at 1976 prices)]. The Consorzio has 
reforested about 200 ha in Grassano since the 1950s; though only maintenance is now 
carried out, on which ten workers were employed in 1988. (Interview with Geometro 
Benevento of the Consorzio di Bonifica della Media Valle del Basento, 14.7.1988.)
At least ten cantieri di rimboschimento have been instituted in Grassano. In 1 9 5 4  
L7,962,816 [L111 ,000 ,000]  was allocated for cantiere 7072R in Cugno di Noce. The 
project lasted 102 days and employed 100 workers, 3 supervisors, and 1 senior 
supervisor (AMG, file: CANTIERE DI RIMBOSCHIMENTO N. 7072/R).
1954: L7,943,221 [L 1 1 1 ,000,000]  was allocated for cantiere 8496R at Cugno di 
Noce (Fosso Caracoia), for the construction of check dams and the reforestation of 8.5 
ha. The same number of people were employed as for the previous project (AMG, file: 
CANTIERE DI RIMBOSCHIMENTO NR 8496R, “Relazione tecnica illustrativa”).
1 958: L3,710,500 was allocated for cantiere 14398R, and reforestation in Cugno di 
Noce and Golfi. The project included the construction of four check dams and 
reforestation of 26 ha. it employed fifty workers, two supervisors, and one senior 
supervisor, for seventy-six days (AMG, file: CANTIERE DI RIMBOSCHIMENTO N. 
14398 /R ,  “Cugno di Noce e Golfi”, “Relazione tecnica illustrativa"; and “Preventivo 
di spesa”.)
1958 to 1959: the Ente per lo Sviluppo dell’lrrigazione e la Trasformazione Fondaria 
in Puglia e Lucania authorized the investment of L111,090,000 [approximately 
L1,350,000,000 assuming 1959 prices] on the repair of the Basento river in 
Calciano and Grassano. (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 224, 872.)
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1 959: L3,959,100 [L 48 ,3 00 ,000] was allocated for cantiere 15212R, reforestation 
of Cugno di Noce (indicated as a prolongation of cantiere 9535/R, details of which it 
was not possible to find). Fifty workers were employed for 76 days. (AMG, file: 
CANTIERE Di RIMBOSCHIMENTO N. 15212/R.)
1 961: L76,200,000 [L8 78 ,000 ,000 ]  was authorized to be spent on a four-year 
project in Grassano, Grottole, and Miglionico. The project involved the construction of 
76 check dams, the reforestation of 40 ha, the construction of 6 km of access roads, 
the construction of three cabins for storage and overnight stops. (The exact extent of 
work in Grassano is not known.) (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 115, 521, “Relazione".)
1 961: The Consorzio di Bonifica della Valle Bradano allocated L97.800.000 
[L 1 ,1 3 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ]  (from Cassa per il Mezzogiorno funds) for land reclamation 
projects in Grottole, Grassano, Tricarico, and Matera. L65,428,082 
( L 7 5 4 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ] of the total was allocated for check dams, L14,860,583 
[ L 1 7 1 ,000 ,000 ]  for reforestation, the rest for extra works, other expenses, and 
general expenses. (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 223, 767, “Relazione”.)
1 961: a total of L160,000,000 [L1 ,8 40 ,0 00 ,0 00 ]  was allocated for the protection 
of the SS7 between Grassano and Matera. The 3,011 m inside Grassano had gutters 
built or replaced, check dams were built, and the road was resurfaced. Ninety-two 
percent of the finance came from the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, 8% from the local 
proprietors (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 48, 233.)
1 961: L4,038,900 [L46,500,000]  was allocated for cantiere 1 9 3 3 6 /R ,  
reforestation of Cugno di Noce. It was envisaged to be a continuation of cantiere 
9535/R, and to carry out repairs on the sites of 7072/R, 8496R, and 15212R. 
Twelve hectares were forested. Fifty workers were employed for 76 days, with 2 
supervisors, and 1 senior supervisor (AMG, file: CANTIERE RIMBOSCHIMENTO N. 
1 93 3 6 /R ,  “Relazione tecnica illustrativa”, and “Preventivo di spesa”).
In about 1961: L875.500 [L10 ,100,000]  was allocated for cantiere 20508/R, the 
continuation of 19336/R. Ten workers were employed for 76 days. The work involved 
reforestation on the site of 19336R, and the repair of previous works, earth moving, 
and drainage works (AMG, file: CANTIERE DI RIMBOSCHIMENTO n. 20508/R CUGNO di 
Noce, “Relazione tecnica illustrativa per prolongamento cantiere di rimboschimento N. 
19336/R e cure culturali ai rimboschimenti eseguiti con precedenti cantieri”).
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1962:  the Ente di Sviluppo’s second major intervention in Grassano was in 1962. It 
organized the expenditure of L55.180,000 [L606 ,000 ,000 ]  on the repair of the 
Torrente Acquafredda in the municipalities of Tricarico, Grassano, and Calciano. 
Reforestation was carried out from 200 m south of the SS7 down to the Basento river, 
six check dams were built, of which one was shared with Tricarico (ASM, Genio Civile, 
III, 19, 105).
1966:  L6,000,000 [L54 ,300 ,000 \  was allocated (L1,020,600 [L9,240 ,000]  to be 
spent on Grassano) for expenditure on reforestation and erosion control in Ferrandina, 
Grassano, Matera, Miglionico, Montescaglioso, Pisticci, Pomarico, Stigliano, and 
Tricarico, by the Ministero dell’Agricoltura e delle Foreste (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 
4 2 5 ) .
1967: L1,277,670 [L11 ,300 ,000 ]  was allocated for cantiere 23101/R in Cugno di 
Noce. Twenty workers were employed for 51 days (AMG, file: CANTIERE Di 
RIMBOSCHIMENTO N. 23101/R) .
1 9 6 7 /8 :  At the expense of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, the Consorzio di Bonifica di 
Bradano e Metaponto authorized the payment of L200,100,000 [L1,7 6 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ]  in 
Grottole and Grassano. The project involved the construction of 80 new check dams, and 
the maintenance of 45 old ones (56 of the 125 were in Grottole and 69 in Grassano). 
Reforestation (at a specified density of 2,000 saplings per hectare), the clearing of 9 
km of watercourses, and the construction of an access road were ordered (ASM, Genio 
Civile, III, 6, 21, “Relazione”).
1969:  L5,500,000 [L46 ,800 ,000]  was allocated by the Ministero dell’Agricoltura e 
delle Foreste for Ferrandina, Grassano, Matera, Miglionico, Montescaglioso, Pisticci, 
Pomarico, Stigliano, and Tricarico. Work included reforestation and the repair of 
check dams. L1,441,000 [L12 ,300 ,000]  was spent in Grassano (ASM, Genio Civile, 
III, 80, 431, “Relazione”).
1970:  The Ministero dell’Agricoltura e delle Foreste allocated L1,939,450 
[ L 15 ,800 ,000 ]  to Grassano (cantiere di lavoro 20508/R) for the canalization of 
surface water and the construction of check dams. The total project cost L5,600,000 
and included work in Matera (three sites), Grassano, and Pisticci. (ASM, Genio Civile, 
III, 81, 450, “Relazione”; and “Stima dei lavori”).
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1 971: 1.5,300,000 [L41,000 ,000]  was allocated by the same ministry to be spent on 
reforestation and erosion control in Matera, Grassano, and Pisticci (L2,740,589 
allocated for Grassano - for Cantiere di lavoro 20508/R) (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 81, 
440, “Relazione”; and ibid, “Stima dei lavori”).
1973: L3,704,185 [L 2 4 ,6 0 0 ,0 0 0 ] plus an unspecified share of the costs was 
allocated for the Ministero dell’Agricoltura e delle Foreste cantiere di lavoro 
20508/R (from a project of L8,000,000 which included Grassano and Policoro) to 
repair damage done during the spring of that year. The aims included “Rejuvenation... 
consolidation of landslipped land... improvement of landslide-prone land... the opening 
of a service road...” (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 81, 447, “Relazione”, translated.)
1973: L8,000,000 [L 5 3 ,100,000]  was allocated by the Ministero dell’Agricoltura e 
delle Foreste for reforestation and the construction of check dams and drainage works, 
after the torrential rains of that year (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 82, 473, “Relazione”; 
and “Stima dei lavori”).
1973: L299.000.000 [L1,9 8 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ]  was authorized for work in Grottole, 
Grassano, and Tricarico. A total of 13 check dams were built (of which 8 were wholly, 
and two partly in Grassano), and 108.7174 ha in Grassano was to be reforested. In 
addition, minor works were carried out including the signposting of potential fire 
hazards, 12 km of roads, and the repair of watercourses (ASM, Genio Civile, II, 12,
19, “Relazione”).
1973 or 1974: L100,000,000 [L663,000,000 or L556,000,000] was authorized 
to be spent on the construction of about 100 check dams, and the clearing of 
watercourses in the Bilioso valley in Tricarico, Grassano, and Grottole. About 40 of the 
check dams were in Grassano (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 55, 294, “Relazione”).
1974: the Ministero dell’Agricoltura e delle Foreste authorized L6,000,000 
[ L 3 3 ,3 0 0 ,0 0 0 ]  to be spent on cantiere di lavoro 20508/R for the construction of a 
check dam, and consolidation works (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 7, 28).
1975:  L8,000,000 [L37,800,000]  was allocated by the Ministero dell’Agricoltura e 
delle Foreste for work on cantiere di rimboschimento 20508/R “to provide a further 
brake to landslides, which occurs with the passing seasons...” The work included 
reforestation and the construction of check dams (ASM, Genio Civile, III, 82, 468, 
“Relazione"; and “Stima dei Lavori", translated).
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1976: 1.200,000,000 [L 81 2 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 ]  was authorized for reforestation and the 
construction of check dams in Grottole and Grassano. A total of 10 check dams were to 
be constructed (only 1 in Grassano), and 27.9072 ha (of which about 60% was in 
Grassano) were to be reforested after fire damage in 1974 (ASM, Genio Civile, III,
33, 160, “Relazione"; and ‘Stima dei lavori”).
1976: L100,000,000 lL4O6,000 ,000l  was allocated for the increased protection of 
about 175 ha already reforested, and the construction of check dams (ASM, Genio 
Civile, III, 62, 308, “Relazione”).
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Appendix D: Geotechnical data on Grassano
The variety of recent geotechnical studies on the area around Grassano have found the 
following data:
Cotecchia, Del Prete, and Puglisi (unpublished, 1981) found that for the clays, the 
fraction smaller than 0.002 mm was between 36% and 53% (with a mean of 
43.13%). The fraction between 0.002 and 0.06 mm was between 42% and 60% (with 
a mean of 53.19%). The physical characteristics of the clays were found to be as 
follows:
Density = 2.05 g per cm3.
Density of constituent solids = 2.65 g per cm3.
Index of voids = 0.57.
Dry weight of unit of volume = 1.69 g.
Porosity = 36%.
Natural water content = 21.50%.
Liquid limit = 42.8% to 57.4% (with a mean of 48.26%).
Index of plasticity = 20% to 30.8% (with a mean of 24.96%).
Index of cohesion = 0.94 to 1.21 (with a mean of 1.07).
Resistance strength (non-draining) = 0.5 to 5.35 kg per cm2 (with a mean of 
1.92 kg per cm2) .
Undrained resistance = >2 kg per cm2 (with the exception of one test at between 
1.1 and 1.6kg per cm2) .
Critical angle = 19.5° to 26° (with a mean of 21.93°).
i’ = 0 to 0.55 kg per square cm (with a mean of 0.3 kg per cm2) .
Residual critical angle = 11.5° to 20.0° (with a mean of 13.46°).
Cotecchia and Del Prete (unpublished, 1982) found the following in their clay 
samples:
Specific weight = 2.01 to 2.16 kg per cm3 (with a mean of 2.9 kg per cm3) .
Dry density = 1.74 g per cm3.
Mean water content = 20.1%.
Degree of saturation = 92.3% to 100.0%.
Mean liquid limit = 43.3% (with a standard deviation of 5.2%).
Index of plasticity = 18.8%.
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Index of cohesion = 0.81 to 1.16 (with a mean of 0.96): solid-plastic.
Cohesion = 0.53 kg per cm2.
Critical angle = 23°.
Boenzi (unpublished, 1973) described the situation a little differently. He wrote that 
the clays are of inorganic origin and medium plasticity. They have a clay fines content 
of 35% to 50%, and a carbonate content of 25% to 30%, a liquidity limit of about 
48%, an index of plasticity of 25%, and a cohesion of about 4.5 kg per cm2 at rupture.
To the east of the town, at the very edge of the clay deposit, Rapisardi, Vignola, and
Vignola (unpublished, 1977) found the following:
Wv = 21.6%
Density = 2.87 g per cm3, 
dv = 1.96 g per cm3, 
ds = 1.61 g per cm3.
Liquid limit = 54.9%.
Plastic limit = 30.8%. 
la = 1.2.
Ip = 1.1 kg per cm2 .
Residual cohesion = 0.9 kg per cm2 .
Critical angle= 7°.
/
Most particles in the sandstones are between 0.2 and 2 mm. The sandstones have a 
resistance of around 1 kg per cm2 (compression test) with some of the more cohesive 
samples giving higher resistance. Rapisardi, Vignola, and Vignola (unpublished,
1977) described the sandstones to the east of the town as marly.
Wu = 5%.
Density = 2.69 g per cm2 .
Permeability = 7x10 '4: “good permeability”, at the limits of “low 
permeability” (ibid, 7).
Analysis of the detritus mantle has proved difficult. Rapisardi, Vignola, and Vignola 
(ibid) found the area to be “very heterogeneous” (page 7). But without in-situ tests, 
they were unable to provide analysis. Cotecchia and Del Prete (unpublished, 1982)
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gave data - though this should be treated with some circumspection, given the caution 
on heterogeneity.
Specific weight = 2.0 to 2.05 tonnes per m3.
Liquid limit = 35% to 40%.
Index of plasticity = 20%.
Water content = 22.5%.
Assumed cohesion = 0 kg per cm2 .
Assumed critical angle = 15° to 20°.
Where analysis was possible:
Density = 2.0 to 2.1 g per cm3.
Cohesion = 0 kg per cm2 .
Critical angle = 20° to 26°.
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Appendix E: The placenames of Grassano
Place-name analysis was used to give information on past patterns of landuse in 
Grassano. It has been used for the purpose before (Hooke and Kain, 1982) and provides 
an important source of information on past landuse in Basilicata (Racioppi, 1876). 
Placenames have already been used in analyses of slope-instability in Southern Italy: 
Almagi& (1910) noted the prevalence of placenames that were linked to slope- 
instability; and Puglisi (1977) commented on the usefulness of placenames in the 
study of deforestation.
The names of the thirty-four districts identified in the 1819 catasto were used for 
analysis (the uses indicated must predate that document). The districts’ names fall into 
the following categories:
• Information on landuse:
Serra Martella (serra probably refers to a hill, perhaps a wooded hill. It means 
“saw”, or “mountain chain” - Prati, 1951; “mountain chain” or “mountain” - 
Battisti and Alessio, 1950-1957. Martello probably refers to mirtelt i,  myrtle 
trees).
Capolaserra {capo: “top". Serra: as before).
Difesa (difesa: an area belonging to feudal proprietors, the area would usually be 
wooded).
Serra (as before). The summit of the Serra Martella.
Piano di Pepe {piano: “plain”. Pepe: “pepper". Hence an area in which peppers 
were grown).
Cugno di Noci {cugno: “wedge”, hence interfluve - Mennona, 1977. Noci: “nuts”. 
Hence an interfluve with nut trees). Wild nuts are still found there.
Piano di Focaccia {piano: “plain”. Focacda: a type of pizza bread. Hence an area 
in which wheat was grown for flour).
Serrauzzi {serra: as before).
Spineto {spinetto: “small spine”, hence: thorn trees).
Macchia {macchia: degraded woodland).
Calanconi {calanchi: area subject to badland erosion or landslides).
• Information on location:
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Manca (m a n g u s “open to the north” - Mennona, 1977; “lacking”, or “on the 
left”, or “unlucky” - Prati, 1951).
Pianella (pi an el I a: “small plain”).
Le Manche (manche: plural of manca) .
Coste di Rizziano (coste: “slopes”).
Piano di Croce (Piano: “plain". Croce: “cross”).
• Description of a dominant feature in the contrada (a land feature, a chapel, and 
soforth).
Cupolo (cupolo: “dome”, hence “hill").
Santa Lucia (perhaps a chapel).
Acquasalsa (acqua salsa: “salt water”, the name of the spring and the Fosso 
Acquasalsa).
Carmine (named after the Franciscan order’s church Santa Maria del Carmine - 
see Altavilla, 1988).
Sotto la Chiesa (means: “under the church”).
Acquafredda (acqua fredda: “cold water”, the name of the spring and the Fosso 
Acquafredda).
Santa Maria della Neve (named after the church of the same name).
Sangiorgio (perhaps a chapel).
Fiumara (Fiume: “river”).
L’Angelo Lontano (perhaps a chapel).
Fontana (name of the spring).
Strada (Strada: “road”).
Santangelo Lontano (perhaps a chapel).
• Other names of an ambiguous or unknown origin: Mantra; Forchi; Golfi (also spelt 
“Eolf i").
Appendix F: Political power in Grassano
Most of Grassano s political history has been dominated by conservative political 
forces. Until the Fascist period, local politics remained a largely factional, rather than 
ideological contest (Camera dei Deputati, 1954; Levi, 1982; Bolettieri, 1991): since 
the end of the last world war, politics has been generally controlled by the Christian 
Democrats, though they lost their hold on the town for a short period in the 1970s.
A list held in the town hall archive at Grassano gives the names of the council leaders 
since 1852. From discussion with council staff, it was possible to identify the political
F.1 Introduction
affiliations of the post-war mayors.
1 8 5 2 - 3 1 . 1 2 . 1 8 5 4  F
1 .1 . 1 8 5 5 - 3 1 .1 2 .1 8 5 7  l\
1 . 1 . 1 8 5 8 - 3 1 . 12.1864J?] C
1 .1 .1 8 6 5 - 2 6 .5 .1 8 6 6  /
2 7 . 5 . 1 8 6 6 - 1 8 7 2  l\
1 8 7 2 - 3 0 . 9 . 1 8 7 6  [
1 .1 9 .1 8 7 6 - 3 0 .6 .1 8 8 1  F
1 .7 .1 8 8 1 - 1 1 .2 .1 8 8 2  t
1 2 .2 .1 8 8 2 - 3 1 .7 .1 8 8 4  C
1 .8 . 1 8 8 4 - 1 8 9 5  F
1 8 9 5 - 2 1 . 1 2 . 1 8 9 7  C
2 2 .1 2 .1 8 9 7 - 3 1 .1 .1 9 0 4  C
1 .2 .1 9 0 4 - 1 4 .1 .1 9 0 8  i
1 5 .1 .1 9 0 8 - 9 .8 .1 9 1 4  C
1 0 . 8 .1 9 1 4 - 2 7 .2 .1 9 2 0  E
2 8 . 2 .1 9 2 0 - 1 2 .1 1 .1 9 2 0  li
1 3 .1 1 . 1 9 2 0 - 3 1 .1 2 . 1923[sic]  C 
1 .1 .1 9 2 3 -3 0 .1 1 .1 9 2 4 1 ? ]  V
1 .1 2 .1 9 2 4 - 3 1 .3 .1 9 2 7  
1 .4 .1 9 2 7 - 3 1 .1 2 .1 9 2 9  
1 .1 2 .1 9 3 4  [s/c] -1 4 .9 .1  936  
1 7 .9 .1 9 3 6 - 6 .8 .1 9 3 8
1 0 .3 .1 9 3 8 - 2 7 .1 .1 9 3 9
2 8 .1 .1 9 3 9 - 1 5 .1 2 .1 9 4 0  
1 6 .1 2 .1 9 4 0 -3 0 .9 .1 9 4 1  
1 .1 0 .1 9 4 1 - 2 9 .1 .1 9 4 3
3 0 .1 .1 9 4 3 - 2 1 .1 0 .1 9 4 3
2 2 .1 0 .1 9 4 3 - 2 9 .1 2 .1 9 4 3
30.12.1943-30.9.1944
1 .1 0 .1 9 4 4 - 2 9 .5 .1 9 4 5
sco Lerose 
e Viscera 
pe Falcone 
i llvento 
e Viscera 
lico de Felice 
ando Materi 
lico Repullone 
lico de Felice 
ando Materi 
lico Repullone 
lico Tortorelli 
lico Repullone 
lico Tortorelli 
Materi 
nzo Decuzzi 
pe Motta 
zo de Carli, 
and Noitana Gavina 
Enrico Materi 
Enrico Materi 
Carlo Mazarella 
Alfonso Santoro 
Nicola Curzio 
Michele Decuzzi 
Francesco Nardelli 
Vincenzo Maciose 
Nicola Tortorelli 
Giovanni Spagna 
Ettore Vulcano 
Giuseppe Pirrone
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Sindaco)
(Reale Commisarii)
(Sindaco)
(Podest&)
(Podest&)
(Commisario Prefettizio)
(Commisario Prefettizio)
(Podesti)
(PodestcO
(Commisario Prefettizio)
(Commisario Prefettizio)
(Commisario Prefettizio)
(Commisario Prefettizio)
(Commisario Prefettizio)
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3 0 .5 . 1 9 4 5 - 3 1 . 7 . 1 9 4 5
2 .8 .1 9 4 5 - 2 7 .9 .1 9 4 5
2 8 . 9 . 1 9 4 5 - 2 9 . 1 1 . 1 9 4 6  
3 0 . 1 1 .1 9 4 6 - 9 .6 .1 9 5 2  
1 0 .6 .1 9 5 2 - 3 1 .1 .1 9 5 3  
1 .2 . 1 9 5 3 - 3 .4 .1 9 5 5  
4 .4 . 1 9 5 5 - 2 7 . 6 .1 9 5 6  
2 8 . 6 .1 9 5 6 - 3 0 .9 .1 9 5 8  
1 .1 0 .1 9 5 8 - 3 0 .1 1 .1 9 6 0  
1 .1 2 .1 9 6 0 - 1 5 .1 .1 9 6 5  
1 6 . 1 . 1 9 6 5 - 1 .9 .1 9 7 0  
6 .9 .7 0 - 1 4 .8 .1 9 7 5
1 5 . 8 .1 9 7 5 - 1 5 .9 .1 9 7 5
1 6 .9 .1 9 7 5 - 9 .8 .1 9 7 6  
9 .8 .1 9 7 6 - 6 .1 2 .1 9 7 7  
1 4 .2 .1 9 7 8 - 2 .2 .1 9 7 9  
2 .2 .1 9 7 9 - 3 0 .6 .1 9 7 9  
1 .7 .7 9 - 1 8 .1 0 .1 9 8 3  
1 9 . 1 0 . 1 9 8 3 - 1 3 .8 .1 9 8 4  
14.8.1984-1989
1989 to the present, 1993
Girolamo Schiavone 
Vincenzo Maciose 
Incenzo Sigilano 
Innocenzo Bolettieri 
Tomasso Celiberti 
Vincenzo Passarella 
Giuseppe Candela 
Emanuele Lopergolo 
Gaetano Ambrico 
Pietro Calabrese 
Antonio Bonelli 
Tomasso Celiberti 
Luigi Daraio 
Giuseppe Calculli 
Luigi Daraio 
Luigi Daraio 
Giuseppe Calculli 
Nicola Vignola [1943-] 
Achile Lenge 
Salvatore Incampo 
Salvatore Incampo
(Sindaco (DC]) 
(Commisario Prefettizio) 
(Commisario Prefettizio) 
(Sindaco,Lista Civica) 
(Sindaco, DC)
(Sindaco, Lista Civica) 
(Sindaco, DC)
(Sindaco, DC)
(Sindaco, DC)
(Sindaco, DC)
(Sindaco, DC)
(Sindaco, DC)
(Sindaco, PCI) 
(Commisario Prefettizio) 
(Sindaco, PCI)
(Sindaco, PCI) 
(Commisario Prefettizio) 
(Sindaco, DC) 
(Commisario Prefettizio) 
(Sindaco, DC)
(Sindaco, DC)
The election results from 1952 were as follows:
25.12.1952 (Ministero deH’Interno... [etc], 1956)
Electorate - 4895, voters - 4291 (of which
87.7%.
SC DGA Destra
votes 1 2 2 2 2 2 9 6 5 4 9
% of votes 3 0 .0 56 .5 13 .5
seats 4 1 6 0
27.5.1956'
Electorate
90.9%.
votes
% of votes 
seats
(Ministero dell’lnterno... [etc], 1958)
■ 4781, voters - 4345 (of which 4091 cast valid votes), turnout
SC
1 6 9 7
4 1 .5
4
DC
1 7 4 3  
4 2 .6  
1 6
Destra
4 8 3
11.8
0
Miste 
1 68 
4.1 
0
6.11.1960 (Ministero deirinterno... [etc], 1962)
Electorate - 4902, voters - 3949 (of which 3553 cast valid votes), turnout -
80.6%.
PCI-PSI DC Miste
votes 1 4 72 1 7 2 6 3 5 5
% of votes 41 .4 48 .6 10.0
seats 4 1 6 0
22.11.1964 (Ministero deirinterno... [etc], 1965)
Electorate - 4791, voters - 3765 (of which 3566 cast valid votes), turnout -
78.6%.
PCI PSIUP PSI DC Ind
votes 1 0 8 0 2 9 3 2 8 7 1 4 1 3 4 9 3
% of votes 30 .3 8 .2 8.1 39 .6 13.8
seats 6 1 1 9 3
7.6.1970 (Ministero deirinterno... [etc], 1971)
Electorate - 4723, voters - 3728 (of which 3539 cast valid votes), turnout -
78.9%.
PCI PSIUP PSI PRI DC Eterogenea
votes 1 107 1 35 3 8 0 6 8 1 5 4 2 3 0 7
% of votes 31 .3 3 .8 10.7 1.9 43 .6 8.7
seats 7 0 2 0 1 0 1
15.6.1975 (Ministero deirinterno... [etc], 1979a)
Electorate - 5194, voters - 4196 (of which 4006 cast valid votes), turnout -
80.8%.
PCI PSI PSDI DC MSI-DN
votes 1 3 0 9 5 7 3 1 25 1 6 2 2 3 7 7
% of votes 32 .7 14.3 3.1 40 .5 9.4
seats 7 3 0 8 2
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20.6.1976 (Ministero deirinterno... [etc], 1979b)
Electorate - 5236, voters - 4294 (of which 4149 cast valid votes),
82.0%.
PCI PSI URSD DC MSI-DN
votes 1 6 0 7 391 71 1 6 8 6 3 9 4
% of votes 38.7 9 .4 1.7 40 .7 9 .5
seats 8 2 0 8 2
24.6.1979 (APM)
No electorate given, voters - 4106 (of which 3961 cast valid votes)
PCI PSI DC MSI Lista Civica
votes 9 0 4 5 9 2 2 1 1 6 2 3 4 1 1 5
%  of votes 22 .8 14.9 53.4 5.9 2 .9
26.6.1983
Electorate
(APM) 
- 5286, voters - 4254 (of which 4013 cast valid votes),
80.5%.
PCI PSI PSDI DC MSI
votes 1 167 6 2 2 3 5 9 1711 1 54
% of votes 29 .0 15.5 8.9 42 .6 3 .8
seats 6 3 2 9 0
24.6.1984
Electorate
(APM) 
- 5240, voters - 4112 (of which 3892 cast valid votes),
78.5%.
PCI PSI PSDI DC Lista Civica
votes 1 165 6 6 9 3 8 8 1 4 1 0 3 4 0
% of votes 29 .9 17.2 7.9 36 .2 8 .7
seats 6 3 1 8 2
1989 (interview, Giuseppe Vignola, 22.5.1991)
seats
PCI
4
PSI
3
PSDI
3
DC 
1 0
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F.2 Interviews with the mayors
Four of Grassano’s mayors were interviewed for the purposes of this dissertation, 
using semi-structured interviews:
• Tomasso Celiberti (Christian Democrat mayor from June 1952 to 
January 1953 and from September 1970 to August 1975) was interviewed on 
10.8 .1988.
• Gaetano Ambrico (Christian Democrat mayor from October 1958 to 
November 1960) was interviewed on 11.8.1988.
• Luigi Daraio (Communist mayor from August to September 1975, from 
August 1976 to December 1977, and from February 1978 to February 1979) was 
interviewed on 16.8.1988.
• Nicola Vignola [1943-]* (Christian Democrat mayor from July 1979 
to October 1983) was interviewed on 10.8.1988. The questions were designed to 
establish the perceived role of the mayor and his administration in combating 
landslides: The questions (translated) were as follows:
1. Were landslides a problem for your administration?
2. What was your administration’s strategy for dealing with the landslides?
3. Could you describe for me the help or hindrance your administration received 
from...
a. The citizens?
b. The political parties?
c. From national and [where appropriate] regional government and government 
agencies?
d. From other organizations?
4. Specific questions were then asked about corruption, repair work, or other 
relevant miscellaneous topics.
There are two Nicola Vignolas in Grassano politics. The Christian Democrat Nicola 
Vignola [1943-] is not to be confused with the Democratic Leftist Nicola Vignola 
[ 1 9 4 8 - ] .
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F.3 Interviews with the councillors
Semi-structured interviews were also carried out with representatives of four of 
Grassano’s political parties:
• Nicola Vignola (1948-J of the Communist Party - now renamed the 
Democratic Left Party (PDS), interviewed 10.8.88.
• Giuseppe Vignola of the Socialist Party (PSI), interviewed 16.8.88.
• Domenico Beatrice of the Christian Democrats (DC), interviewed
12 .8 .88 .
• Salvatore Giancursio formerly of the Social Movement (MSI), 
interviewed 7.8.88.
The questions were designed to provide information on the individual and his party 
(question 1), and on landslides and politics in Grassano (3 to 5). All the politicians 
were asked the same questions (with the exception of Domenico Beatrice, who insisted 
in being given a written question schedule in advance - though did not have time to read 
it before the interview). For all but Beatrice the questions (translated) were as 
follows:
1. Why do you belong to your party?
2. How does your party secure support for itself? and for its politics?
3a. How long have landslides been a problem which involves the administrators 
of Grassano?
3b. How important is the problem today?
4a. What do you believe is the importance the administrators should give to 
landslides in the future?
4b. Why after twelve years [since the destruction of the old cemeteryl has no 
new cemetery been built at Grassano?
5. What plans has your party to ensure security from landslides in the future?
For Beatrice the questions (translated) were as follows:
1. Unlike all the other political parties with whom I have already spoken, I have 
had to give you the questions in advance. Why is this, and with whom must you 
speak before the interview?
2. How do you ensure support for your party in Grassano, and how do you ensure 
support for your policies?
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3. What is the importance of the influence from organizations outside of politics 
(the Church, the unions, and soforth) on your party and its politics?
4. How long have landslides been a problem which the political parties have had' 
to deal with at Grassano?
5. What is the significance of this problem today?
6. In your manifesto for the [local] elections of 1979, you explained the 
importance of a geological report to “give the municipal administration... a 
means of co-ordinating the consolidation of the town". Have you had success in 
this co-ordination since ’79?
7. Why, after twelve years, is there no new cemetery at Grassano? What are the 
problems?
8. What projects does your party have to ensure the safety of local people against 
landslides in the future?
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Appendix G: The semi-structured interviews
Forty-four interviewees were interviewed as part of the gathering of oral history of 
landslides in Grassano. Oral history allows some of the limitations of documentary 
evidence to be overcome: most importantly in this case where there are only 
fragmentary documents from the literate (ruling) classes. It can “give back to the 
people who made and experienced history, through their own words, a central place” 
(Thompson, 1978, 2).
As Milillo (1983) noted in her work on the oral history of Tricarico, the technique 
can give what at first appears to be a bewildering variety of information. Oral evidence 
is subject to collective processes of selection, recording, creativity, and transmission, 
as even the small matter of the dating of events shows. Evidence becomes part of a 
social document, the events perceived in the terms of the people who transmit them: it 
takes on a symbolic character elaborated by the culture of the tellers which can only 
be interpreted with the understanding of the social processes it reflects - though in 
this respect it does not differ from other sources of data (Guidoboni, 1987).
Semi-structured interviews have the advantage of providing quotable, colourful 
material, and of being spontaneous - but they can also be selective, overlong, lack 
organization, and be difficult to analyze statistically (Lounsbury and Aldrich, 1986). 
They allow the same in-depth probing of causality as explained in chapter one.
Forty-four semi-structured interviews were conducted with local people in 1988 
(1% of the electorate). The interviewees were chosen by random number from the 
electoral rolls. The 1988 electoral roll contained 5,283 names of whom 2,625 
(49.7%) were men and 2,658 (50.3%) were women. This compares to the resident 
population aged eighteen or over of 4,461 in 1981 - of whom 2,186 (49.0%) were 
men and 2,275 (51.0%) were women (ISTAT, 1984b).
Finding the subjects proved difficult. Street names were a problem - particularly in 
the old part of town. Many streets lack name plates. Street names are imposed by the 
council, and often the local people do not know the street names, or even have their own 
dialect names. Houses are frequently renumbered by the council without the consent or 
even the consultation of the residents. Many houses bear a range of numbers: an
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extreme example of which is that some houses on Corso Umberto Primo have three 
displayed, none of which are current. Some of the residents interviewed were unaware 
of their house numbers.
Some felt the questions to be too intrusive, although they may have felt this about any 
outsider’s interest. Mistrust was particularly the case with women. Nine women 
refused to be interviewed, only two men. The interviews were kept as near to a 
conversation as possible, and were referred to as “conversations (“conversazionr) .  
The order of the questions tended to come from the flow of the conversation, rather 
than just punctuate it. Direct quotations were, wherever possible, taken in the 
original Italian or the local dialect, Grassanese. Summaries were made in English. Two 
drafts were made of the interview schedules. Five pilot interviews were undertaken on 
25 and 26 June 1988.
The subjects were approached directly, though with a neighbour or relative - if 
neighbour or relative was known. No warning note was delivered - principally because 
of the gross inaccuracy of the electoral rolls as a guide to who lived where; partly to 
avoid the problem of alienating illiterates, and partly to avoid the appearance of being 
too official. Each subject has been given a false first name, chosen at random, to 
protect the identity of the interviewees. In the text they are referred to as follows:
Andrea was an artizan in his thirties. He was born in Grassano, and had returned 
to live there continuously since the 1960s. The interview lasted 26 minutes.
Antonio was a pensioner in his seventies. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 88 minutes.
Arcangelo was an agricultural worker in his sixties. He has always lived in 
Grassano. The interview lasted 25 minutes.
Bruno was a professional in his thirties. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 37 minutes.
Domenico was a student in his teens. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 45 minutes.
Donato was a pensioner in his sixties. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 44 minutes.
Egridio was a pensioner in his sixties. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 15 minutes.
Francesco was a pensioner in his seventies. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 40 minutes.
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Giacinto worked in commerce. He was in his sixties. He has always lived in 
Grassano. The interview lasted 92 minutes.
Giacomo was a pensioner in his eighties. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 63 minutes. A translator was used, from Grassanese to Italian.
Giovanni was a professional in his thirties. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 83 minutes.
Giuseppe was an agricultural worker in his fifties. He has always lived in 
Grassano. The interview lasted 83 minutes.
Innocenzo was a professional in his fifties. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 30 minutes.
Leonardo worked in commerce. He was in his sixties. He has always lived in 
Grassano. The interview lasted 44 minutes.
Luigi was a blue collar worker in his fifties. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 55 minutes.
Marco was a professional in his thirties. He was born in Grassano but lived away 
from the sixties to the eighties. The interview lasted 49 minutes.
Michele was a pensioner in his seventies. He has lived in Grassano since the 
forties. The interview lasted 40 minutes.
Nicola worked in commerce. He was in his twenties. He has always lived in 
Grassano. The interview lasted 46 minutes.
Paolo was a blue collar worker in his forties. He has always lived in Grassano. 
The interview lasted 44 minutes.
Pasquale was a professional in his twenties. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 28 minutes.
Pietro was a pensioner in his seventies. He has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 23 minutes.
Vincenzo was an agricultural worker in his sixties. He has always lived in 
Grassano. The interview lasted 64 minutes.
Angela was a housewife in her forties. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 38 minutes.
Anna was a professional in her twenties. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 49 minutes.
Antonia was an agricultural worker in her fifties. She has always lived in 
Grassano. The interview lasted 21 minutes.
Appolonia was a student in her teens. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 18 minutes.
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Beatrice was a pensioner in her sixties. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 52 minutes.
Carmella was a professional in her twenties. She has always lived in Grassano. 
The interview lasted 114 minutes.
Caterina was unemployed and in her twenties. She has always lived in Grassano. 
The interview lasted 38 minutes.
Eufemia was a housewife in her fifties. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 32 minutes.
Filomena was a housewife in her forties. She has lived in Grassano since the 
sixties. The interview lasted 44 minutes.
Giovanna was an agricultural worker in her forties. She has always lived in 
Grassano. The interview lasted 16 minutes.
Giuseppa was a housewife in her twenties. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 40 minutes.
Isabella was a housewife in her thirties. She lived in Grassano until the 1970s 
and now visits occasionally. The interview lasted 53 minutes.
Leonarda was a housewife in her forties. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 25 minutes.
Luisa was a pensioner in her seventies. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 20 minutes. A translator was used, from Grassanese to Italian.
Maddalena was a housewife in her thirties. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 33 minutes.
Nicolina was a housewife in her fifties. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 59 minutes.
Paolina was a professional in her twenties. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 31 minutes.
Porzia was an agricultural worker in her fifties. She has always lived in 
Grassano. The interview lasted 60 minutes.
Rosa was a professional in her forties. She has lived in Grassano since the 1970s. 
The interview lasted 70 minutes.
Santia was a housewife in her sixties. She was born in Grassano but lived away 
from the 1960s to the 1980s. The interview lasted 51 minutes.
Teresa was a housewife in her forties. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 63 minutes.
Vittoria was a pensioner in her sixties. She has always lived in Grassano. The 
interview lasted 40 minutes.
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The questions were designed to establish a range of information: background 
information on the interviewee (questions 1 to 6), an assessment of landslides in 
Grassano (7 to 10), an assessment of intervention against landslides (11 to 15), an 
assessment of earthquakes (16 to 19), and impressions about the interview (20-21). 
The questions (translated) were as follows:
1. [It was explained to the interviewee that they had been chosen at random, that 
the interview was for a report on landslides in the town, and that their name 
would be changed to ensure anonymity.]
2. What is your name?
3. What is your date of birth?
4. [If appropriate] Which grade of education did you reach?
5. What is your occupation?
6. How long have you lived in Grassano?
7. Have you ever come across landsliding?
8. Why do you think there are landslides at Grassano?
9. How much of a danger do you think landslides are for Grassano?
10. Do you think they represent a bigger or a smaller danger than in the past?
11. What do you think is the attitude of the political parties towards landslides?
12. What do you think is the attitude of the town hall towards landslides?
13. What do you think is the attitude of the government and the government 
agencies towards landslides?
14. Do you think enough is being done to prevent landslides?
15. [If appropriate] What do you think should be done to prevent landslides?
16. What were your experiences of the 1980 earthquake?
17. Do you think enough was done after the earthquake to put right the problems?
18. [If appropriate] What were your experiences of the 1930 earthquake?
19. Have you ever heard the suggestion that there is a landslide under the town
which moved after the 1980 earthquake?
20. If it’s necessary, could I come back to talk to you again?
21. What impressions have you had of our conversations?
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The response-codes to questions seven to nineteen were as follows (codes given below):
Questions: 7 8 * 9 10 1 1 12 13 14
*
1 5 16 1 7 18 19
Andrea 1 1 ,2 , 3 3 3 4 4 4 1 • 3 1 • 2
Antonio 2 3 3 1 4 4 4 3 1, 2 2 1 3 2
Arcangelo 2 2 2 1 4 4 4 2 5 3 2 2 •
Bruno 2 5 2 ♦ 3 3 4 • ♦ 2 1 * • 1
Domenico 2 ,3 2 3 2 4 ♦ 4 3 2, 3 3 1 * 2
Donato 2 2 3 1 5 • 5 3 2 2 2 * 1 2
Egridio 4 • • • • • • • ♦ • ♦ • •
Francesco 1 ,2 2 2 1 3 • 3 3 1 2 1 3 2
Giacinto 2 1 .2 « 1 5 • 5 3 « 2 4 •
Giacomo 2 ,4 6 3 2 « ♦ # 3 • 2 • 3 •
Giovanni ♦ 1 3 1 5 • 5 3 • 1 1 * ♦ 2
Giuseppe 1 ,2 2 3 3 4 3 5 3 1 1 ♦ • •
Innocenzo 2 ,4 1 .5 2 1 2 1 2 1 « 2 2 • 1
Leonardo 1 2 2 1 2 • 2 1 1 ,3 3 1 2
Luigi 1 .2 2 3 1 4 • 3 1 • 3 2 • 2
Marco 2 5 • • 5 5 5 3 6 1 1 • 1
Michele 1 ,2 ,3 1 ,2 3 1 1 • 2 3 1 3 1 2
Nicola • 1, 2 3 3 5 4 5 • 4 1 2 * • 2
Paolo 1 1 ,2 3 2 5 5 • 3 5 1 2 • 1
Pasquale 2 5 3 • 2 2 3 3 5 1 1 • 1
Pietro 1 ,3 2 2 1 4 4 • ♦ 6 2 2 2 «
Vincenzo 1 .2 2 3 3 4 4 4 3 2 2 1 3 2
Angela 1 ,2 1 ,2 3 • # « 4 3 6 3 2 • 2
Anna 1 1 3 2 4 • 4 3 5 1 1 • 2
Antonia 1 ,2 2 3 1 • • 2 « • 2 • • •
Appolonia • • 1 1 2 • • • • 3 1 • 1
Beatrice 1 2 1 1 2 • • 1 6 3 1 1
Carmella 2 1, 4 3 1 4 4 4 3 3 2 1 • 2
Caterina 1 ,2 ,3 2 ,4 3 3 5 5 5 3 4 2 1 * • 2
Eufemia 1 ,2 • 3 1 • « • 1 1 2 1 • 2
Filomena 4 2 3 1 4 • 5 3 1 2 2 • 2
Giovanna 2 2 2 2 • • 5 1 6 2 1 ♦ 1
Giuseppa 2 1 2 1 2 ♦ 4 1 5 3 1 • «
Isabella 1 ,2 1 .4 • 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 • 1
Leonarda 1 ,3 1 ,2 3 2 5 ♦ 4 2 6 3 1 * • 2
Luisa 1 ,4 2,5 3 3 4 ♦ 2 3 2 ,3 2 1 2
Maddalena 2 2 2 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 • ♦
Nicolina 2 ,3 1 .2 2 3 • • • 3 1 2 1 • 1
Paolina 2 4 3 • • • ♦ 3 3 2 1 • 2
Porzia 2 1 ,2 3 1 4 • 3 1 • 3 1 • ♦
Rosa 2 1 2 3 3 • 4 3 6 2 1 • «
Santia 1 ,2 ,3 1 .3 2 1 4 • 3 1 • 1 1 3 •
Teresa 1 ,2 1 3 1 2 • 2 1 3 3 1 • 2
Vittoria 2 ,3 ,4 2 3 1 3 • 2 3 6 3 1 4 2
For questions 8 and 15 the first factor named by the respondent, given in underlined 
typeface, was used for the contingency analysis.
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Where the codes indicate references made to the following:
Q7: 1 = the Calvario landslide, 2 = the cemetery landslide, 3 = the Petrino landslide, 4 
= other landslides, • = no response.
Q8: 1 = geology, 2 = precipitation or drainage, 3 = relief, 4 = deforestation, 5 = lack 
of defences, 6 = other, • = no response.
Q9: 1 = none, 2 = moderate, 3 = severe, • = no response.
Q10: 1 = less, 2 = equal, 3 = more, • = no response.
Q11: 1 = very good, 2 = good, 3 = adequate, 4 = poor, 5 = bad, • = no response.
Q12: 1 = very good, 2 = good, 3 = adequate, 4 = poor, 5 = bad, • = no response.
Q13: 1 = very good, 2 = good, 3 = adequate, 4 = poor, 5 = bad, • = no response.
Q14: 1 = yes, 2 = probably, 3 = no, • = no response.
Q15: 1 = retaining structures, 2 = drainage, 3 = reforestation, 4 = planning 
regulation, 5 = abandonment, 6 = other, • = no response.
Q16: 1 = away from Grassano, 2 = threatening experience, 3 = very threatening 
experience, • = no response.
Q17: 1 = yes, 2 = no, • = no response, * = problems identified with action.
Q18: 1 = not threatening/does not recall, 2 = unsure, 3 = threatening, 4 = very 
threatening, • = no response.
Q19: 1 = surprised, 2 = not surprised, • = no response.
For question 7 there were valid responses from 41 interviewees (more than one 
answer was possible). The response-codes were as follows: modal class = 2; 
distribution: 1 = 20, 2 = 31, 3 = 8, 4 = 6, • = 3.
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For question 8 there were valid responses from 41 interviewees. The response-codes 
were as follows: modal class = 2; distribution: 1 = 20, 2 = 26, 3 = 3, 4 = 4, 5 = 5, 6 
= 1, • = 3.
For question 9 there were valid responses from 40 interviewees. The response-codes 
were as follows: modal class = 3; distribution: 1 = 2, 2 = 12, 3 = 26, • = 4.
For question 10 there were valid responses from 38 interviewees. The response-codes 
were as follows: modal class = 1; distribution: 1 = 24, 2 = 6, 3 = 8, • = 6.
For question 11 there were valid responses from 36 interviewees. The response-codes 
were as follows: modal class = 4; distribution: 1 = 1 , 2  = 9, 3 = 4, 4 = 14, 5 = 8, • =
8.
For question 12 there were valid responses from 16 interviewees. The response-codes 
were as follows: modal class = 4; distribution: 1 = 1, 2 = 3, 3 = 2, 4 = 7, 5 = 3, • = 
28.
For question 13 there were valid responses from 35 interviewees. The response-codes 
were as follows: modal class = 4; distribution: 1 = 0, 2 = 9, 3 = 5, 4 = 12, 5 = 9, • =
9.
For question 14 there were valid responses from 38 interviewees. The response-codes 
were as follows: modal class = 3; distribution: 1 = 11, 2 = 2, 3 = 25, • = 6.
For question 15 there were valid responses from 32 interviewees (more than one 
answer was possible). The response-codes were as follows: modal class = 1; 
distribution: 1 = 9, 2 = 5, 3 = 7, 4 = 2, 5 = 5, 6 = 8, • = 12.
For question 16 there were valid responses from 43 interviewees. The response-codes 
were as follows: modal class = 2; distribution: 1 = 9, 2 = 20, 3 = 14, • = 1.
For question 17 there were valid responses from 39 interviewees. The response-codes 
were as follows: modal class = 1; distribution: 1 = 28, 2 = 11, • = 5, * = 7.
For question 18 there were valid responses from 14 interviewees. The response-codes 
were as follows: modal class = 3; distribution: 1 = 3, 2 = 2, 3 = 7, 4 = 2, • = 30.
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For question 19 there were valid responses from 32 interviewees. The response-codes 
were as follows: modal class = 2; distribution: 1 = 10, 2 = 22, • = 12.
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